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The Activist Insecurity and the Demise of Civil Rights
Law
John Valery White*
Civil rights law is today moribund. An impressive edifice, built
upon the ruins of Jim Crow, with the blood and sweat of the civil
rights movement, and intended to both dismantle that system and
ensure the civil liberties that Jim Crow illustrated were all too easily
lost, civil rights law was to be the lasting monument of the civil
rights struggle. Fortified by this legacy, civil rights law retains a
symbolic value, implying that there are formidable forces working
to protect citizens from abusive state action, to ensure a broad anti-
discrimination ethic, and to fix the wrongs of Jim Crow. The body
of civil rights law promises much indeed. Only, today, it crumbles
when one reaches for it, it disappoints when one seeks its solace, it
disappears when it is needed most. It is a great ruin, a magnificent
display of rotting grandeur.'
When, over twenty years ago, Critical Legal Scholars argued
that civil rights law promoted false consciousness,2 they could not
have imagined how quickly what they criticized would be lost. Ten
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1. The allusion is to the opening line of Gabriel Garcia Marquez, The Autumn
of the Patriarch 1 (Gregory Rabassa trans. 1976):
Over the weekend the vultures got into the presidential palace by pecking
through the screens on the balcony windows and the flapping of their
wings stirred up the stagnant time inside, and at dawn on Monday the city
awoke out of its lethargy of centuries with the warm, soft breeze of a great
man dead and rotting grandeur.
Unlike Marquez's general, an amalgamation of Latin American and Caribbean
dictators, who finally dies after a nearly four century long regime of avarice, evil,
and duplicity, the demise of civil rights law is the more typical tale of a short lived
period of hope, grace, and liberty, collapsed by the weight of criticisms over the
"form" of its efforts and the supposed contradictions of its results.
2. See, e.g., Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn.
L. Rev. 1049 (1978); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1362
(1984). This perspective is wonderfully critiqued in Kimberly Crenshaw, Race,
Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation andLegitimation in Antidiscrimination
Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1349-68 (1988). For Crenshaw the problem is that
Critical Legal Studies literature "seldom speaks to or about black people," id. at
1356, and evidences an "inability to appreciate fully the transformative significance
of the civil rights movement in mobilizing black Americans and generating new
demands." Id. Crenshaw's particular critiques of Freeman and Tushnet are found
at 1360-64 and 1364-66, respectively.
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years ago, when Critical Race Theorists complained about the
dismantling of that law,3 they could not have imagined how
complete the gutting of the field would be. Distracted, perhaps,
with the important questions of understanding race, identity, and
being and the law's intersection with these notions,4 critical
theorists paid inadequate attention to the doctrinal background for
all these debates.' Indeed, both critical movements have been
3. See, especially, Crenshaw, supra note 2. Crenshaw notes that the central
role of race in American history is a crucial and missing component of neo-
conservative and critical critiques of rights. Id. at 1369-87. Taking this
perspective reveals that
Rights discourse provided the ideological mechanisms through which the
conflicts of federalism, the power of the Presidency, and the legitimacy of
the courts could be orchestrated against Jim Crow .... Casting racial
issues in the moral and legal rights rhetoric of the prevailing ideology
helped create the political controversy without which the state's coercive
function would not have been enlisted to aid Blacks.
Id. at 1381.
4. The predominate theme in Critical Race Theory and those movements it has
spawned has concerned identity issues. This focus has produced valuable
assessments of how social issues addressed by law are constructed. See, e.g., Lisa
C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African
American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles, " 66 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1581 (1993) (discussion of identity and essentialism in conceptions of
Los Angeles Riots of 1991); Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal
Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81
Cal. L. Rev. 1243 (1993)(on hegemony ofblack/white construction of race). It has
been powered by the reminder that it is necessary to consider the perspective of
oppressed people, especially as conveyed through storytelling. See, e.g., Derrick
Bell, White Superiority in America: -Its LegalLegacy, Its Economic Costs, 33 Vil.
L. Rev. 767 (1988); Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals
from Deconstructed Rights, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401 (1987). The focus on
identity has been especially important in that it has created space to consider
unstated identities which inform legal policy discussion, see Ian F. Haney Lopez,
White By Law: The Legal Constitution of Race (1996) (on the legal construction
of whiteness) and Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1
(1994), the intersection of race and gender and how that intersection often obscures
and excludes certain legal problems from consideration, see Paulette M. Caldwell,
A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 Duke L.
J. 365 (analysis of discrimination on the basis of hair style) and Angela P. Harris,
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581 (1990). For
a critical assessment of these approaches, see Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry,
Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 807
(1993).
5. Many Critical Race Theory articles talk of the inadequacies of civil rights
law, see, e.g., E. Christie Cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics : The Myth of
the Protected Class in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 Conn. L. Rev.
441(1998) (critiquing employment discrimination law as overly dependent on
essentialist categories), problems with scholarly development of constitutional
issues related to civil rights law, see, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar:
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criticized for exaggerating the inadequacies of civil rights law.6
There are in fact many commentators who reasonably contend that
civil rights law remains vibrant.7 These defenders of the current
state of civil rights law can note that few central civil rights cases
and statutes have been invalidated! And, in every controversial
reexamination of civil rights precedent of the last two decades, save
affirmative action, the important civil rights precedent under review
has been upheld. In fact, in 1989 when the Supreme Court cast
doubt on several significant civil rights doctrines, it did so by
leaving the doctrines intact but imposing onerous requirements on
their use. 9 Even then, Congress quickly reaffirmed the original
Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 561 (1984),
or propose alternatives and supplements to civil rights law, especially hate crimes
legislation. See, e.g., The Price We Pay: The Case Against Racist Speech, Hate
Propaganda, and Pornography (Laura Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995).
There are, of course, numerous critical race theory articles focusing on civil rights
doctrine. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious
Districting: A Case of the Emperors Clothes, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1589 (1993); Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1
(1991).
6. See, e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment
After Hicks, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2229 (1995).
7. See, e.g., Michael Zimmer, Slicing and Dicing of Individual Disparate
Treatment Law, 61 La. L. Rev. 577 (2001) (arguing that Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000), advances and
strengthens employment discrimination law, despite early lower court refusals to
follow it). See also Michael J. Zimmer, Leading by Example: An Holistic
Approach to Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 11 Kan. J. L. & P. Pol'y. 177
(2001).
8. Despite an attempt to overturn Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 96 S. Ct.
2586 (1976), which applied 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to private discrimination in forming
contracts, that case was upheld. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). Instead, Patterson restricted the scope of § 198 I's
substantive coverage. There have been two substantial reversals on substantive
civil rights law whose significance cannot be overlooked. In Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 115 S. Ct. 2097(1995), the Court overruled its decision
in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980), which had granted
Congress substantial deference in the creation or racial set asides in government
spending and contracting. Adarand had been made necessary by the Court's
watershed opinion in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 109 S.
Ct. 706 (1989), which subjected all state use of race to strict scruitny. The Court
also effected a significant overruling of substantive civil rights law in Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986), which declared that due process
could not be violated by negligent (or generally non-intentional) government action,
as recognized earlier in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981).
See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 109
S. Ct. 998 (1989) (rejecting government liability for third party injury except when
victim in government custody or perhaps when state creates danger).
9. The controversial 1989 term saw the Court, for example, cast doubt on the
continued existence of the disparate impact method for proving discrimination in
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constructs. 0 As a consequence it is difficult to say that civil rights
law is dead," much less to explain what brought on that death.
One easy explanation of the demise of civil rights law focuses on
changes in the political temperament ofludges in the federal judiciary
since the election of President Reagan in 1980.2 This argument holds
that conservative judges, hostile to civil rights, have simply undercut
civil rights law. 3 This is surely an accurate and compelling
explanation, possessing the additional advantage that conservative
politicians have been candid in their goal of "reigning in" civil rights
law. 1' While this explanation is accurate, it seems insufficient to tell
employment. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S. Ct.
2115 (1989). But rather than invalidate the seminal employment discrimination
case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971), the Court
borrowed principles from disparate treatment cases (order of burdens of proof, see
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973); Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981)) and
pattern and practice cases (weight of indirect, statistical proofs, see Hazlewood Sch.
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977)) to render the proof
nearly impossible. These changes were repudiated by Congress in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
10. See Civil Rights Act of 1991.
11. But see, John Valery White, Foreword, Symposium: Is Civil Rights Law
Dead? 63 La. L. Rev. 609 (2003) (arguing civil rights law has been made a form of
equity).
12. The following passage by Lucille Renwick in The Nation, discussing the
ascendent resegregation of public schools, conveys this argument succinctly:
Sudden as it seems, the end of desegregation has been coming for quite
some time. It began during the Reagan and Bush administrations, with the
ascent of conservative judges who viewed desegregation orders with
suspicion. Together, Reagan and Bush appointed more than 60 percent of
the country's district court judges, nearly 70 percent of appellate judges
and five of the nine Supreme Court Justices. This set the stage for a series
of Supreme Court rulings between 1992 and 1995 easing the way for
school districts to protest court mandates and to be declared free ofjudicial scrutiny. The rulings allow judges to end judicial oversight if a
school board has made a "good faith" commitment and has succeeded "to
the extent practicable" in establishing racial balance, even if has come
nowhere close to achieving it.
Lucille Renwick, Busing Rolls to a Stop - As Courts Give up on School
Desegregation, Activists Look for New Strategies, The Nation, Nov. 15, 1999, at
17.
13. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So
Hard to Win? 61 La. L. Rev. 555 (2001) (arguing courts are biased against
employment discrimination cases); WilliamN. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?
Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 613
(1991) (commenting on the 1989 civil rights decisions limiting civil rights
recovery).
14. See Mark Kozlowski's description of the "imperial judiciary" argument of
conservative legal commentators. Mark Kozlwoski, The Myth of the Imperial
Judiciary: Why the Right is Wrong About Courts (2003).
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the story of civil rights law's demise. In civil rights law there is a
troubling absence of landmark reversals of cornerstone decisions as
The efforts to create an alternative vision of civil rights law is the product of an
overt political strategy which has consisted of replacing civil rights rhetoric with the
rhetoric of supply side economics and promoting that rhetoric through the creation of
a new class of conservative black leaders in order to circumvent the then established
black leadership of veterans of the civil rights movement. Of course, there were then,
as now, problems with self-appointed black leaders whose questionable political
accountability strained leadership claims, see Adolph Reed, Jr., The Jesse Jackson
Phenomenon 4-5 (1986), and there have always been black conservatives; however,
the Reagan administration initiated an overt effort to create anti-civil rights black
leaders, in order to facilitate the abandonment of civil right and the welfarist policies
in which civil rights were embedded. "he Chicago Tribune's Clarence Page... says
that 'there have been conservative blacks around for a long time; black conservatism
was invented in the basement of he Reagan White House in 1980."' Doug Ireland,
Alan Keyes Does the Hustle-Black Conservative Republican Presidential Candidate
for 1996, The Nation, Oct. 30, 1995, at 500.
... Adam Myerson, editor of the Heritage Foundation's Policy Review...
puts [black conservatism's] beginnings at the so-called Fairmont Conference
in San Francisco in December 1980. The conference... was sponsored by
the Institute for Contemporary Studies, a California think tank created by Ed
Meese, Reagan's first Attorney General and political hatchetman. While the
meeting's speeches were collected in a book,.. . this was but intellectual
veneer for a conference that seems to have been more of a jobs fair for
blacks during the post-election Reagan transition.
Id. While the Reagan administration focused on "job creation rather than
enforcement of civil rights laws," that plan depended on the presence of black
advocates like Robert L. Woodson to advance the plan. See Dick Kirschten, White
House Weighs Whether to Reach Out, The Nation, Dec. 29, 1984, at 2452. The
Reagan administration, for example, made it a point to meet with a group of black
leaders in early 1985 to celebrate the Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday. The group,
calling itself the "Council for a Black Economic Agenda" consisted on business
men and educators, "none of whom [was] generally recognized as a prominent
national leader of black America" and included "[n]one of the heads of such black
leadership groups as the Urban League, or the NAACP and none of the members
of the Congressional Black Caucus." Jack W. Germond & Jules Witcover, Blacks
Still Find Few Reasons to Cheer Reagan, The National Journal, Jan. 26, 1985, at
224. The concerted effort has created numerous, recognized black figures,
including Clarence Thomas, Thomas Sowell, Armstrong Williams, and Alan Keyes,
as well as creating a justificatory rubric for a watered down civil rights law. For a
discussion of black conservatives, see Martin J. Kilson, Anatomy of Black
Conservatism, 1993 Transition 4.
See John Colapinto, The Young Hipublicans, N.Y. Times, May 25, 2003, section
6 at 30. Conservative student activism is:
fueled and financed by an array of conservative interest groups, of which
there are, today, almost too many to keep straight.... These groups spend
money in various ways to push a right-wing agenda on campuses ....
Through these coordinated activities, these groups have embarked in the
last three years on a concerted campus recruitment drive to turn
temperamentally conservative youngsters into organized right-wing
activists.
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well as a dearth of new, conservative landmark decisions. Again,
with the exception of newly articulated limitations on affirmative
action there have been few reversals of settled law. 5 And, excludinA
the affirmative action-like decisions on electoral reapportionment
and the recent sovereign immunity decisions,1 7 there have been few
landmark decisions pointing civil rights law in a distinctly
conservative direction. The troubling aspect of the "conservative
judges" explanation, then, is that conservative judges have
themselves continued to celebrate the central importance of civil
rights law in the post-civil rights world.18 Louis Henkin's declaration
that we live in the "age of rights"' 9 holds, even if it is a conservative
age. Under these circumstances we might doubt that civil rights law
is dead at all.
The following pages articulate a supplemental theory (explaining
the demise of civil rights law) and illustrate the operation of that
theory in the demise of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The theory is that civil
rights litigation has been plagued from the beginning by an "activist
insecurity" which has undercut civil rights law even during the
15. Even with affirmative action, the outright reversals have been limited
mostly to Adarand's reversal ofFullilove. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), overruling Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980). While City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
109 S, Ct. 706 (1989), constituted a sea change in affirmative action jurisprudence,
it did not reverse any existing precedent, as the case law on affirmative action was
heavily hedged. See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98
S. Ct. 2733 (1978). Compare Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S.
561, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984) and Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986), with Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara
County, California, 480 U.S. 616, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987) andUnited Steelworkers
of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
16. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); and Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,
116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
17. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 120 S. Ct. 631
(2000). Seealso Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114
(1996) and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999). Even here, the
only civil rights-specific aspect of this line of cases is the troubling reading of the
14th Amendment in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) a reading ascribed to City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
18. While it is surely the case that conservative commentators and judges argue
for a limited judiciary, such as described by Kozlowski, supra note 14, this is
distinct from the view advanced briefly by conservatives, that rights were an
inappropriate means of thinking about law and justice. See Mary Ann Glendon,
Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (1991). Rather it is
probably more accurate to say that the current conservative view of civil rights
accepts their legitimacy, but regards appropriate civil rights law as quite limited in
scope.
19. Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (1990).
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"revival" period when courts were self-consciously seeking to expand
civil rights causes of action in the name of an age of rights. When the
orientation of the courts changed-circa the Supreme Court's 1977
and 1978 terms-the judicial style along with the legal precedents
created under the influence of the activist insecurity made civil rights
law particularly vulnerable. And, since about 1978 that law has been
eviscerated, leaving a seemingly untouched carcass hanging trophy-
like in the halls of conservative retrenchment.
The activist insecurity is a judicial unease with affecting social
change. It is not based on legal or constitutional principle; rather, it
is a mostly unstated notion that courts should not change the social
status quo ante, absent extraordinary reasons for doing so. It is, thus,
a substantive restriction on judicial decisions that operates
irrespective of existing legal doctrine. As such, it is the motivation
behind the manipulation of legal doctrine, procedural and
substantive, in the fulfilment of relatively conservative outcomes.
Judges simply do not believe in social change, even when the law
seems to require it of them. Consumed with the activist insecurity,
judges leap at restrictions in the law that quell the prospects of change
while stonewalling, defraying, and avoiding applicable legal doctrine
when it demands social change. Consequently, civil rights law has
been less the rule of law than the rule of men, frightened men (and
women).
The activist insecurity takes two general forms: first, judges
require that parties seeking social change assiduously comply with
prerequisites, restrictions, and limitations in extant law. Second,
thosejudges themselves escape extant law if it requires social change,
usually by generalizing the legal question presented (and ignoring the
narrow legal requisites to which they held the civil rights plaintiffs).
These forms operate in opposite directions. The former points
toward ever narrower conceptions of legal questions. Plaintiffs are
required, for example, to focus on the narrowest cause of action under
which they might proceed. 0 Under the latter form, however, judges
faced with a statutory right which requires social change flee to the
first broader principle which might block it.
The first, narrowing form characterizes the revival period in civil
rights law. Concerned that the need for social change (called for by
the civil rights movement) placed improper demands on
constitutional law, the Courts sought narrower grounds for the civil
rights law they were creating. Consequently such a law is today
rooted in statutes from the Reconstruction Era (given new life by an
antsyjudiciary) and more recent legislation inspired by the civil rights
movement. The latter, generalizing form predominates today, with
20. See, especially, Grahamv. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
2003]
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a restrictive judiciary eager to constitutionalize every question in
order to pre-empt discomforting state and federal legislation.
The following discussion will proceed in three parts. Part one
will define the revival and limiting periods of civil rights law. This
definition is key to understanding the limitations of the "conservativejustices" theory of civil rights law's demise. Part two will define the
activist insecurity in some detail. Part three, finally, will illustrate the
role of the activist insecurity in the demise of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
I. DEFINING REVIVAL AND LIMITING PERIODS IN CIVIL RIGHTS
LAW
The story of civil rights law is conventionally told in three parts.
First, there is a glorious period of revival,2 beginning with Brown v.
21. The revival period is that era which, just after Brown, C. Vann Woodward
deemed the "second reconstruction." See C. Vann Woodward, The "New
Reconstruction" in the South, 21 Commentary 501 (1956). See also, C. Vann
Woodward, From the First Reconstruction to the Second, Harpers, Apr. 1965, at
127. Social historian Manning Marable compares the two reconstructions (and
implies their similar demise):
During two brief moments in history, the United States experienced major
social movements which, at their core, expressed a powerful vision of
multicultural democracy and human equality. The first was developed
before the seminal conflict in American history, the civil war (1861-65),
and came to fruition in the twelve-year period of reunion, reconstruction,
and racial readjustment which followed (1865-77). Almost a century
later, a "Second Reconstruction" occurred. Like the former period, the
Second Reconstruction was a series of massive confrontations concerning
the status of the African American and other national minorities .... Both
movements brought about an end of rigid racial/caste structures .... Both
elevated articulate and charismatic black leaders .... Both were fought
primarily in the southern U.S. . . . In both instances, the federal
government was viewed as a "reluctant ally" of the blacks and their
progressive white supporters .... Both movements pressured the federal
courts and Congress to ratify and to validate legislative measures which
promoted greater racial equality .... Finally, both movements eventually
succumbed to internal contradictions, loss of northern white support, and
the re-emergence ofthe South's tradition ofinequality and racial prejudice
Manning Marable, Race, Reform, and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction in
Black America, 1945-1990 4-5 (2nd ed. 1991). The frame of a second
reconstruction was also salient for segregationists. Historian Neil McMillen
highlights that this notion animated the segregationist White Citizens' Council's
view of Brown and the assault on Jim Crow, allowing them to link derogatory views
of the first reconstruction among white citizens with the second and inspiring their
members to believe that "'the white South won a total victory in Reconstruction I
by showing its determination to fight and by organizing from one end of the region
to the other'... [and that] desegregation was not inevitable; it had been evaded
once, and it could be evaded again." Neil R. McMillen, The Citizens' Council:
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Board of Education and coinciding with the civil rights movement
and the term of Chief Justice Warren. Second, there is a period of
limitation which is usually dated to coincide with the term of Chief
Justice Burger. And, in recent years, a separate period of
conservative retrenchment is said to follow, beginning with the
election of Ronald Reagan as president and the elevation of William
Rehnquist to Chief Justice.22 Each stage of the story tells a tale of law
and politics turning on the significant question: how could so much
change have occurred without undercutting the legal traditions which
give law its power and distinguish it from raw politics? Throughout,
it is the tale of judicial activism versus judicial restraint. Whether
civil rights is activist or restrained is usually taken for granted today,
because of the role judicial restraint has played in the right's assault
on the Warren and Burger courts,23 but really activism turns heavily
on one's perspective.24 That is, depending on one's perspective, one
part of the conventional story of civil rights law is bound to be
viewed as the triumph of raw politics over law; other parts in turn
mixed and redemptive. Thus any assessment of the history of civil
rights law triggers discussion of political perspectives on each period.
Progressives view the revival period as one in which the Supreme
Court rediscovered constitutional values long sacrificed during the
destruction of Reconstruction and the emergence of Jim Crow rule.25
The Supreme Court of the fifty years beginning in the 1870s, and
which celebrated states rights and disregarded notions of equality, is
viewed as destroying the legal regime produced by the Civil War,
except insofar as it transformed those rights into protections of gilded
age corporations from government regulation.2 The revival of civil
rights law is seen as restorative and urgently needed, even
revolutionary, given the horrors of the Jim Crow period which by
1960 was under grass roots attack from everyday black citizens in the
Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-64, at 359 (Rev. ed.,
1994), quoting William J. Simmons, A Comparison of Attitudes during
Reconstruction I and II: Address to Jefferson Davis Camp No. 635 Sons of
Confederate Veterans, Jackson, Mississippi (April 5, 1962).
22. This story is, of course, more complicated. See White, Foreword, supra
note 11. For a discussion of revival approaches to various civil rights statutes, see
John Valery White, Vindicating Rights in a Federal System: Rediscovering 42
US.C. § 1985(3)'s Equality Right, 69 Temple L. Rev. 145, 160-205 (1996).
23. See generally Kozlowski, supra note 14.
24. See John Valery White, Brown v. Board of Education and the Origins of
the Activist Insecurity in CivilRights Law, 28 Ohio N. L. Rev. 303,330-47 (2002).
25. For a discussion of the post-Reconstruction Court's treatment ofcivil rights
law, see Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
Mich. L. Rev. 1323 (1952).
26. See id. at 1357-58.
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South.27 In this light, the period of limitation of the Burger Court is
viewed quite critically and the civil rights jurisprudence of the
Rehnquist period judged a grave injustice. The latter is regarded as a
return to the end of Reconstruction and a manifestation of raw
politics. 28  Professor Cheryl Harris has recently remarked:
Many progressive advocates assert that as a result of the highly
conservative ideological commitments of these judges, the
foundation of antidiscrimination law has been undermined and
the doctrinal framework has been reshaped in key areas of
concern to social justice advocates including education,
employment, and protection from police abuse and other civil
rights violations.
Professor Mark Tushnet offers a slightly less acerbic version of the
progressive vision in his contribution to the popular progressive book,
The Politics of Law.30 Tushnet argues that the Warren Court was the
product of the liberal New Deal coalition' and was an "unusual and
brief instance in which the Court happened to come under control of
progressive interests to a somewhat greater extent than those forces
sustained elsewhere in the political system. 3 2 The Burger court
represented the end of that coalition's dominance on the Court, but not
the emergence of a clear replacement; thus the Burger Court produced
mixed results. 33 "By the end of the 1980s the Supreme Court appeared
27. See, e.g., Morton J. Horowitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of
Justice, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 5, 6 (1993).
28. See, e.g., Lisa Cardyn, Sexualized Racism/Gendered Violence: Outraging
the Body Politic in the Reconstruction South, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 675, 859 (2002)
(equating Rehnquist Court jurisprudence with Supreme Court decisions in wake of
first Reconstruction).
29. Cheryl I. Harris, Mining in Hard Ground, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2487,
2488-89 (2003) (reviewing Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, The Miner's Canary:
Enlisting Race, Resisting Power, Transforming Democracy (2002)).
30. Mark Tushnet, The Politics of Constitutional Law, in The Politics of Law:
A Progressive Critique 219 (David Kairys, ed., rev. ed., 1990).
31. Id. at 228-29.
32. Id. at 230. Lawrence Friedman is in accord:
The Supreme Court, from the Civil War on, usually represented forces and
ideas which we, today, would identify as on the right rather than the left.
The Court that struck down civil rights laws, that upheld segregation and
labor injunctions, that refused to allow Congress to ban from commerce
products made with child labor, that voided big hunks of the New Deal -
this was not a court that was popular with progressives of various stamps.
From this standpoint the Warren Court was the aberration and the
Rehnquist Court is simply regressing to the mean.
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Rehnquist Court: Some More or Less Historical
Comments, in The Rehnquist Court: A Retrospective 151 (Martin H. Belsky ed.,
2002).
33. Id. at 229.
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to have taken a definitive turn in the conservative direction,"
according to Tushnet.
Conservative versions of this story tend to turn on the damage
wrought to the national balance by what is regarded as a politicized
Warren Court.35 Any politicization of the judiciary is said to have
occurred then and any such charge against the current court, regarded
as necessary to restore legal order.3  For conservatives, the Burger
court, while an improvement on Warren's reign, is dismissed as
similarly problematic."
Liberals have struggled with the civil rights period. From the
onset, liberal legal scholars were uneasy with the civil rights
34. Id.
35. Philip B. Burland, Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court
186-204 (1970); John Denton Carter, The Warren Court and the Constitution: A
Critical View of Judicial Activism (1973). On interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see, Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of
the Fourteenth Amendment (1977); on school desegregation, see Lino A. Graglia,
Disaster by Decree: The Supreme Court Decisions on Race and the Schools (1976).
36. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, has argued that the Rehnquist Court was
justifiably "activist" in its invalidation of reapportionment and affirmative action
plans:
I believe the controversy over the nondiscrimination principle can be
traced to one overriding concern. When a Rehnquist Court majority
invoked the principle, it did so in an activist fashion. The principle of race
neutrality... was generally summoned to strike down the enactments of
the democratic branches of government ....
The Rehnquist Court's judicial activism in support of the
nondiscrimination principle stands in contrast to the Burger Court's more
passive stance ....
... [T]he Burger Court was more apt than the Rehnquist Court to
invoke maxims of judicial restraint to uphold the exercise of race-based
action.
J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Rehnquist Court and the Search for Equal Justice, in
The Rehnquist Court: A Retrospective 52-53 (Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002). See
also Lino A. Graglia, The Rehnquist Court and Economic Rights, in The Rehnquist
Court, supra, at 116 (repeating the standard view of the Burger Court, "the counter-
revolution that wasn't" and applying it to the Rehnquist Court).
37.
Conservatives wanted nothing less than a comprehensive rollback of
Warren Court precedents in as many areas as possible, probably most of
all in criminal procedure. What they got instead was a [Burger] Court that
"not only maintained its commitment to most of the major Warren Court
constitutional innovations, it continued to extend the range of its scrutiny
ofmajoritarian legislation, venturing into areas where the Warren Court's
review posture had been cautious ......
Kozlowski, supra note 14, at 18, quoting G. Edward White, The Supreme Court
and Constitutional Law, 1925-2000: Changing Stances of Constitutional Review,
2000 Va. Q. Rev. 323-24.
For example, the Burger Court's school desegregation decisions are received
especially poorly by Lino Graglia, in Graglia, Disaster by Decree, supra note 35.
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movement and the legal decisions it produced.38 Brown v. Board of
Education is generally judged a correct outcome earned at the
expense of fidelity to legal principles. 39  The Warren Court's
subsequent decisions in the area of civil liberties and civil rights are
grudgingly conceded to be "activist" exercises of judicial power,'
but again regarded as usually achieving just outcomes.4 ' The Burger
court, operating under the assumptions of the liberal critique of the
Warren period, is regarded as valiantly struggling to discover a
balance between civil rights and fidelity to legal principle.42 On this
ground, liberals judge the Rehnquist court badly for it too seems to
have abandoned legal principle in order to achieve "just"
conservative results. " This is to say that the liberal view of civil
rights law is that it has always been politicized and that the role of
legal scholarship is to discover another way to achieve the ends of
civil rights protection without undercutting judicial values that
separate law from politics."
38. Consider the debate over the propriety of Brown between Bickle, Hart,
Weschler, and Black, and on the propriety of Brown v. Board of Education.
Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1955); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court: 1958 Term, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 84, 84-125 (1959); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles in
Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959); Charles L. Black, Jr., The
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L.J. 421 (1960); Alexander
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics
(1962). See also, John Valery White, Brown v. Board of Education and the Birth
of the Activist Insecurity in Civil Rights Law, 28 Ohio N. L. Rev. 303 (2002).
39. See Bickel, Original Understanding, supra note 38; Weschler, Neutral
Principles, supra note 38; Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 38.
40. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of
Progress 7-8 (1978).
41. See e.g., Gerald Kurland, The Supreme Court Under Warren 3 (D. Steve
Rahmas ed., 1973).
42. See especially the "counter-revolution that wasn't" theory as articulated in
the essays in The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't (Vincent
Blasi, ed., 1983). This theme has dominated liberal scholarship on the Burger
Court. See, Richard Y. Funston, Constitutional Counterrevolution? The Warren
Court and the Burger Court: Judicial Policymaking in Modem America (1977). But
see, Kahn, supra note 47. This view of the non-revolutionary Burger Court is also
present in conservative visions of the Court. See Graglia, The Rehnquist Court,
supra note 36 (adopting frame to describe both Burger and Rehnquist Courts).
43. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice: How the High Court
Hijacked Election 2000 (2001).
44. This notion dates to the Realist revolution and is fairly associated with the
likes of Justice Frankfurter. See Justice Frankfurter as quoted in Alpheus Thomas
Mason, The Supreme Court From Taft to Warren 14-15 (1968). See also, Bickel,
Least Dangerous, supra note 38, at 19; John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A
Theory of Judicial Review 4-5 (1980). Today, in the form of notions of the
"imperial judiciary," it is the life-blood of the conservative critique of the courts.
See discussion in Kozlowski, supra note 14, at 11-51.
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This vision of civil rights law is as unconvincing as it is widely
accepted. First, it is cast in such general terms that none of the
partisans need actually confront counterfactual evidence challenging
their vision. Second, each version of the story casts law and politics
as irreconcilably distinct. This either/or construction forces one to
accept that law is "just politics" perhaps in a different form,45 or that
"true law" is immune from political considerations.46 Neither is a
persuasive view of public law and civil rights law where in each case
the political legitimacy of the state is in question and where that
legitimacy turns precisely on what the relationship between the state
and its citizens should be.
The conventional tale of civil rights law transforms any
assessment of the civil rights law's vitality into an assessment of the
political performance of the respective Courts. While civil rights law,
like all public law, is inherently related to political debates over the
role of government, this lens on civil rights law transforms relatively
empirical questions into relatively normative ones. Judging whether
civil rights law is vibrant comes to turn on agreement with various
partisan visions of specific policy more than on whether the rights,
causes of action, and remedies which constitute civil rights law are
available to those for whom they were designed. Though the former
is a valid ground for judging law, it distorts both whether that law is
degraded and how it came to be so.
Ronald Kahn argues that assessments of the performance of
different Supreme Courts are distorted by a similar focus.47 Kahn's
main concern is on how the performance of the Burger Court has
been sullied by "political" or "instrumental" analyses48 which
"emphasize that judges use polity and court principles, and all
constitutional theory, instrumentally, as a means to achieve their
45. This notion is often associated, perhaps in exaggerated form, with the
Critical Legal Studies movement, especially Duncan Kennedy's work. See, e.g.,
Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. Legal Educ. 518 (1986). It is also ascribed to the legal
realist movement, typically as a slur against that movement. See Gary Minda, Post
Modem Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at Century's End 28-39 (1995);
Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, 247-50
(1992).
46. This is a central tenant of the conservative, "imperial judiciary" argument.
See Kozlowski, supra note 14, at 20-24.
47. Ronald Kahn, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Theory, 1953-1993
(1994).
48. He addresses four main theories of constitutionalism which he views as
variants of the instrumental approach: (1) the Election Returns theory associated
with Robert Dahl and Richard Funston; (2) the Policymaking approach attributed
to Martin Shapiro and others; (3) the Safety-Valve theory of Anthony Lewis and
Archibald Cox; and (4) the Biographical Approach of G. Edward White. See id. at
5, 7-18, for definitions and works representative of each approach.
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policy objectives." '49 Critiquing various constitutional theories, he
concludes that a better lens through which to analyze the Court is a
"legalist" or "constitutive" approach. Such judicial behavior
"emphasizes the place of developing polity and rights principles,
precedent, and constitutional theory as significant to the Court's
constituting constitutional law and principles" while recognizing that
political and social developments affect the Court.5 Kahn's careful
analysis of the writings of contemporary constitutional theorists
highlights the risks and limitations of judging courts through
predominately political approaches. In accord with Kahn, I believe
a focus on the political aspirations and messages of various Courts
presents a distorted picture, at least as an explanation of the demise
of civil rights law.
Ultimately, however, the conventional, highly politicized tale of
civil rights law (and its demise) is unsatisfactory because it overlooks
the consistent practice of judges throughout the civil rights era. 1
Seeking to adhere to principles of judicial behavior while avoiding
politics, judges have consistently undercut the rule of law at all three
stages of civil rights law's history. 2 The defiling of the rule of law
has occurred quite apart from the partisan ideological splits that have
animated civil rights law. Rather, it has occurred in response to an
"activist insecurity" which has de-legitimized the very idea of a legal
regime which can (much less should) promote social change. In
consequence, every stage of the development of contemporary civil
rights law has been framed by the desire to avoid social change
through the law, even when the law itself prescribes such change.
This avoidance is crucial because it trumps the normal frame offered
to explain the shifts in civil rights jurisprudence.
A. A Revival of Reconstruction Values
Civil rights law and the Civil Rights Movement are parallel
developments which ushered in a transformation of American life.53
49. Id. at 3-4.
50. Id. at 4.
51. "[M]any of the current Court's so-called conservative cases and doctrines
are direct descendants of Warren Court cases and doctrines." Suzanna Sherry, All
the Supreme Court Really Needs to Know It Learned From the Warren Court, 50
Vand. L. Rev. 459 (1997).
52. In an earlier work, I demonstrated the birth of the activist insecurity at the
beginning of the civil rights period. White, Activist Insecurity, supra note 24. This
work demonstrates its operation during the Burger Court years, when the limiting
period began.
53.
The Civil rights movement was the product of a coalition... comprised
of a broad array of groups-liberal Democrats, moderate Republicans, the
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Civil rights law is the jurisprudential response to the Civil Rights
Movement in two important ways. First, it is the direct product of the
legal strategy of the NAACP. Second, it is the corpus of law
developed in response to the grass roots action of black Americans
and others to end Jim Crow and guarantee civil liberties.
The NAACP's strategy for addressing Jim Crow injustice is
represented in contemporary civil rights law. That strategy was
threefold: a mostly legislative attack on lynching,54 ajudicial strategy
to enforce the "equality" component of "separate but equal," and the
ultimately successful frontal assault on the separate but equal policy.
The attack on lynching--consisting largely of careful reporting of
lynching episodes, a publicity campaign aimed at building public
opposition to lynching, and various lobbying efforts to encourage
anti-lynching legislation 55-was largely unsuccessful as no anti-
lynching statute was ever enacted and lynching persisted unabated
until the emergence of the civil rights movement in the 1950s. These
efforts, nevertheless, successfully characterized the horrors of Jim
Crow and helped build the organizational linkages that would
transform into the civil rights movement.56
Today, civil rights law reflects this strain of the NAACP strategy
in the federal government's enforcement of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and
2425" and the judiciary's revival of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).5" Most
national organizations of the black and Jewish communities, organized
labor and others-that succeeded in invalidating de jure segregation and
passing far-reaching legislation in support of the rights ofblacks, including
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action
Debate, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1327, 1327 (1986).
54. See Robert L. Zangrando, The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching,
1909-1950 (1980). These efforts of the NAACP continued a tradition of activism
against lynching that predated the organization. See Ida B. Wells-Barnett, On
Lynching: Southern Horrors, A Red Record, Mob Rule in New Orleans (1969);
Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, Revolt Against Chivalry: Jessee Daniel Ames and the
Women's Campaign Against Lynching (1993).
55. See National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Thirty
Years of Lynching in the United States, 1889-1918 (1969); Zangrando, supra note
54.
56. This is dramatized by the interrelationship between American Communist
Party efforts to publicize the Scottsboro Trials and the way that trial convinced
many blacks to embrace the Communist Party as an aid to organizing against Jim
Crow. See James E. Goodman, Stories of Scottsboro 74-82 (1994). On the
Communist Party's efforts in Jim Crow Alabama, see, Robin D. G. Kelley, Hammer
and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression (1990); Theodore
Rosengarten and Nate Shaw, All God's Dangers: The Life of Nate Shaw (1984);
and Nell Irvin Painter, The Narrative of Hosea Hudson: His Life as a Negro
Communist in the South (1979).
57. See White, Vindicating Rights, supra note 22.
58. See id. at 181-93, 216-43.
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recently, perhaps in response to the demise of § 1985(3) as an
effective basis for civil rights enforcement, hate crimes statutes have
emerged as a version of the anti-lynching campaign (although the
underlying concern is different in both degree and type).5 9
The NAACP's efforts to enforce the "equality" component of
Plessey, focused most heavily on severe inequalities in public
benefits. Most dramatically in the areas of public teacher pay,'
educational opportunities,6' and access to government and public
programs and facilities, 62 the NAACP plan reflected the chorus of
59. See, e.g., The Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat.
140 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1994)). For a discussion of the hate
crimes/hate speech debate, see Mari J. Matsuda, et al., Words That Wound: Critical
Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (1993); Samuel Walker,
Hate Speech: the History of an American Controversy (1994); The Price We Pay:
The Case Against Racist Speech, Hate Propaganda, and Pornography (Laura
Lederer & Richard Delgado, eds., 1995).
60. Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of Anne Arundel County, 30 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md.
1939) (discrimination in black teacher salary barred by fourteenth amendment);
Alston v. Sch. Bd. of City of Norfolk, 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940) (reversing
dismissal of equal pay suit because Fourteenth Amendment bars discrimination in
teacher pay on basis of race); Whitmyer v. Lincoln Parish School Board, 75 F.
Supp. 686, 687 (W.D. La. 1948). Compare, Heard v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., 94
F. Supp. 897 (W.D. La. 1951) (Plaintiff must add state as necessary party to salary
equalization suit). See, e.g., Doris Morein White, Thesis, The Louisiana Civil
Rights Movement: Pre-Brown Period, 1936-1954 (1976); Alan Fairclough, Race
and Democracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana, 1915-1972 (1995).
61. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S. Ct. 232
(1938) (equal protection requires that state provide black citizen facilities for
graduate legal education within its boarders); Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md.
1936) (scholarships for black students to attend graduate school out of state violates
Fourteenth Amendment, but integration inappropriate remedy).
62. See, e.g., attacks on segregated transportation, Morgan v. Virginia, 328
U.S. 373, 66 S. Ct. 1050 (1946). Cases like this one were to inspire bus boycotts
in Baton Rouge (1953), Montgomery (1955-56), and Tallahassee (1956-57), that
were to signal the beginning of the civil rights movement. See Adam Fairclough,
The Preachers and the People: The Origins and Early Years of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, 1955-1959, 52 J. Southern Hist. 403 (1986).
They contradict the notion that Supreme Court decisions were counterproductive
because they ignited white resentment, see Michael J. Klarman, How Brown
Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. Am. Hist. 81 (1994), and
violence by showing that the very origins of the civil rights activity which prompted
change was encouraged by federal court decisions questioning segregation.
Klarman's thesis is that Brown is overestimated as a catalyst of civil rights activity
which he persuasively argues is connected to social and economic changes in the
South. Id. at 91. Brown, he argues, is ironically responsible for 1960s civil rights
legislation, because it ignited massive resistance, destroyed moderate forces in the
South, and forced the federal government's involvement in civil rights matters.
Klarman's thesis, like conservative arguments that Brown should not have been
decided because change would have come at a "natural" pace, overlooks the fact
that the quite little change was coming to the South, and that "moderate"
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voices duplicated in the 1944 publication What the Negro Wants63
demanding economic and educational opportunities for black
Americans. This strategy came to be reflected in the civil rights laws'
underlying goals of opening economic opportunities, narrowing
income disparities, and, recently, addressing continuing severe wealth
disparities. Unfortunately, it is this goal that has, recently, come to
be most severely criticized 64 and restricted.65
Most familiarly, the NAACP strategy came to focus on attacking
Jim Crow's formal separation. In a series of decisions culminating in
Brown v. Board of Education,66 the organization succeeded in
undercutting the doctrinal pillars that had buttressed Jim Crow and
that had steeled the system against rising grass roots protests. It is
this strategy that became most clearly reflected in the corpus of
contemporary civil rights law. In part because of the clarion call of
Brown's rejection of segregation, but as much because of the force of
the civil rights movement's protests, civil rights law sought to ensure
protection of individual liberties from strategies of government
suppression that had long existed and had been previously applied
against unions, political parties, and ordinary citizens, as well as
black people resisting Jim Crow. Civil rights law became a law of
southerners worked affirmatively to preserve segregation in order that "radical"
segregationists would not be inflamed. This "moderation," amply demonstrated in
the events leading to the Baton Rouge bus boycott, held black citizens hostage to
the threats of retribution of white employers and others, leaving black citizens with
no avenue to channel their post-World War II aspirations for social change. See
Mary J. Hebert, Beyond Black and White: The Civil Rights Movement in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, 1945-1972 (1999) (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State
University). In Baton Rouge a modification of bus rules that preserved segregation
while allowing the bus company to fill more seats with the black riders who
constituted more than 80% of the bus company's customers prompted a strike by
white bus drivers who saw segregation threatened. The city responded by
rescinding the ordinance. In response black bus riders, emboldened by decisions
like Morgan, boycotted and succeeded in extracting a reversal from the city. While
the boycott was prompted by agitation by black World War II veterans and occurred
in a town filled with urbanized and relatively well educated and wealthy black
citizens, it is not clear that the numerous workers who risked their jobs and futures
by participating in the boycott would have done so in the first place without the
encouragement of Supreme Court decisions.
63. What the Negro Wants (Rayford W. Logan ed., 1944).
64. See, e.g., Thomas Sowell, From Equal Opportunity to "Affirmative
Action," in Civil Rights (1984). See also, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325
(2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
65. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
66. 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954). The Supreme Court decisions leading
to Brown include, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S. Ct. 232
(1938); Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631, 68 S. Ct. 299 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629, 70 S. Ct. 848 (1950); and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339
U.S. 637, 70 S. Ct. 851 (1950).
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anti-discrimination and civil liberties in no small part because the
civil rights movement was a grass roots protest movement
challenging entrenched government R ower where the electoral
process provided no receptive hearing.
Civil rights law developed in response to the civil rights
movement in at least two significant ways. First, the courts crafted
a system of enforcing civil liberties which provided an opportunity to
develop substantive constitutional rights.6 The central aspect of this
system was Monroe v. Pape and the revival of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a
tool for rights enforcement. Following its precedent in Monroe, the
Court eventually revived 42 U.S.C. § 1982,69 1985(3),70 and 1981. 7'
Each of these "revivals" gave force to a statute which had been
dormant for decades. The Court's efforts to divine the meaning of
these 100 year old statutes generated much controversy.72 In any case,
the revivals can be seen as an effective response to the civil rights
movement which avoided constitutional issues and respected
congressional intent (albeit 100 year old intent).73
These revivals were controversial beyond the fact that they rested
on perhaps shaky readings of ancient legislative purpose. Many
viewed the Court as being activist, reaching out to participate in the
civil rights movement and as using the statutes as mere pretexts for
that participation.74 Significantly, those critics argued that the Court
should have waited for the sitting Congress to respond to civil rights
67. This is the construction, of course, of Carolene Products' footnote 4.
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4, 58 S. Ct. 778, 784 n.4
(1938). These protests, and the suppression of them, heightened the importance of
civil liberties in dismantling Jim Crow as well as highlighted the necessity of civil
liberties protections in a large, federal state. See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163 (1958) (privacy and associational
rights); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 82 S. Ct. 248 (1961) (right to fair
proceedings); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 86 S. Ct. 1783 (1966) (removal
right necessary to ensure fair proceedings).
68. This is the significance of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473
(1962) (providing cause of action for violation of constitutional rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961)
(establishing that selectively incorporated rights in "Bill of Rights" applicable
against states).
69. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S. Ct. 2186 (1968)
70. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S. Ct. 1858 (1971).
71. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976).
72. Compare Charles Fairman, The Oliver Wendall Holmes Devise History of
the Supreme Court of the United States, Volume VI: Reconstruction and Reunion,
1864-88 Part I, 1117-1260 (1971) and Stanford V. Levinson, New Perspectives on
the Reconstruction Court, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 461, 482-83 (1974).
73. See White, Vindicating Rights, supra note 22, at 160-93.
74. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, The Constitution in Crisis 308-09 (1992)
(discussing the court's activism in deciding Jones).
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activism.v5 This criticism is buttressed by the fact that Congress did
respond in almost every area which the Court revived Reconstruction-
era statutes. Congress enacted the omnibus Civil Rights Act in 1964,
duplicating and exceeding the Court's decisions on § 1981 and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It passed the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 surpassing the Court's gerrymandering7 6
and one-man-one-vote decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment."
And, Congress adopted the Fair Housing Act of 1968, providing a
more detailed enforcement scheme than developed by the Court under§ 1982 and its constitutional decisions on restrictive covenants.7"
Each of Congress' enactments were express responses to the civil
rights movement, the often violent suppression of that movement, and
the violence associated with the frustration growing out of the limited
success of the movement in achieving its goals.7
The "revival" of Reconstruction-era civil rights law became
symbolic of the expansion of civil rights law generally. Thus, the
revival period in civil rights law emerged in direct and indirect
response to the Civil Rights Movement. The question, then, is not
whether there was a revival, but rather how do we define the limiting
period and what do we make of it.
B. A Limiting Period
The notion of a limiting period has considerable intuitive force.
The notion underlies conservative and liberal discussion of civil
rights. Progressives see the emergence of a limiting period as
unjustified and, sometimes, malicious; rights conservatives view the
period as necessary to correct judicial excesses, especially of the
Warren court. Both sides, nevertheless accept the notion that the last
few decades have witnessed the restriction of rights developed during
the revival period.
Indeed, almost from the time Monroe was decided, opposition to
the revival interpretations was heard. 0 It is, nevertheless, difficult to
75. Id. See also Samuel Estreicher, Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private
Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of Reconstruction Era
Amendments, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 449, 474-77 (1974) (reconciliation between
revival of reconstruction era statutes and recent civil rights statutes needed.)
76. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S. Ct. 125 (1960).
77. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,82 S. Ct. 691 (1962); Reynolds v. Simms, 377
U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362 (1964). Of course, the Voting Rights Act does not reach
questions of reapportionment, except as implicating discrimination. In that sense,
it does not go as far as the court's generalized reapportionment decisions.
78. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836 (1948).
79. See White, Vindicating Rights, supra note 22, at 195.
80. This opposition, focusing on the deleterious effect of civil rights on
federalism, is vigorously voiced in Monroe itself, in Justice Frankfurter's dissent.
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locate a limiting period as the Court issued decisions significantly
expanding the reach of the Reconstruction-era acts well into the
1970s.81 But as with other issues, a review of the decisional law only
tells part of the story. The beginning of the limiting period can be
fairly located at the Court's invalidation of a medical school
affirmative action admissions program in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke.8 2  Though couched in the language of
balancing, Bakke represented a shift in the conception of the goal of
civil rights law. 3 Applying a "color-blind" requirement in Fourteenth
Amendment interpretation, the court re-affinned an "equal treatment"
over equal results approach to addressing racial discrimination and
disparities in contemporary American society. Bakke symbolized and
gave effect to a growing hostile reaction to the civil rights movement
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202, 81 S. Ct. 473,492 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). See also Burke Marshall, Federalism and Civil Rights 81 (1964);
Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, Foreword: Equal in Origin and
Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78
Harv. L. Rev. 143, 144, 162-63 (1964). See contra, Note, Theories of Federalism
and Civil Rights, 75 Yale L.J. 1007 (1966) (arguing that federalism is not opposed
to civil rights law); Dean Alfange, Jr., "Under Color of Law": Classic and Screws
Revisited, 47 Cornell L. Q. 395 (1962)(arguing that Frankfurter's dissent overstates
the case against a broad reading of "under color of law"). The significant effects
of Monroe are described with some fear in Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort:
Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L. Rev. 277, 279-82 (1965)
("The explosive potential of Monroe adds to a growing catalogue of issues
concerning the role of the states in the federal system").
81. The list of landmark 1970s civil rights decisions is quite impressive,
including Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971) (developing
disparate impact proof of discrimination); Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 91 S. Ct. 1267 (1971) (approving busing as desegregation
measure); Griffmv. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,91 S. Ct. 1790 (1971) (permitting
recovery of damages for private conspiracy to violate equal protection of the laws);
McDonald Douglas v. Greene, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973) (announcing
disparate treatment proof of discrimination); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,96
S. Ct. 2586 (1976) (permitting recovery for discriminatory refusal to contract);
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979) (permitting
voluntary affirmative action by private employers).
82. 438 U.S. 312, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
83. Earlier shifts tookplace, transforming and limiting the development ofcivil
rights law. See White, Foreword, supra note 11, at Part U. It can be argued,
however, that these shifts remained, until Bakke and the terms of 1977 and 1978,
efforts to build the civil rights edifice, molding it to comport with federalism and
other notions of constitutional order. Bakke, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976), International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977), Milliken v. Bradley (II), 433 U.S. 267, 97 S.
Ct. 2749 (1977), and HazelwoodSch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 97 S. Ct.
2736 (1977), along with the earlier decision in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.
Ct. 1155 (1976), fundamentally transformed civil rights law, setting up the more
widely recognized limiting decisions of the 1989 term.
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and to judicial attempts to dismantle our segregated society.
Whatever the motivation, the shift represented the view, still
prevalent, that the civil rights movement occasioned special treatment
for some at the expense of others.
The volatile issue of race and race equity, the subtext of Bakke,
gave new life to old arguments over the proper powers of federal
courts in vindicating rights and the content of those rights
themselves.84 Bakke was thus at once (1) an attempt to reconcile the
view that same treatment was mandated by law with the broad equity
powers used by federal courts to remedy injustice and (2) an attack on
the specific race-conscious remedies used voluntarily and pursuant to
court order to remedy years of Jim Crow. The highly controversial
use of broad remedial authority to desegregate public schools, which
had already bred resentment, were at once threatened by an equal
treatment limitation. Rights discourse's implicit reference to
"oppression," subtly assumed in early desegregation cases85 as well
as the revival cases, was by then the subject of considerable debate.
In the years that followed, the broad commerce clause based
approaches such as the disparate impact proof of Griggs v. Duke
Power were attacked for punishing unintentional (and therefore,
presumably, non-discriminatory) action.87 The private action reach
of §§ 1981 and 1982 was criticized as not supported by the statutes'
84. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary, supra note 35; Lino
Graglia, Disaster by Decree, supra note 35.
85. See Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S. Ct. 848 (1950) (separate law
school in fact unequal) and Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (separate but equal inherently
unequal). Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. describes this famous line of cases as
attacks on oppression in his public letter to Justice Thomas shortly after Thomas'
confirmation to the Supreme Court. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open
Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1005 (1992). Reproduced in Raceing Justice, En-gendering Power: Essays
on Anita Hill, Clarence Thomas, and the Construction of Social Reality (T.
Morrison ed. 1992). Judge Higginbotham urges Justice Thomas to consider
sympathetically the contributions of civil rights lawyers and organizations in
eliminating oppression and making it possible for Thomas to become a Supreme
Court justice. Race-ing Justice 13-17.
86. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S. Ct. 2186
(1968) ("In this setting [the local outcroppings of a spirit of hostility toward
Negroes] it would have been strange indeed if Congress had viewed its task as
encompassing merely the nullification of racist laws.").
87. See Michael Evan Gold, Griggs'Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems
and Origins of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and
a Recommendationfor Reform, 7 Ind. Rel. L. J. 429 (1985). See, on the emergence
of disparate impact theory, Alfred Blurnrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. and the Concept ofEmploymentDiscrimination, 71 Mich. L. Rev.
59 (1972).
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legislative history and purpose.8" And, § 1983 cases were often
denounced for treating mere torts as constitutional violations.89
In 1989 several limiting decisions left revival supporters
disenchanted and angry. City of Richmond v. Croson9 ended much
speculation on the meaning of Bakke for voluntary affirmative action
plans undertaken by state governments, imposing the strictest scrutiny
to allow such plans only when specific discrimination was identified
and only if other "less discriminatory means" were unavailable.
Wards Cove Packing v. Antonio9' announced several limitations on
the Griggs proof formula, prohibiting inter-workforce comparisons
and requiring sophisticated correlations between an employer's
workforce and the available pool of qualified employees. And, in
Patterson v. McClean Credit Union,92 the Court limited the reach of§ 1981 to the formation of contracts after threatening to reverse the
revival decision in Runyon outright. 3
88. See, e.g., Gerhard Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused
Muse, 1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. 89, 100, 122.
89. See e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976) (section 1983
not a font of tort law).
90. 488 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
91. 490U.S. 642, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
92. 491 U.S. 164, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
93. Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr. captures the frustration of many with the
1989 Supreme Court decisions. Describing the Court's rejection of Brenda
Patterson's racial harassment claim under § 198 1's guarantee to all persons of the
same rights as white citizens to make and enforce contracts, Patterson, 491 U.S.
164, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), Eskridge says:
The Court... reasoned, in part, that interpreting section 1981 to cover
claims of on-the-job racial harassment would interfere with the operation
of Congress' more recent regulation of workplace discrimination in title
VII ....
Ironically, however, the Court was giving title VII a narrow
construction. [T]he Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio [490 U.S.
642, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989)] held that in discriminatory impact cases
under title VII, the employee must prove not only a disparate impact, but
also that the employer has no reasonable business justification for its
discriminatory practices. [A] Court divided on other issues indicated in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins [490 U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989)] that
employment decisions motivated in part by prejudice do not violate title
VII if the employer can show after the fact that the same decision would
have been made irrespective of the intentional discrimination.
Following the trend ... the Court held in Martin v. Wilkes [490 U.S.
755, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989)] that white employees who were not parties
to the original litigation could nonetheless challenge court-approved
consent decrees providing for affirmative action to remedy past violations
of title VII and the fourteenth amendment. [It also held] in Lorance v.
AT&T Technologies [490 U.S. 900, 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989)], that title
VII's statute of limitations for challenging seniority plans begins to run
when the plan is adopted [and limited attorneys fees awards against
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These decisions brought congressional reversal94 but only after a
reenactment of the debate surrounding the Revival. After one
presidential veto, the resulting Civil Rights Act of 1991 pleased
few.95 Revival advocates continued to smart from the narrowing
decisions and felt the act offered only the barest salvation.
Opponents of the revival decisions saw the Act as well as the 1989
decisions it remedied as perpetuating the revival decisions they
disdained. 97  This hottest of recent political maelstroms
notwithstanding, Title VII continues to be a powerful, if limited tool
for remedying workplace discrimination and, ultimately, achieving
racial equity in the workplace. Sections 1981 and 1982 retain the full
force and power of their revival incarnations. Indeed, § 1981 has
been statutorily buttressed with new, more explicit language,
extending it to terms and conditions of contracts.
Section 1983 cases, also limited to some degree in 1989 by the
court's restrictive view of municipal liability for failure to train its
officers in Canton v. Harris,98 continue to proliferate in legion.99
intervening defendants in Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v.
Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989)].
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Symposium: Civil Rights Legislation in the 1990s:
Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game,
79 Cal. L. Rev. 613, 613-14 (1991).
94. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat 1071.
95. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the
1991 Civil Rights Act: The "Impossibility" of Permanent Reform, 45 Rutgers L.
Rev. 965 (1993).
96. See, e.g., id.
97. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota
Bill," a Codification of Griggs, A Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the
Above? 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 287 (1993).
98. 489 U.S. 378, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989).
99. Section 1983 has been limited in two distinct ways. First, pursuant to its
direct approach, the Court has limited the rights remediable in § 1983 litigation.
Constitutional rights have been "limited" in Bakke-like cases through the
identification of conflicts between rights recipients. Courts are thus charged with
anticipating conflicts between individuals' rights, compare City ofRichmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (plurality opinion) (invalidating
voluntary affirmative action plan) and Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 113 S. Ct. 2816
(1993) (allowing challenge to facially neutral but apparently race-based
reapportionment plan), or hearing challenges to remedial orders by non-parties' who
feel deprived. See Martin v. Wilkes, 490 U.S. 755, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989)
(allowing challenge to consent decree by aggrieved non-parties). Constitutional
rights have also been limited through the direct limitation of the rights recognized.
In procedural due process cases this takes place at three stages: (1) when an injury
is a deprivation of rights, see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976)
and Bd, ofRegents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972); (2) when an actor
"deprives" a plaintiff of a right, compare Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.
Ct. 1908 (1981) with Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1983); and
(3) whether there are adequate post-deprivation remedies available, see Parratt, 451
8072003]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Only the equality approach of § 1985(3) was fundamentally changed
in the limiting period, the promise of a powerful tool for vindicating
rights survived to the 1990s with only the narrowest scope
(apparently that of the facts of Griffin). When the Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic invoked the statute against an abortion
protester alleged to have conspired to deprive the clinic's patients of
the right to travel and the right to an abortion, the outcome was by no
means certain, notwithstanding the clinic's duplication of the Griffin
language. The complete death of § 1985(3) will be shown later;
however, it remains to be seen why this statute fared so badly when
its 1871 counterpart, § 1983, appears to have suffered the limiting
period with little effect (indeed, among the several approaches, the
fewest). In any case, § 1985(3) appears to be an especially promising
ground for studying the processes that undercut all of civil rights law
while leaving these other statutory causes of action apparently
available.
U.S. 527, 101 S. Ct. 1908. Constitutional rights, finally, have been limited through
inquiry into against whom may an injured party claim deprivations of rights. See
Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S. Ct.
998 (1989) (no state protected right against third party actions). Although
conceptually distinct from those procedural due process cases that have had a
limiting effect, the incorporation doctrine has also operated to restrict the
constitutional rights remediable under § 1983. Compare Twining v. State of New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14 (1908) (establishing limited incorporation
doctrine: "it is not so because those rights are enumerated in the first eight
Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they are included in the
conception of due process of law") andAdamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.
Ct. 1672 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[I] would follow what I believe was the
original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment-to extend to all the people of the
nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights.").
For federal statutory rights Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S. Ct. 2502
(1980), appeared to have extended the reach of § 1983, despite some contrary
legislative history; however, subsequent cases have limited the reach ofthis holding,
perhaps undercutting it. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981) (requiring intent
of congress to allow private right of action).
The second, indirect limiting approach in § 1983 cases has been the attack on the
statute as inconsistent with federalism. While this concern has informed the Court's
recognition of rights deprivations, e.g. Paul v. Davis, supra, it is most prominent
in the attack on the lack of an exhaustion of state remedies requirement in Younger
abstention cases. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971).
Although the application of Younger to cases requesting only compensatory relief
is unclear, the Court's reading of Younger to require state resolution of civil suits,
in the absence of an argument that the civil action is in furtherance of the criminal
law, see Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 97 S. Ct. 1911 (1977), appears to
undercut the view that § 1983 changed the federal relationship. See Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S. Ct. 2151 (1972) ("legislative history makes evident that
Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the states
and the nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights").
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C. Defining a Limiting Period
If some support for a limiting period can be noted in the cases, the
more significant question remains: how particularly is a limiting
period defined? At least three rough bases are immediately apparent:
the intent of the courts, the outcomes in the cases, or the structure
imposed on recovery (that is, the legal process of vindication of
rights). The limiting period is here defined in terms of the third
criterion.
Intent, like the notion of a limiting period itself, possesses
considerable intuitive appeal as an explanation. However, intent is
very difficult to support. While commentators may possess insight
into the proclivities of jurists, especially perhaps when the
commentators are former clerks, divining an aggregate of a court's
intent is an inherently suspect enterprise. It is all the more difficult
to transfer assessments of any single court's "intent," however well
founded, to the entire legal system. Perhaps more importantly, a
focus on the courts' intent seems to presuppose that courts are
incapable of manifesting hostility to social change or anti-
discrimination without also abandoning its allegiance to rights.
Indeed, this appears to have been precisely what courts have been
able to do in response to the Second Reconstruction."°
A second tempting method for testing the existence of a paradigm
shift in the judiciary is a focus on outcomes. This approach is
especially appealing because, unlike the intent basis, a focus on
outcomes is amenable to empirical tabulation. Cases can be read and
the courts' position on various social conditions, moral positions, or
specific groups can be collected. Courts can be characterized as pro-
abortion, anti-business, or pro-plaintiff in the clear (if hollow) way
that only scientific positivism can offer. All manner of forecasts,
from optimism to gloom and doom, can be attached to trends
attributed to the judiciary. Indeed, it is all too easy today to have the
on-line computer databases generate all the cases on affirmative
action and determine, for example, that most court decisions today
uphold challenges to such plans. In this manner a limiting period
might be "proved;" however, such a method of identifying a limiting
period is troublesome.
In the absence of a consensus on what justice means, such
tabulations possess little that is truly revealing; in a very important
way they only condense or index what is in the database: litigation
100. Indeed, black students remain in poor schools despite the promise of
Brown, not because the court has rejected the notion of rights, but because it has
proclaimed that the rights of others or limits on its powers preempt most remedies
that might have fulfilled Brown's promise.
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results. To say that the court has cut back on rights, even if shown by
data documenting some absolute reversal in outcomes, says little
about whether the alleged reversal is unjust, improper, or even
constitutes abandonment of "rights" as opposed to particular rights or
extension of rights, or recover in particular fora.
Furthermore, if the categories are group-based they suffer the
additional problem that the limitation may be explained as justified
by externalities. So employment differentials that were readily
explained as the product of discrimination prior to the mid-1960s,
today are attributed by some to choice, qualification disparities, and
even innate disabilities.' In the face of such explanations, it is not
sufficient to say only that the explanations inaccurately describe the
existence of discrimination, much less whether the courts have cut
back on rights. Such a response distorts any assessment of the
judiciary's performance. Of course any legal system must be judged
by its ability to respond to and resolve social problems and atrocities
and preserve the generalized equality of the citizenry. However,
evaluation of such a system on the terms of its performance relative
to particular groups or issues ignores that, in pluralistic societies,
groups and their visions of normatively acceptable outcomes are often
in irreconcilable conflict. Evaluation of a judiciary on the basis of
outcomes can give no instruction on resolving these conflicts and, as
importantly, places no checks on power. By merely insisting that a
legal system respond to one crisis or another, without more, the rule
of law is hung on the whims of the day. When the climate changes,
the powers of government, enhanced to fix a problem now maligned,
will be ushered to the aid of enhancing those problems. Indeed, any
analysis of a judiciary limited only to outcomes becomes dependent
on the whims of the institutions' constituent members; there is no rule
of law there.
Any limiting period need be determined by an analysis of changes
in the courts' allegiance to a priori structural commitments of the
system itself. Such an approach not only permits analysis of sea
changes in institutions but allows for critique of the fidelity ofjudicial
institutions to the rule of law. Further, such an approach is the only
way to determine shifts in the quality, as opposed to the content, of a
legal system.
101. Consider, for example, EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th
Cir. 1988) (disparity in female commission salespersons attributed to women's
desire for security of flat salary). See also Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical Proof
ofDiscrimination: Beyond "Damned Lies, "68 Wash. L. Rev. 477 (1993) (arguing
that central assumption of statistical proofs of discrimination - that non-
discriminating employer's workforce would roughly duplicate the qualified
population - is false).
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Accordingly, what distinguishes the limiting period from the
revival period is that thejustices of the limiting period courts abandon
their allegiance to structural commitments, albeit in order to correct
perceived defects in the rights vindication formulae established
during the revival period. (Their claim that the revival period judges
abandoned those commitments is insupportable in the case of
federalism and civil rights statutes.) 10 2 The following pages show
something far more troubling, however-judges in the limiting period
escaping all institutional restraints in order to interpret statutes (either
conservatively or progressively) as they believe they should. In the
case of § 1985(3), these rejections of institutional restraint prove
merely restrictive, notwithstanding the often sympathetic origin of the
diversions.
II. DEFINING THE ACTIVIST INSECURITY IN CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
The activist insecurity'0 3 is an alternative explanation ofjudicial
behavior on civil rights questions. It operates across revival and
limiting periods and applies to all the post-Brown Courts. It is a
supplement to the "conservative judges" explanation (and similar
political explanations) of the demise of civil rights law. It is,
however, a proposed replacement for the predominant vision of the
dilemma of civil rights law: rather than asking how to reconcile civil
rights law with notions of judicial restraint, it asks how must civil
rights law be conceived to remain true to rule of law notions?
The conventional vision of civil rights law turns on the role of
judicial activism.' 4 Fidelity to principles of appropriate judicial
102. While the balances struck in the development of rights vindication models
and substantive conceptions of rights may be characterized as excessively
interfering with state prerogatives, it is not accurate to suggest that those judges did
not factor concerns with federalism into their analyses. Indeed, in the case of the
various NAACP membership list cases, Professor Tushnet provides evidence that
was the primary consideration on the Courts' mind.
103. See this author's description of the birth of the activist insecurity in the
Supreme Court's treatment of Brown. White, Activist Insecurity, supra note 38.
104. Judicial Activism is a chameleon-hued notion, defined vaguely and mostly
in the negative. That is, it is usually regarded as a departure from tenants ofjudicial
restraint such as those offered by Charles Lamb: (1) judges should be reluctant to
exercise judicial review; (2) judges should avoid constitutional questions where
possible; (3) judges should adhere to the record below; (4) judges should issue no
advisory opinions; (5) judges should not resolve "political questions"; and (6)
judges should decide cases based on law rather than opinion. See Charles Lamb,
Activism and Restraint, in Supreme Court Activism and Restraint 7, 15-20
(Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982). See also Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48, 56 S. Ct. 466, 482-484 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (seven cannons of judicial behavior).
For a discussion of the charge of activism against the Warren Court, see White,
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behavior means avoidance of judicial activism. This vision is
embraced across the political spectrum. The Progressive version of
this vision argues that activism was a necessary antidote to the
conservative judicial activism that ended Reconstruction.
Progressives currently decry the conservative activism of the
Rehnquist court.10 5 Conservatives decry the activism of the Warren
Court and, recently admitting the activism of the Rehnquist court,
argue it is necessary to put things right. 0 6 Liberals have consistently
argued against activism, but have struggled to discover how civil
rights law can be reconciled with principles ofjudicial restraint.
In cases involving social change, however, activism itself has not
been the formative principle in judicial behavior as much as concern
over being regarded as activist. That is, courts have not decided to
abandon principles ofjudicial restraint so much as they have formed
those principles to conform with the demands of the legal issues with
which they are confronted and their view of how those issues ought
be resolved. Judicial restraint suggests that courts, as bodies of
limited democratic legitimacy, ought defer to the political branches
in resolving normative disputes: courts should judge; legislatures
should legislate. Activistjudges disregard the political branches and
the structural implications of the Constitution to achieve normative
policy results they find attractive. This article maintains that this sort
of activism is exceedingly rare. Rather the courts have generally
adhered to notions of judicial restraint in each of its major shifts in
civil rights law.
But courts have consistently avoided being the agent of social
change, even if the law in question requires it, by modifying judicial
principles in accordance with two moves: the "narrowing move" and
the "generalizing move." The former includes both the avoidance of
jurisdiction actually granted through manufacture of sharp limitations
on its exercise and the requirement of strict compliance with most
narrow and strict requirements of recovery. The latter consists of the
abandonment of the narrow requirements when plaintiffs have
complied with them in favor of general principles of law on which to
rest recovery.
The activist insecurity is a radical rejection of Cohens v.
Virginia 's injunction that the Supreme Court has "no more right to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given.' '1 7 In cases involving social change, courts
Activist Insecurity, supra note 38, at 330-47.
105. See, e.g., Dershowitz, supra note 43.
106. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 36.
107. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). Accord Wilcox
v. Consol. Gas Co. 212 U.S. 19, 29 S. Ct. 192 (1909). See White, Activist
Insecurity, supra note 38, at 320-21.
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influenced by the activist insecurity commit "treason to the
constitution"' 8 by avoiding decision. When required to decide, these
courts sully the Siler doctrine"° by generalizing the question in search
of weighty commands to provide an escape or to buttress the narrow
legal command that required decision in the first place.
The narrowing move is seen in courts' requirement that plaintiffs
meticulously comply with all extant procedural rules (as well as
newly created limitations like "heightened pleading"'1) while
identifying specific, narrow legal grounds for their recovery. That is,
the Court has been generally unimpressed with generalized legal
claims. And, where there is both a general and specific ground for
action, the courts have usually required reliance on the more narrow.
The procedural and substantive components of the narrowing move
compliment each other. A civil rights plaintiff is not free to rely on
notice pleading and develop her cause of action as discovery and
motion practice proceeds. Rather she must state her claim with
particularity and connect it to particular statutory or constitutional
violations, selecting from among them the most narrow."' Though
it can be argued that these requirements have been extended to
onerous degrees by conservative courts, these requirements are
generally consistent with the longstanding federal court practice and
are independently justifiable.
However, when plaintiffs have complied with the foregoing
requirements and still seem to present a claim requiring social
change, judges have generally sought to escape the requirement of
ordering social change by generalizing the claim. Typically these
judges find sanctuary in more general principles found in the
constitution, the common law, the inherent structure of government.
This generalizing move, following the particularizing requirements
108. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 404.
109. See Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 29 S. Ct. 451
(1909). See infra text accompanying notes 148-186. See also White, Activist
Insecurity, supra note 38, at 321.
110. See White, Foreword, supra note 11, at 618-21, note 28 and text
accompanying note 28.
111. This remains the case even in jurisdictions rejecting so called "heightened
pleading" requirements as the normal operation of individual immunity law
demands that plaintiffs show the defendants' behavior violated clearly established
law. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001). Saucier pointed
courts to examine the facts of the case from the onset to determine if a constitutional
right alleged could be established, id. at 201, and, if a claim could be established,
determine, "in light of the specific context of the case," id., if the claim could be
supported. The Court recognized that this second inquiry would require
development of the facts surrounding the incident, but the Court emphasized that
courts must not allow this process to undercut the goals of immunity law - to wit,
limiting defendants' engagement in proceedings like discovery.
2003]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
the courts have generally imposed, amounts to a bait and switch.
Plaintiffs are asked to prove particular requirements only to have their
claim subject to a general requirement.
To be sure, this generalizing does not always result in denial of
the plaintiff's claim. It is as likely that judges consumed with the
activist insecurity will resort to the general ground to buttress a
decision for social change as to defeat it. The key is that the activist
insecurity undercuts the idea that civil rights law is law which can
stand on its own. If social change is required, the more general
precepts add to the view that what mandates change are principles of
equity. This generalizing is also troubling on its own as it has
reflected a tendency to undercut the very notions ofjudicial restraint
that animate it in the first place. The courts avoid the requirements
of binding constitutional precedent by resorting to general notions of
law, common law principles and the sort. Legislation is eviscerated
by placing it in a constitutional context or reading its terms as
pregnant with common law notions. The apparent restraint of the
courts is revealed a farce.
While it is likely the case that these judicial moves are available
to courts in cases that do not implicate social change, their application
to civil rights cases is unique in two respects. First, the application
of the narrowing move is in tension with the general goal of civil
rights law to ensure citizens' rights and with its more particular role
in eliminating the vestiges of Jim Crow.' Insofar as the courts
choose to focus claims narrowly, its ability to address either of the
goals of civil rights law is automatically prejudiced. Second, the
generalizing move tends to undercut the legal character of civil rights
law. While the application of the generalizing move defeats most
claims, it is perfectly suitable to upholding, supporting, and justifying
a civil rights claim. In either case, this use of generalization
undercuts the value of civil rights precedent, makes the law
vulnerable to being subverted by hostile judges, and makes civil
rights litigation expensive and uncertain.
A. Requiring the Narrowest Legal Grounds
The first aspect of the activist insecurity is courts' insistence that
plaintiffs seeking social change identify the narrowest grounds upon
which to rest their claim. This requirement is not the same as a court
112. This is reflected, for example, in the Court's past practice of giving Title
VII, the employment discrimination statute enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, a liberal construction consistent with its remedial purposes. See, e.g.,
Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971). For a defense of this
approach in Griggs, see Blumrosen, supra note 87, at 73-74.
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resting its decision on the narrowest ground available. Rather it is a
resort to narrower legal grounds as a limit-defining rule occupying the
whole of the field. So if there is a narrower ground for recovery, it
implicitly excludes broader grounds that might, otherwise, appear to be
alternative or complementary grounds for recovery. This doctrine does
place on plaintiffs seeking social change a heavy burden to frame their
claim as narrowly as the situation will allow. In effect, this aspect of
the activist insecurity amounts to a fact pleading requirement, one
which is compounded by specific heightened pleading rules in some
jurisdictions. '
For civil rights teachers, the obvious and longstanding example of
this narrowing approach is in the special context of prisoner litigation.
In Preiser v. Rodriguez,"4 the Court held that a prisoner could not use
§ 1983 to challenge a deprivation of liberty as a procedural due process
violation because it went to the fact or duration of his confinement.
Such challenges, the Court noted, duplicated habeas corpus claims. As
such, prisoners challenging prison action that touched on the fact and
duration of confinement were required to pursue their claims under
habeas. In 1994 the Court underscored Preiser, ruling that, even in
cases which were framed to avoid challenging the fact or duration of
confinement - cases praying only for damages - the plaintiff did not
have a § 1983 cause of action because a decision in his favor would
amount to challenging the propriety of his confinement."'
This approach is most dramatically evident in the Court's decisions
in O'Shea v. Littleton"" and Rizzo v. Goode."7 In O'Shea a class of
plaintiffs claimed that they had been subjected to discriminatory
enforcement of the criminal law. They argued that at every stage of the
criminal process in their small city, black citizens were treated more
harshly. They were more likely to be stopped by police, arrested for
offenses, charged with a crime, denied bail, tried for the crime,
convicted, and sentenced to longer sentences. The nature of their claim
focused on the uniform and interrelated nature of this process. The
Court rejected their general attack on the operation of the criminal
justice system.
113. For example, the Fifth Circuit's revival of heightened pleading
requirements in post Leatherman cases. See White, Foreword, supra note 11, at
618-21, note 28 and text accompanying note 28.
114. 411 U.S. 475, 93 S. Ct. 1827 (1973).
115. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994) (Section 1983
claim does not arise until prisoner found innocent or cleared of charges for which
he was convicted). See also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S. Ct. 2364
(1997) (extending Heck to case challenging only procedures for deducting good
time credits).
116. 414 U.S. 488, 94 S. Ct. 669 (1974).
117. 423 U.S. 362, 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976).
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The plaintiffs in Rizzo were also a class which claimed that
widespread illegal and unconstitutional police conduct was aimed at
minority citizens. Theirs was a claim that the city ran a system that
supported illegal police brutality. The court applied O'Shea to their
complaints and rejected their claims as not stating ajusticiable injury.
In O'Shea and Rizzo the Court comes to perhaps defendable
outcomes on rather strange doctrinal grounds. Both decisions are
built upon the prohibitions in standing law against suits by parties
with generalized injuries. In taxpayer and citizen suits, the taxpayer
or citizen, whose interest in the litigation is nominal and diffuse, is
denied standing. The problem is that their injury is insubstantial. In
O'Shea and Rizzo, the Court turns this view on its head. The
plaintiffs' claims fail in those cases because the plaintiffs are
challenging multiple parties and general practices. In these cases as
well as in the citizen suits the claim can be said to be generalized, but
there is little in common between these notions of generality. In the
citizen standing suits, it is the injury that is general; in O'Shea and
Rizzo it is the claim of illegality that is general. Nevertheless, the
O'Shea and Rizzo Courts' opinions do not really turn on the
generality of the claims, despite the criticism thereof. Instead, the
cases are transformed into standing suits.
Both decisions eventually refer to the particular plaintiffs'
inability to speak for others or to claim that they will be subject to
mistreatment in the future.
Although it was claimed ... that particular members of the
plaintiff class had actually suffered from alleged
unconstitutional practices, [the O'Shea Court] observed that
"[past] exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a
present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief.., if
unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects...."
Past wrongs were evidence bearing on "whether there is a real
and immediate threat of repeated injury... ." But the prospect of
future injury rested "on the likelihood that [plaintiffs] will again
be arrested for and charged with violations of the criminal law
and will again be subjected to bond proceedings, trial, or
sentencing before petitioners.""1 '
Of course, courts have allowed plaintiffs to show that, having been
subject to illegal action and planning to continue that behavior they
have shown cognizable injury.119 Consequently, O'Shea and Rizzo
118. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102-03, i03 S. Ct. 1660,1665 (1983)
(quoting O'Shea).
119. In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S. Ct. 1209 (1974), the Court
found that a protester threatened with arrested for handing out handbills did state
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must hold, as the Court ultimately reaffirms in Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 120 that it cannot take cognizance of a claim based on a future
expectation of violating the law. Presumably, the court means to
limit this to future expectations of violating ordinary criminal law and
does not mean to apply this to otherwise protected speech which
might violate a criminal ordinance.
This is not to say that O'Shea, Rizzo, and Lyons were necessarily
wrongly decided. Rather, it is to point to the Court's aversion to
generalized claims. Even where those claims seem to overcome the
limitations of general canons of constitutional practice orjusticiability
requirements, the Court remains adverse to such claims.
The narrowing requirement of the activist insecurity is more
apparent in cases like Schweiker v. Chilicky12 1 and United States v.
Stanley. 2 In Schweiker the Supreme Court denied a Bivens damages
action to plaintiffs who claimed improper denial of social security
benefits. The Court reasoned that the existence of the statutory
scheme made a Bivens action inappropriate even though the statute
did not provide a cause of action for damages. In Stanley the Court
denied a Bivens action against the military which had tested LSD on
the plaintiff. The Court held that Congress' decision to exempt the
military from the Federal Tort Claims Act required that it deny a
Bivens cause of action.'23 Of course the Bivens cause of action is one
implied by the Court, providing a ready explanation for the Court's
reluctance to allow the plaintiff to proceed on the more general
ground. 4 That the claims involved in Stanley were constitutional
also lends support to the Court's decision to avoid recognizing the
Bivens claim, in an effort to comply with the Siler doctrine.
The Court recently reaffirmed its Schweiker and Stanley
approaches in Correctional Services v. Malesco.125 In Malesco, the
Court pointed potential Bivens plaintiffs to narrower statutory
grounds when available. The decision comes close to abandoning
Bivins claims altogether, by focusing the question on whether
Congress has acted in any way in the field from which the question
a case or controversy because he intended to continue handing out handbills and a
companion had been arrested already for doing just that. Id. at 458, 94 S. Ct. at
1215.
120. 461 U.S. at 105-06, 103 S. Ct. at 1667.
121. 487 U.S. 412, 108 S. Ct. 2460 (1988).
122. 483 U.S. 669, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987).
123. Id. at 683, 107 S. Ct. at 3063-64.
124. Accord Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983). Bush was
a First Amendment retaliation claim by government employee. Although the court
agreed that the civil service remedy available to the plaintiff was incomplete, the
court saw that system as extent of remedy provided by congress. Id. at 373,
380-88.
125. 534 U.S. 61, 122 S. Ct. 515 (2001).
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comes. This question was always lurking in the background of
Bivens suits.2 6 As such, the implication of Malesco is an extension
of the Court's narrow view of the "and laws" language in § 1983127
and the Court's restrictions on recognizing implied rights of action. 2 s
These efforts at limitation pale in comparison with Graham v.
Connor.'29  The Graham Court memorialized the specificity
requirement in civil rights cases. The plaintiff in Graham was
suffering from "low sugar" related to his diabetic condition. After
running into a store to purchase juice and returning when the line was
too long, he caught the attention of a police officer who stopped him
to investigate the suspicious activity. The officer ignored his claims
of illness, precipitating a series of events culminating in his release
with severe injuries. He challenged the standard under which the trial
court issued a directed verdict for the defendants. The Supreme Court
vacated and remanded.
The lower courts had analyzed Graham's claim under the four
part, substantive due process test developed in Johnson v. Glick, '30
which included the requirement that plaintiff show that excessive
force was inflicted "maliciously or sadistically." In holding that the
claim should have been analyzed under the objective reasonableness
test of the Fourth Amendment, the Court made it easier for Graham
to prosecute his claim against the officers he encountered. This
easing of the requirements for Graham made more difficult the
litigation of civil rights claims generally as the Court expressly
endorsed the specificity requirement in § 1983 cases.
The Graham Court correctly recognized that "§ 1983 'is not itself
a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'""3 The Court saw the
departure from this fact as the source of error in the courts below:
"many courts have seemed to assume... that there is a generic 'right'
126. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18, 100 S. Ct. 1468, 147 (1980)
(Bivens action available unless (1) defendant demonstrates specific factors or (2)
"Congress has provided an alternative remedy").
127. See Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981). See also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122
S. Ct. 2268 (2002) (violation of federal program established under spending power
does not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action).
128. See especially Touche Ross v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560, 99 S. Ct. 2479
(1979). Justice Scalia's Malesco concurrence is express on this point. See
Malesco, 534 U.S. at 73-74, 122 S. Ct. at 523-24 (Scalia, J., concurring)..
129. 490 U.S. 386, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
130. 481 F.2d 1028 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S. Ct. 462
(1973).
131. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870-71
(1989) (quoting from Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3, 99 S. Ct. 2689,
2695 n.3 (1979)).
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to be free from excessive force, grounded not in any particular
constitutional provision but rather in 'basic principles of § 1983
jurisprudence.'" 3 2 Having framed the problem below as deriving from
courts which ascribe to § 1983 substantive content, the Court did not
restrict itself to correcting that error, but instead articulated a new and
severe rule for § 1983 litigation: a requirement that plaintiffs rely on the
most specific rights applicable. 33
Section 1983 "analysis begins by identifying the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged
application."' 34  Quoting from Baker the Court reemphasized its
position: 'The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit' is 'to isolate theprecise
constitutional violation with which [the defendant] is charged" "1 35 The
Court then intimates that "in most instances" this requirement means
that the narrower Fourth and Eighth Amendments, rather than the
broader due process clause, will govern the litigation. 36 It is fair to
view this injunction as pointing in the same direction as Stanley; that
is, it implies that rights that fall outside the protection of the Fourth and
Eighth Amendments ought not be protected by the more general
constitutional grounds away from which the court points plaintiffs.
This view is supported by the court's summary declaration:
Today we make explicit . . . that all claims that law
enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or
not -in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other
"seizure" of a free citizen should be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment and its "reasonableness" standard, rather
than the "substantive due process" approach. Because the
Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection against this sort of physically
intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the
more generalized notion of "substantive due process," must
be the guide for analyzing these claims. 37
132. Graham, 490 U.S. at 393, 109 S. Ct. at 1870 (quoting from Justice v.
Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 382 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc) ("There are ... certain basic
principles in section 1983 jurisprudence as it relates to claims of excessive force
that are beyond question [,] [w]hether the factual circumstances involve an arrestee,
a pretrial detainee or a prisoner."). As if unsatisfied that the point is clear, the next
paragraph includes a third reference to specificity. 'The validity of the claim must
then be judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard which governs
that right." Id. at 394, 109 S. Ct. at 1871.
133. Id. at 393-94, 109 S. Ct. at 1870-71.
134. Id., 109 S. Ct. at 1870 (emphasis added).
135. Id., 109 S. Ct. at 1870 (quoting from Baker, 433 U.S. at 140, 99 S. Ct at
2692) (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 395, 109 S. Ct. at 1871 (first emphasis in original, second added).
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Notwithstanding the constitutional context of Graham, there is
nothing limiting its specificity requirements to constitutional tort cases.
Indeed, Graham reflects the Court's activist insecurity-based tendency
to allocate cases among grounds for decision. Where the choice is
between statutory and constitutional grounds for decision, it has been
the court's longstanding practice to avoid decision on constitutional
issues. 131 Moreover, this approach, known as the Siler doctrine, has
been used by the Court to point toward the narrower ground for
decision in a choice between statutory grounds'39 and to justify
resolving a constitutional case on the ground that the jury verdict was
reasonable. " In general, it should be noted, the narrowing effect of the
activist insecurity operates to the advantage of the judicial system.
However, this narrowing comes with significant costs.
First, the narrowing approach throttles the development of law. It
is clearly a device for limiting the volume of cases the courts hear, if
not also providing a device for affirmatively avoiding cases.' In
138. Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193, 29 S. Ct.
451, 455 (1909):
Where a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions
arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued and
is not departed from without important reasons. In this case we think it
much better to decide it with regard to the question of a local nature,
involving the construction of the state statute and the authority therein
given to the commission to make the order in question, rather than to
unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions appearing in the
record.
Id., 29 S. Ct. at 455. See also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,
347, 56 S. Ct. 466, 483 (1936) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
139. Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U.S. 129, 136-37, 67 S.
Ct. 231, 233-34 (1946) (citing Siler, Ashwander, and Spector Motor Co. v.
McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105, 65 S. Ct. 152, 154):
This Court has said repeatedly that it ought not pass on the
constitutionality of an act of Congress unless such adjudication is
unavoidable. This is true even though the question is properly presented
by the record. If two questions are raised, one of non-constitutional and
the other of constitutional nature, and a decision of the non-constitutional
question would make unnecessary a decision of the constitutional
question, the former will be decided. This same rule should guide the
lower courts as well as this one. We believe that the structure of the
problems before the Circuit Court of Appeals required the application of
the rule to this case.
140. Neese v. Southern Ry. Co., 350 U.S. 77, 78, 76 S. Ct. 131, 132 (1955)
(employing doctrine as justification for upholding jury verdict on reasonableness
grounds without reaching constitutional question) (citing Alma, 329 U.S. 129, 132,
136, 142, 67 S. Ct. 231, 232, 233,236 and Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331,338, 75
S. Ct. 790, 793 (1955)).
141. This is the overt call of some, from Bickle's argument in The Least
Dangerous Branch to today. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court?
The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy,
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certain constructions, this is precisely what the practice of narrowing
the inquiry should do. 42  Cases undecided leave the law
underdeveloped. Second, the narrowing tendency fragments the law
into seemingly mutually exclusive bases for recovery. This second
problem is open for manipulation by courts seeking to defeat plaintiffs'
claims. It might also produce inefficiencies in litigation that raise the
costs of civil rights enforcement. But the predominant cost of the
narrowing tendency is the derogation of civil rights law that occurs
through its own operation.
This derogation is discussed by Professor Elizabeth Iglesias in her
compelling study of the intersection of labor and employment
discrimination law.'43 Professor Iglesais argues that limitations in the
protections of Title VII and the NLRA
are often obscured... because legal interpretation is practiced
in and operates through a strategic fragmentation of doctrinal
and institutional domains. This fragmentation is, to some
degree, inherent in the practice of case by case adjudication, but
it has also been significantly exacerbated and strategically
manipulated by judicial decisions which intentionally separate
doctrinal and institutional domains in order to promote specific
interests and policies.... ""
The law of both statutes is degraded "by establishing boundaries
between Title VII and the NLRA and invoking the fact of the DFR
["'45]-that is, invoking its existence as an alternative avenue of
recourse."'46 Thus in the allocation of cases between the statutes, the
requirement that plaintiffs employ the more specific protection as a
means of determining the appropriate statutory protection, the law
becomes relatively ineffective for, in Professor Iglesais' argument,
women of color who exist at the intersection of gender, race and
employment status. 147
102 Colum. L. Rev. 237 (2002); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional
Questions, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 1003 (1994). See contra William K. Kelley, Avoiding
Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 831
(2001).
142. "The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly
within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a
large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision." See
Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346, 56 S. Ct. at 482 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
143. Elizabeth Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color at the
Intersection of Title VII and the N.L.R.A. Not! 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L L. Rev. 395
(1993).
144. Id. at 399.
145. Duty of Fair Representation under the NLRA.
146. Id. at 406-07.
147. Professor Iglesias' discussion of Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western
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The costs of this prong of the activist insecurity might derive
"naturally" from the nature of litigation. Moreover, they may bejustifiable in any case. Indeed, it may be that in cases involving
social change, judges are merely more attuned to the precarious
nature of the judicial power. So focused, the narrowing behavior of
the activist insecurity-inspired judges is perhaps best understood as
those judges' assiduous compliance with the rules and norms of
judicial behavior described above. Judges, attuned to their role asjudges by the social change possibilities of civil rights law, carefully
comply with notions ofjudicial restraint. The hurdles for plaintiffs
are high, but perhaps, where social change is involved, that is as it
should be. But what courts tend to do next is less easily justified.
B. Generalizing from the Narrow
The second trait of activist insecurity-infused legal decision
making arises only when the first has not operated to abort the social
Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 95 S. Ct. 977 (1975), is a nice
illustration of her larger analysis. Commenting on the Supreme Court's reading of
the issue, she exposes the Court's fragmenting and narrowing behavior.
Analytically, the Court's first and perhaps most significant move was to
separate Title VII and the NLRA, or more precisely, to fragment the
national labor policy across two doctrinal domains. In rejecting the D.C.
Circuit's argument that the mandate of Title VII compelled both the
employer and the union to bargain with black workers demanding non-
discriminatory employment policies, the Supreme Court distinguished the
substantive rights established by Title VII from those established by the
NLRA, most specifically, the right to engage in collective action to apply
economic pressure in support of collective demands.
According to the Court, the fact that a particular conduct (like employee
opposition to race discriminatory practices) might be protected under Title
VII does not mean that it should be protected under the NLRA.
28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 422.
Her analysis highlights that the boundary maintenance behavior of the Court is
one of identifying mutually exclusive grounds for recovery.
The Court's decision did not simply distinguish the substantive rights
established under Title VII and the NLRA. It also held that the substantive
rights created under one legal regime would not be enforced through the
procedural mechanisms of the other (or at least, that Title VII substantive
rights would not be enforced through NLRA procedures, which includes
the protection of concerted action). The black workers objected to this
result on the grounds that Title VII procedures were "inadequate to
effectively secure the rights conferred by Title VII."
Id. at 423. "[T]he Court's decision in Emporium Capwell ensured that the policy
promoting the resolution of industrial conflict would be articulated and enforced in
one procedural framework and doctrinal domain, while the policy prohibiting race
and gender-based discrimination would be articulated and enforced in a very
different framework/domain." Id. at 424.
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change implications of the litigation. When the risk of social change
persists, judges search for reasons to avoid the social change
implications in more general principles of law. Failing in that effort,
they subvert the law they are required to create by obscuring the
narrow legal grounds for the social change they are asked to order, by
clothing their decisions in general, imprecise principles. That is, they
undermine the legal force of the narrow law with which they insisted
plaintiffs comply. This generalizing of civil rights law takes several
forms.
First, courts generalize to cover up, and often to subvert, the law
which demands social change. This author has argued that the
activist insecurity was born in Brown v. Board of Education as a
Supreme Court infused with Realist sensibilities sought to cover up
the formalist grounds for its reconsideration of Plessey.4 Early in
the opinion, the Court reveals the true basis for its opinion: the
precedent of Plessey had been undercut by intervening decisions (and
perhaps changed social understandings).'49 It was required by these
facts to reaffirm Plessey or abandon it.'50 The choice to abandon
Plessey is surely animated by the social science and other
considerations which followed, but the necessity of a decision by the
Court was not.' 5' On formal legal grounds, Brown was necessary.
But, a realist court could never be comfortable with resting its
decision on this ground alone. Concerned with potentially violent
objections to the decision, the Court sought to conceal the formalist
grounds of its decision in arguments that were appealing to the then
dominant Realist sensibilities.' Almost immediately, this cover
subverted the force of the opinion, providing a hook for critics of the
outcome who spoke vaguely about correct outcomes but bad law.'
While the Court's resort to the general in Brown was not aimed at
subverting the law, the decision sets the framework for obscuring or
subverting social change decisions that become readily accessible in
subsequent years.
Second, resort to general law is used to limit broad civil rights
causes of action. Although § 1983 causes of action are conceived as
limited by the need to establish an underlying constitutional
violation, 54 experience has shown that even severe limitations on
148. See White, Activist Insecurity, supra note 24.
149. Brown, 347 U.S. at 491-92, 74 S. Ct. at 690-91. See also id. at 486-88,
490-91.
150. White, Activist Insecurity, supra note 24, at 373.
151. Id. at 374.
152. 1d. at 374-80.
153. See, e.g., Weschler, supra note 38; Bickel, Segregation, supra note 38. See
also White, Activist Insecurity, supra note 24, at 365-68.
154. See White, Vindicating Rights, supra note 22, at 166-176.
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constitutional rights do not sufficiently limit the scope and reach of
the § 1983 cause of action.155 In this light, the Court's recognition of
individual immunities can be understood as a resort to the general
principle, superimposed on the more narrow statute, to achieve
additional limiting effects.'56 Though not found on the face of §
1983, individual immunities were imposed on the statute because
immunities were firmly established in common law at the time the
statute was enacted.'57
This approach can also be noted in the Court's treatment of Title
VI claims, especially the question of whether such claims can be
established using evidence of disparate impact. Initially, the Court,
in Lau v. Nichols,58 extended the Title VII-based approach to the
analogous Title VI. By the time the Court decided Bakke in 1978,'
five justices held that Title VI was remedial only. In other words, it
155. Marshall Shapo anticipated this problem as early as 1965, arguing that
restriction of the growth of § 1983 litigation could be accomplished only by limiting
recovery to cases where the defendants conduct is "outrageous." Shapo, supra note
80 at 317. This seems to be the Court's view of the problem in its controversial
decision in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976). On the other hand,
certain recent substantive limitations might be more than adequate to foreclose a
wide variety of civil rights claims. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept.
of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
156. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001). Resort
to the common law as a source of content in § 1983 cases has been criticized in
Michael Wells, Constitutional Law and Civil Rights Symposium, Part I:
Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983 and the Common Law, 68 Miss. L.J. 157
(1998). Wells points out that the use of common law in the interpretation of § 1983
is complicated and multi-faceted. Id. at 160-76. He determines that the Court's use
of common law in this area is misdirected, however, and proposes that it break from
subordinating constitutional tort litigation to common law and develop a more
independent jurisprudence. See id. at 159-60, 222-23. His criticisms reveal, I
believe, the kind of use of common law principles to blunt the social change
implications of civil rights law generally.
157. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213 (1967). This proposition,
a cornerstone of civil rights jurisprudence, turns out to be largely inaccurate. Randy
Block has shown that absolute judicial immunity was recognized in only 13 of 37
states at the time § 1983 was enacted. J. Randolph Block, Stump v. Sparkman and
the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 Duke L.J. 879, 899. It was not applied to
prosecutors until 1896. Compare Griffin v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.E. 1001
(1896) with Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421, 96 S. Ct. 984, 990 (1976)
(citations omitted). On these points, I am indebted to my student, Alexandra White
(no relation), whose excellent class paper discusses these issues. Alexandra White,
The Case for Limiting the Scope ofProsecutorial Immunities Under § 1983: Where
Has All the "Well Grounded Historical Reasoning" Gone? (Paper submitted in
fulfillment of requirements of Civil Rights Litigation Course, Spring 2003) (on file
with author).
158. 414 U.S. 563, 94 S. Ct. 786 (1974) (disparate impact available because
regulations providing for disparate impact proof are reasonable under the statute).
159. 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733.
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lacked substantive content and disparate impact was precluded by the
Court's view that the substantive issue in the case was found in the
equal protection clause (which it had read to preclude disparate
impact in Washington v. Davis6°). The implication of Lau that the
regulations administering Title VI could add the broader disparate
impact proof, was called into question. In Guardians Assoc. v. Civil
Service Comm. of New York, 6' the court expressly raised these
concerns, rejecting an implied right of action for disparate impact
under Title VI, but reserving the question of whether regulations
providing such a proof could be enforced via a private right of
action.'"6 Finally, the court barred disparate impact proofs altogether
inAlexander v. Sandoval.'63 Significantly, by first constitutionalizing
Title VIjurisprudence, the Court succeeded in foreclosing a proof that
it had initially approved, all the while remaining true to precedent (by
avoiding overruling Lau).'64
Third, courts called on to change the social status quo ante often
resort to constitutional principle where the narrower legal ground
points to social change. In these cases, the goal is precisely to avoid
affecting social change. An example of this is found in the 1974
Supreme Court decision in Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational
Equality League.165 Mayor of Philadelphia involved a challenge to
a complicated state scheme for nominating members to the
Philadelphia School Board. The District Court denied plaintiffs'
claims under the equal protection clause, but the Circuit Court
reversed, arguing that the District Court had ignored probative
evidence. The Supreme Court reinstated the District Court decision.
Partly, the Supreme Court decision turns on its view that the Circuit
Court should not have second guessed the trial court's findings of
fact; 6 6 partly, it turned on the narrowing view that an injunction
should not run against a successor officeholder where there is no
specific evidence against him. 67 This second, narrowing approach
could be seen as anticipating Lyons 'limitation on injunctions.16' But
the decision also turned on the generalization of the case,
transforming it into a constitutional case on two grounds. First, the
160. 426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976).
161. 463 U.S. 582, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983).
162. Id. at645 n.18, 103 S. Ct. at 3255.
163. 532 U.S. 275, 121 S. Ct. 1511 (2001) (no private right of action exists to
enforce disparate impact regulations under Title VI).
164. The Court distinguishes and limits Lau but does not overrule it. See id. at
285, 121 S. Ct. at 1519.
165. 415 U.S. 605, 94 S. Ct. 1323.
166. Id. at 616-21, 94 S. Ct. at 1331-33.
167. Id. at 621-23, 94 S. Ct. at 1333-34.
168. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-06, 103 S. Ct. at 1667.
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Court refers to a vague "separation of powers" issue in the case. 69
Second, the Court's very decision on the constitutional ground was
probably unnecessary.
The Court acknowledges that "the Mayor's reliance on federal
separation-of-powers precedents is in part misplaced, because this
case, unlike those authorities, has nothing to do with the tripartite
arrangement of the Federal Constitution.""' The Court nevertheless
relies on this notion to establish that the courts should not interfere
with elected officials' exercise of state statute-granted discretion. 172
Ultimately, the Court holds that its view of the facts in the case makes
it unnecessary for it to resolve these issues, 173 but clearly it is
influenced by its view that it ought not interfere with the Mayor's
decisions.
More troubling, however, is the Court's eagerness, in the view of
Justice White's dissent, to reach the constitutional issue.'74 The
record revealed that the Mayor had, in fact, failed to comply with
numerous requirements of the statute in question.' 7  More
importantly, the plaintiffs had presented the argument below that the
statute itself required affirmative steps to ensure racial diversity on
the commission in question. 76  This requirement, if it were
believed,'77 would have provided a substantial legal ground for
plaintiffs to prevail. Justice White argued that the Court should have
followed the Siler and Ashwander doctrines and remanded the case
169. Mayor of Philadelphia, 415 U.S. at 615-16,94 S. Ct. 1330-31.
170. The Court defends its focus on constitutional issues by arguing that the state
issues were insubstantial. Id. at 623-29, 94 S. Ct. 1334-37.
171. Id. at 615, 94 S. Ct. at 1330-31.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 633-44, 94 S. Ct. 1339-45 (White, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 624, 94 S. Ct. 1335. The Majority dismisses these departures as
unsubstantial, but as White notes in dissent, competing arguments were made below
on the import of these departures; the departures must be viewed in the context of
competing views of the requirements of the statute, and the trial court refused to
rule on either ground. See id. at 638-39, 94 S. Ct. 1341-42 (White, J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 634, 94 S. Ct. 1339-40.
177. Although the [trial] court did not directly reach the state
claim, it though that the legislative history of the Educational
Supplement 'serves as the background for the facts of which
plaintiffs complain,' particularly the evidence that the
chairman of the Educational Home Rule Charter Commission,
which drafted the Educational Supplement, contemplated that
the composition of the Panel would 'constitute a balanced
representation or cross-section of the people of the entire
community - all of the community's ethnic, racial, economic,
or geographic element and segments.'
Id. at 635, 94 S. Ct. 1340 (citations omitted).
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for proceedings on the state issues.178 The Majority responded that
those issues were insubstantial.
The generalization in Mayor of Philadelphia takes place at the
District Court where the judge refused to consider the state law
questions and framed the case as solely a constitutional one. As
Justice White noticed, this move undercut the plaintiff's claim,
pointed the Supreme Court toward deciding an unnecessary
constitutional issue, and, if the plaintiffs had prevailed, would have
rooted their victory in the more vague, more difficult to enforce idea
of discrimination (as opposed to the statute's affirmative duty to
ensure that the selection commission was representative of the
Philadelphia community).
Fourth, courts sometimes generalize by creating general doctrines
to superimpose on all civil rights cases. Prominent among these is
what has been called "civil rights abstention, '1 79 but this approach
might also be used to explain the court's invigorated sovereign
immunity law, 8 ° and especially its reading of congressional power
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Civil rights abstention is a mutation of Younger abstention' into
a broad basis for denying statutorily established access to federal
courts on the grounds of comity and federalism.' It is rooted in the
Court's extension of Younger to civil cases in Huffinan v. Pursue,
Ltd. 84 and is related to a shift in the Court's focus from the "adequacy
178. Justice White though that the Siler doctrine should apply here, noting that
Siler, like the case at bar, involved appeal of a constitutional claim. The Court,
there also "without benefit of a construction of the statute by the highest court of
Kentucky" nevertheless chose to resolve the claim on the state law grounds. Id. at
637, 94 S. Ct. 1341 (citations omitted). The Siler doctrine was reviewable by the
court, according to White, despite not having been raised below. "[T]his Court
clearly has 'the power to notice a 'plain error' though it is not assigned or specified
.... " Id. at 642, 94 S. Ct. 1344 (citations omitted). See also Alma Motor Co. v.
Timken Co., 329 U.S. 129, 136, 67 S. Ct. 231, 233-34 (1946).
179. Bryce M. Baird, Comment, Federal Court Abstention in Civil Rights
Cases: Chief Justice Rehnquist and the New Doctrine of Civil Rights Abstention,
42 Buff. L. Rev. 501 (1994).
180. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 120 S. Ct. 631
(2000). See also, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114
(1996) and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
181. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999), a reading ascribed to City of Boeme v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
182. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971).
183. Baird, supra note 179, at 502-03,passim.
184. 420 U.S. 592, 95 S. Ct. 1200 (1975). See also Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327, 97 S. Ct. 1211 (1977); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 99 S. Ct. 2371 (1979);
Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 102 S. Ct. 177
(1981).
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of the state interest to the adequacy of the state forum"' 8 5 in cases
where there is state litigation and potential or actual federal litigation.
It is also consonant with the Court's reading of procedural due
process, excluding from coverage cases where post-deprivation state
proceedings exist.'8 6 In all cases, the broad notions of federalism,
unmoored from the equitable bases for Younger abstention, are
invoked to avoid potential social change implications of § 1983
litigation.
In the following Part, the activist insecurity is shown in operation.
Tracing the revival and demise of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the section
shows a powerful but narrowly defined right recognized in an opinion.
Lower courts which are forced to confront the powerful social change
implications of the statute apply it to several cases which arise under
the statute, but generalize the statute's basis. By locating the root of the
statutory force in constitutional principle, these lower court decisions
set up the statute's demise. In a series of Supreme Court decisions
following these lower court developments, the statute is transformed
into a "remedial statute" without substantive force. Finally, the court
invokes the language of the revival decision, understood in light of
constitutional provisions to finally destroy any force in the statute.
II. THE ACTvIST INSECURITY IN OPERATION: THE DEMISE OF 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3)187
This Part illustrates the operation of the activist insecurity in the
demise of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Section 1985(3) is an especially
promising focus for illustrating the activist insecurity's operation,
because it involves a unique revival decision, Griffin v. Breckenridge,
and because the subsequent Supreme Court decisions completely
destroy Griffin 's reading of the statute without ever overruling it.
Substantively, Griffin read § 1985(3) in a way that promised to provide
a balanced and effective response to ethno-violence and hate crimes. 8
In the wake of the statute's demise, the hate crimes legislation meant
185. Baird, supra note 179, at 540-42.
186. Parrattv. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981), overruled on other
grounds by, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986). See Baird,
supra note 179, at 542-44.
187. The discussion of Griffin v. Breckenridge and the right it identified in 42
U.S.C. § 985(3) is derived substantially from John Valery White, Vindicating
Rights in a Federal System: Rediscovering 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 's Equality Right,
69 Temp. L. Rev. 145, 153-160, 181-193, 216-28. The reader is encouraged to
consult that article for a more extensive discussion of the "Griffin right."
188. Id. at 235-43.
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to replace it has been the subject of heated debate. Those statutes are
normatively inferior to the Griffin construct, and point civil rights law
in a conservative or at least reactionary direction. Section 1985(3) is a
promising focus for an additional, important reason: the Griffin-right
was destroyed by liberal judges who were trying to apply the statute to
uphold plaintiffs' claims several years before the limiting period can
fairly be said to have begun. What is shown below is a statutory right
destroyed as insecure judges seek broader support in other statutes and
the Constitution for what § 1985(3) seems to require of them.
A. The Paradox of Griffin and Bray
The transformation of civil rights law can be illustrated through the
demise of § 1985(3). This transformation is evident in a comparison
between the revival decision, Griffin v. Breckenridge,89 and the
Supreme Court's rejection of § 1985(3)'s applicability to the claims in
Bray v. Alexandria Women s Health Clinic."9 Both cases involve
attacks on citizens for what they are incorrectly perceived as doing and
representing. They are attacked in an effort to send the message to
those engaging in the political behavior attributed to the victims that
their behavior is unwanted. In both cases the violence used against the
victims is meant to restrict them to what the perpetrators regard as the
victims' appropriate social role. Terror is employed in each case as a
tool in a very contentious political debate. Yet § 1985(3) provides a
remedy in 1971 to the black men mistaken for civil rights workers
while withholding that remedy to the women taken for "abortionists"
and beaten during the height of the abortion wars of the 1980s and early
1990s.
Bray leaves the unmistakable impression that, had the Griffin
plaintiffs sued in 1993 rather than 1971, they too would have lost.
However, Griffin has not been overruled; nor has any part of the
decision been criticized or called into doubt in the three Supreme Court
decisions since Griffin. Quite the contrary, Griffin is confidently cited
in Bray, Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. Novotny, 9'
and UnitedBrotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott 92 for the very
doctrines employed to deny recovery in those three cases.
Yet, Griffin 's § 1985(3) right did not die because a conservative
court set out to reign in civil rights law. 93 Rather, Griffin is undercut
189. 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790 (1971).
190. 506 U.S. 263, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
191. 442 U.S. 366, 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979).
192. 463 U.S. 825, 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983), reh 'g denied, 464 U.S. 875, 104 S.
Ct. 211.
193. Although it is a mostly conservative coalition of Justices who decided Bray,
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because federal courts are reluctant to give the statute and Griffin
their natural meaning. It dies because federal courts are afraid to be
employed as agents of social change. Overwhelmed by the activist
insecurity, federal judges generalized Griffin 's right. In doing so they
disturbed Griffn's careful balance of rights vindication and
federalism preservation, the repair of which obliged them to gut the
statute, conceiving of it as a redundant, narrower basis for § 1983
recovery.
Section 1985(3) was enacted as Section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871.194 Its principal provision provides recovery where:
Two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go
in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for
the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws ....
This language vexed courts that might have intended to revive the
statute. Consequently, the section was the last of the Reconstruction
Era statutes to be revived by the Supreme Court and has apparently
never fully overcome the troubling implications of its terms.
Ten years before Monroe v. Pape" initiated the Revival period,
the Supreme Court confronted 1985(3) in Collins v. Hardyman.97
In Collins, the Court refused to recognize a claim under the section
by members of a political club whose meeting was disrupted by
adherents of opposing political views.198 Central to the Court's
decision in Collins was its concern that extending § 1985(3) to
private action would transform all conspiracies to commit torts into
federal actions, a transformation the Court viewed as without
adequate constitutional authority. 99
and the 6-3 decision was written by Justice Scalia, the majority included Justice
White and a partial concurrence by Justice Souter. Mostly conservative justice
O'Connor was in dissent. Similarly, the conservative result in Scott was reached in
an opinion by the moderate-liberal Justice White commanding a bare majority that
also included the liberal Justice Stevens along with Chief Justice Burger, and
Justices Rehnquist and Powell. The Scott dissent by the liberal bloc of Blackmun,
Marshall and Brennan was also joined by Justice O'Connor. In Novotny the Court's
conservative justices achieved a conservative result in a broad coalition that
included moderately liberal justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell and Stevens.
Indeed, the unanimous Griffin decision was undone by a Novotny opinion penned
by the same justice, Justice Stewart. This article is, in part, a tale of how Stewart
is convinced to change his view of § 1985(3) in a mere seven years.
194. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
196. 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473 (1961).
197. 341 U.S. 651, 71 S. Ct. 937 (1951).
198. Id. at 653-54, 71 S. Ct. at 938.
199. Id. at 661, 71 S. Ct. at 941-42.
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In Griffin, twenty years after Collins and ten years after Monroe,
the Court determined that its concerns with potential constitutional
problems had been exaggerated. 2' Griffin involved the beating of
several black travelers on a northern Mississippi highway by a group
of white men who mistook one of the black travelers for a civil rights
worker. 20 1 Griffin's facts resemble very closely the all too frequent
terror against voting rights organizers, civil rights workers, and
ordinary black citizens by staunch segregationists in the South during
the Civil Rights Movement. The difference between Collins 's and
Griffin 's facts might alone explain the different results. However, the
Court had also already moved toward recognizing civil rights
protection against private acts.20 2 Together these elements produced
a forceful and unanimous decision.
But in Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Novotny,0 3 the Supreme Court eviscerated the statute. Section
1985(3), the Court noted, "provides no substantive rights itself; it
merely provides a remedy for violation of the rights it designates."2" 4
Since the "manner defined by the section" included the showing that
the conspiracy was motivated by "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus,""' the Court in Novotny
had effectively combined the competing teachings of Griffin to
require the identification of a class basis in the facts (gender in
Novotny) and an underlying right deprivation, the reach of which may
or may not cover private action.
Just what classes were covered and whether the underlying right
required state action (although § 1985(3) did not) were questions
raised in United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott.206 In
200. The Griffin Court stated:
Whether or not Collins v. Hardyman was correctly decided on its own
facts is a question with which we need not here be concerned. But it is
clear, in the light of the evolution of decisional law in the years that have
passed since that case was decided, that many of the constitutional
problems there perceived simply do not exist.
Griffin, 403 U.S. at 95-96, 91 S. Ct. at 1795.
201. Id. at 89-91, 91 S. Ct at 1792-93.
202. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 n.17, 86 S. Ct. 1170, 1179
(1966) (stating that rationale behind applying 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1969 & Supp. 1996)
to governmental interference with the right to travel supports extending the
protections of the statute to private interferences as well). Griffin cited Guest for
the proposition that "the right of interstate travel is constitutionally protected, does
not necessarily rest on the Fourteenth Amendment, and is assertable against private
as well as governmental interference." Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105-06, 91 S. Ct. at
1800 (citing Guest, 383 U.S. at 757-60 n.17, 86 S. Ct. at 1177-79).
203. 442 U.S. 366, 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979).
204. Id. at 372, 99 S. Ct. at 2349.
205. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. at 102, 91 S. Ct. at 1798 (1971).
206. 463 U.S. 825, 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983).
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Scott the Court rejected the claims of a construction company owner
and his non-union employees. They had been beaten by union
workers protesting the non-union shop in a union county. The
plaintiffs argued that their political association and speech rights were
violated. The Court found that animus based on union membership
did not constitute the kind of class-based animus necessary to invoke
the section's protection. The Court went further, emphasizing the
obvious, that violation of First Amendment association rights
required state action. 7 Because the section had been read as
requiring independent constitutional justification for its application
to a given set of facts and because it was deemed a remedial statute
only, the Scott Court needed only to resolve whether the Constitution
authorized use of the section to enforce associational rights against
private actions; the Court determined it did not.0 ' The Scott Court's
recognition that § 1985(3) applied to private action could not remove
the state action requirement from a case aimed at protecting
associational rights.
In 1993, in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,2°9 the
Supreme Court addressed 1985(3) in the context of a health center's
suit against abortion protesters blockading its clinic.' The plaintiffs
in Bray confronted several requirements under 1985(3). First, they
needed to show the existence of a conspiracy aimed at depriving them
of rights because of "racial, or ,erhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus. " Second, they needed to show
the deprivation of some right by that conspiracy.212 And third, if that
right could be violated only by state action they needed to show state
action or action under color of state law."3 The plaintiffs sought to
satisfy these requirements by modeling their allegations on Griffin 's
facts. They alleged, inter alia, a conspiracy against women seeking
abortions in violation of a woman's right to interstate travel.2"4
For the Court, Justice Scalia found the plaintiffs' allegations were
insufficient to invoke the protection of the statute. They failed, he
argued, to satisfy either the "class-based" animus requirement or the
207. Id. at 834-36, 103 S. Ct. at 3359-61. The animus in question was said to
be "political." Id. at 846, 103 S. Ct. at 3365.
208. Id. at 832-33, 103 S. Ct. at 3358 (First Amendment violation requires state
action, which is therefore an essential element of a § 1985(3) claim alleging
violation of association rights).
209. 506 U.S. 263, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
210. Id. at 266-67, 113 S. Ct. at 758.
211. Id. at 268, 113 S. Ct. At 758-59 (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
at 102, 91 S. Ct. at 1798).
212. Bray, 506 U.S. at 268, 113 S. Ct. at 758 (citing Scott, 463 U.S. at 833, 103
S. Ct. at 3358).
213. See Bray, 506 U.S. at 278, 113 S. Ct. at 764.
214. Id. at 274-75, 113 S. Ct. at 762.
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requirement that the right violated be one which protects against
private action.1 5 While Justice Scalia's opinion perhaps goes beyond
what is necessary to dispose of the case,2 6 it is not inconsistent with
the Court's precedent.
This anomaly, Bray in the shadow of Griffin, is the direct result
of the Court's characterization of the section as "remedial. 2 7 By
reading the section as remedial only, the Court not only eliminates
any practical differences between this section and 1983, but also
imports the problems and jurisprudence of 1983 to the related but
distinct 1985(3). It is the move from Griffin's substantive right to the
"remedial" statute design adopted byNovotny and Scott that demands
explanation. On inspection, lower federal courts are shown to have
bungled the Griffin right as they were consumed by the activist
insecurity. To understand this fully, a more detailed discussion of
Griffin 's right is needed.
B. Section 1985(3) and the Griffin Right
In Griffin v. Breckenridge, the Supreme Court tacitly overruled its
earlier decision in Collins v. Hardyman,21 and interpreted § 1985(3)
to reach private conspiracies to deprive persons of the "equal
protection of the laws" and "equal privileges and immunities under
215. Id. at 268, 113 S. Ct. at 758.
216. Justice Scalia equates "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus" with the specific intent requirement in Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection cases: "'Discriminatory Purpose' ... implies more
than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the
decisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its averse effects upon an identifiable group."
Bray, 506 U.S. at 271-72, 113 S. Ct. at 760 (quoting from Personnel Adm'r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2296 (1979)). This becomes
the basis for Justice Scalia's argument that animus aimed at pregnancy-related
conditions does not constitute animus against women. Id. at 271, 99 S. Ct. at 2292.
See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,494-95, 94 S. Ct. 2485,2491(1974) (holding
that excluding pregnancy for covered disabilities not invidious discrimination based
on sex in violation of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause).
217. As Professor Banks noted:
The characterization in Novotny of section 1985(3) as remedial is without
question the greatest limitation that the Court has placed on the statute.
Requiring plaintiffs to invoke some independent right whose denial section
1985(3) is suppose to remedy practically emasculates the provision since
most federal statutory rights have their own exclusive administrative and
judicial remedies and very few constitutional provisions apply against
private persons.
Taunya Lovell Banks, Rethinking Novotny in Light of United Brotherhood of
Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott: The Scope and Constitutionally Permissible
Periphery of Section 1985(3), 27 How. L. J. 1497, 1513 (1984) (footnote omitted).
218. 341 U.S. 651, 71 S. Ct. 937 (1951).
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the laws."2 9 Section 1985(3), enacted as § 2 of the 1871 Civil Rights
Act, is the third act codified under the heading "Conspiracy to
interfere with civil rights" as 1985 of Title 42.220 Subsection 3 creates
an action for injuries resulting from acts in furtherance of four
separate conspiracies: (i) conspiracies to deprive persons of equal
protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the
laws; (ii) conspiracies to prevent authorities of a State or Territory
from securing equal protection of the laws; (iii) conspiracies to
prevent entitled citizens from exercising their right to vote; and (iv)
conspiracies to injure supporters or advocates of the underlying rights
protected by the section. 1 The central prohibition, and the subject
of both Collins and Griffin, is the first conspiracy: to deprive persons
of "equal protection of the laws, or equal privileges and immunities
under the laws."
The Griffin Court easily rejected Collins' concerns with private
deprivations of equal protection of the laws, or equal privileges and
immunities under the laws, stating, "in the light of the evolution of
decisional law in the years that have passed since that case was
decided, that many of the constitutional problems there perceived
219. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 104, 91 S. Ct. at 1799.
220. Section 1985(1) prohibits conspiracies aimed at preventing "any person
from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United
States, or from discharging any duties thereof .... 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1). Section
1985(2) prohibits obstructions ofjustice and intimidations ofparties, witnesses, and
jurors. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2).
221. 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)). The full text
provides, in full:
(3) If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the
constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to
all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws;
or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or
threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support
or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any
lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or
as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in
person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of
conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein
do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the party so injured may have an action for the recovery of
damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or
more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
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simply do not exist." ' The difficulty recognized in Collins,
nevertheless, led the Court to give meaning to the section by
constructing a distinct right to equality from its face. The Court went
on to argue:
That the statute was meant to reach private action does not,
however, mean that it was intended to apply to all tortious,
conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others. For,
though the supporters of the legislation insisted on coverage
of private conspiracies, they were equally emphatic that they
did not believe. . . "that Congress has a right to punish an
assault and battery when committed by two or more persons
within a State."22
The Griffin Court avoids these potential problems "by requiring, as
an element of the cause of action, the kind of invidiously
discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the limiting
amendment .... [T]here must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators' action." '224
The "right" is internal in this construction. The Griffin Court's
limitation of the statute to an injury that infringes freedom from
invidious discrimination serves a broader purpose than the intentional
discrimination corollaries in §§ 1981 and 1982 cases.22 5 Without the
internal substantive limitations of 1981 (limited to contracts) and
1982 (limited to property contracts), this furtive limitation not only
prevents a deluge of tort actions in federal courts, it provides
substantive coverage. Its location and purpose in the Griffin opinion
implies that it is an independent right to be free of offensive treatment
when such treatment, related to the victim's vulnerability to
subjugation by her fellow citizens, deprives that victim of meaningful
citizenship--in other words, it contains a right to substantially
meaningful citizenship.
This is the key construct in Griffin, one which the Court drew
fully formed from the Solicitor General's argument on brief:
[I]t was precisely to overcome the objection that the bill
encompassed all ordinary torts and crimes that [§ 1985(3)]
was amended to confine its reach to deprivations of equality,
rather than any deprivation of rights .... Nor was this a
222. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 95-96, 91 S. Ct. at 1795.
223. Id. at 101-02,91 S. Ct. at 1798 (quoting Cong. Globe, 42dCong., 1st Sess.
485 (1871) (statement of Rep. Cook)).
224. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102, 91 S. Ct. at 1798.
225. For a discussion of the intent requirements in those statutes, see White,
supra note 22, at 176-81.
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meaningless change of words .... We fully accept the
statement in Collins v. Hardyman, that there is no deprivation
of "equal protection" or of "equal privileges and immunities"
within the meaning of Section 1985(3) "to assault one
neighbor without assaulting them all, or to libel some persons
- ! ,,2 2 6
without mention of others.
Under the Griffin model, 1985(3) creates a self-limiting right, internal
to the statute and independent of other statutes which, as the Solicitor
General noted, would be "wholly superfluous in light of section
1983" if read to require state action.
Contrary to Griffin 's construction, subsequent readings of the
statute locate the "right" protected by 1985(3) outside the statute and
require invidious intent in order to limit the statute's reach.228 Section
1985(3) speaks of conspiracies aimed at depriving both "equal
protection of the laws" and "equal privileges and immunities under
the laws." "Equal protection of the laws"--plural-is consistent with
the view that deprivation of underlying rights trigger the section.
However, the additional concern of 1985(3) is deprivation of "equal
privileges and immunities under the laws. '229 The section's reference
is not designed in terms of corollary duties of state and citizen, but
rather a general guarantee to all persons under the power of the
authority of state and federal laws. 230 The reference to "equal
226. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14-15, Griffin, 403 U.S. at
88, 91 S. Ct. at 1790 (1971) (No. 70-144).
227. "Since the plaintiffs in Giffin... were Negro citizens of
Mississippi and charged harassment on racial grounds, the
Court expressly reserved the question whether conspiracy
motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than
racial bias would be actionable under § 1985(3). Since then
the task of defining the scope of the private conspiracy cause
of action under § 1985(3) has been going forward in the lower
federal courts."
Id (citations omitted).
228. See Novotny, 442 U.S. at 372, 99 S. Ct. at 2349 (following Griffin).
229. This language is significantly different from its Fourteenth Amendment
analogue, which the Slaughter-House Cases read as lacking practical consequence.
The section refers to "equal privileges and immunities" of "laws," plural and
general, while the amendment refers to "privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States," singular and specific.
230. Representative Poland's statement is illuminating:
I do agree ... if a state make[s] proper laws and ha[s] proper officers to
enforce those laws, and somebody undertakes to step in and clog justice
... then I do claim that we have the right to make such interference an
offense against the United States;... we have a right to say that anybody
who undertakes to interfere and prevent the execution of that state law is
amenable . .. to the law that we may make under [the Fourteenth
Amendment] declaring it to be an offense against the United States.
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privileges and immunities under the laws," thus, suggests (1) a
person's benefit under all laws, and (2) without regard to the person's
citizenship status.231 Again the reading of the Solicitor General iscompelling:
[I]n our view, the attempt to particularize the rights affected
is both unreal and unnecessary in a case like the present one.
. . . Indeed, in the typical instance of this kind, the
conspirators have no more specific object than to deter black
citizens from asserting a claim to equality in civic life .... It
is enough under the statute, we believe, if the evidence reveals
a conspiracy to prevent Negroes from equally enjoying their
legal rights generally ....
In most contexts, that comes to the same thing as alleging
a purpose to terrorize or otherwise intimidate black citizens
on account of their race.232
As this reading emphasizes, the Grifin model prohibits terror.
The Griffin model protects a person's equality under the laws
from deprivation de facto through the conspiracies of her fellow
citizens. Conceived as a limiting provision, the "invidiously
discriminatory" requirement establishes an internal, self-limiting right
to equality. Such a right supplants state tort law only when the injury
is invidiously discriminatory. It supersedes state tort actions only
when a citizen's equal protection of the laws and equal privileges and
immunities under the laws are threatened-when the value of a
person's full citizenship, the value of living under a legitimate system
of laws, is at risk.
Griffin does more than articulate a unique approach to vindicating
"right." The opinion establishes an altogether unique conception of
"right." This Griffin-right fundamentally differs from more familiar
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong. 1st Sess. 514 (1871) (statement of Rep. Poland).
231. Section 1985(3)'s protection of the benefits of the laws-general-is
buttressed by the section's coverage of conspiracies that deprive persons of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws "directly or indirectly." The language of
the section does not mandate any difference between intentional and incidental
deprivations of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities. A reasonable,
if not necessary, understanding of these words is that § 1985(3) focuses on the
effect of the conspiracy on the person's enjoyment of the privileges and immunities
of the laws, no matter the substance and no matter whether state or federal in origin.
Significantly, the section is not limited to citizens, except in the clause
prohibiting conspiracies involving voting. The enjoyment of a legal system's
privileges and immunities thus extends most broadly to all who might benefit from
the existence of the rule of law, rather than the particular injunctions of specific
laws.
232. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16-18, Griffin, 403 U.S. at
88, 91 S. Ct. at 1790 (1971) (No. 70-144).
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conceptions of "right," vindicated under §§ 1981 & 1982, § 1983, or
Title VII. Compared to the substantive manifestations of those
vindication approaches, the distinctive nature of the Griffin right is
readily apparent.2 a3
Griffin although in no way as influential as Brown v. Board of
EducationTM or Roe v. Wade,235 presents a third model for the
vindication of rights that transcends the tension inherent between
Brown and Roe. While Roe juxtaposes the individual and state, and
Brown the individual and institution, with the consequent broad-
prospective protection of rights for formal and informal groups of
individuals, Griffin focuses on the consequences of actions on the
relation of persons to the state, regardless of whether they belong to
a formal group, and regardless of whether the action is actually
initiated by, or attributed to, the state or its institutions. This third
model, perhaps more importantly, transcends the psychological injury
requirement that underlies both Roe and Brown and commits each to
the unbounded individualist bias that ultimately dismantled the
Brown regime and left only Roe.236 The linchpin of the Griffin
approach, and the basis of its own unfortunate demise, is its focus on
the consequences of actions on contextualized persons.
This new conception of rights was not to survive long. Griffin
was fundamentally about finding a way to give § 1985(3) its apparent
scope and effect while limiting it to avoid supplanting state law. This
balance is achieved in Griffin by focusing the cause of action on
protecting the value of equal citizenship, violated when conspirators'
behavior (1) is aimed at undermining the citizenship of identifiable
classes of citizens (the racial or perhaps other class-based animus)
and (2) which has the effect of doing so (the animus is invidiously
discriminatory). Because these are interrelated, the balance they
struck was easily disrupted. And, when lower courts confronted the
post-Griffin cause of action, they proceeded to remove the limiting
components of the formula, sending them on a desperate search for
additional limitations that ultimately spelled the end of the section's
viability.
C. Griffin and Bray: Problem of Precedent and Intervening Cases
It is not uncommon for precedent to change meaning as
subsequent cases put it in a new light. The issue is whether precedent
of any type can be said to preserve any particular meaning which
233. See White, supra note 22, at 160-205.
234. 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954).
235. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
236. For this discussion, see White, supra note 22, at 206-16.
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must be preserved if we are to say it is precedent. If some core
meaning must be preserved, some view of the case itself and how it
is transformed is necessary to determine what the core meaning is and
if it has been abandoned. In Griffin the prior decision in Collins is
disregarded. The Griffin Court argues expressly that Collins was
limited to its facts and impliedly overrules its broader implications.237
In Bray, by contrast, Griffin is neither criticized, nor overruled.
Rather it is cited for propositions that seem to run against its own
reasoning and outcome.23 But it must still be asked whether this
distinction is one with a difference.
The force of precedent is a subject well beyond the scope of this
article. However, it is clear that there are accepted norms permitting
the disregarding of "binding" precedent in certain circumstances thus
allowing for substantial growth in the law. As Duncan Kennedy has
shown, the restraint "the law" as it is placed on "how-I-want-to-come-
out" is less severe than usually assumed.239 Judges are only relatively
restrained by precedent according to the tightness of the precedent"'
and the energies of the judge:
[W]e might hypothesize that the probability that a judge will
move the law so as to achieve any given result is smaller in
proportion as the work and the credibility risk involved are
greater, and that the total quantity and quality of work
available from the judicial labor force limit the total amount
of legal movement we can expect in any given direction.24'
This process is heavily dependent on context, meaning that a "rule
may at any given moment appear objective; but at the next moment
it may appear manipulable. It is not .. essentially one thing or the
other.''2 2 It is not so much the shift from Griffin to Bray that
237. "Whether or not Collins v. Hardyman was correctly decided on its own
facts is a question with which we need not here be concerned. But it is clear, in the
light of the evolution of decisional law in the years that have passed since that case
was decided, that many of the constitutional problems there perceived simply do not
exist." Griffin, 403 U.S. at 95-96, 91 S. Ct. at 1795.
238. The opinion opens, for example, with the statement, "Our precedents
establish that in order to prove a private conspiracy in violation of the first clause
of § 1985(3), a plaintiff must show, inter alia, (1) that 'some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class based, invidiously discriminatory animus lay behind the
conspirators' action,' Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).. ." Bray, 506
U.S. at 267-68, 113 S. Ct. 758.
239. See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. Legal Educ. 518 (1986), reproduced in Critical Legal
Studies (James Boyle, ed., 1992).
240. Id. at 526-30.
241. Id. at 559.
242. Id. at 562.
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demands explanation, then, so much as the nature and propriety of
that shift. What is going on between Griffin and Bray can be
compared and contrasted with a few lines of cases with the effect of
highlighting the true paradox of the situation. This paradox is what
is explained below.
First, as was the case between Collins and Griffin, courts might
distinguish and limit the facts of the prior case from the latter. This
is, after all, the practice that defines the use of precedent. For sure,
this process is less definite than it appears. Jan Deutsch's Precedent
and Adjudication243 demonstrates the ways in which, in a single line
of decisions, fact findings are often misunderstood or manipulated
with the result of clouding just what precedent is. Nevertheless, this
is not the case between Griffin and Bray. Indeed, it seems that there
is a transformation of the law or the role of certain legal findings and
rules in Griffin that transform the context in which the facts are
understood in Bray.
Second, the application of law to new factual circumstances and
in new contexts, might expose the limitations of the prior precedent.
From Plessy to Brown this seems to be what happens. The social
context of Plessy lent force and support to the assumptions of Plessy
which allowed Plessy to be used to justify applications of its separate
but equal rule that went far beyond the limits of its facts. As the
anthropological and social beliefs underlying the decision changed,
its assumptions were put to test in cases which exposed them as
generally false. Bit by bit the false equality of separate but equal was
exposed. Eventually the question of separation was raised in
circumstances implying that equality was impossible with
separation.244 Brown, then represented more the demise of Plessy as
precedent than it did the abandonment of Plessy. While the Court did
not necessarily have to abandon the Plessy rule, it would have had to
reaffirm the opinion if it was to preserve the, by then, frayed
precedent.
Griffin to Bray might be understood in this light, consistent with
the "conservative judges" theory of civil rights law's demise. That is,
one could argue that the social context of Griffin, in the immediate
aftermath of the civil rights movement, where white violence was
becoming to be widely condemned, dictated its result. Bray, on the
other hand, occurring outside that time and involving a different
political dispute (one which a majority of the Court perhaps has a
preferred side), simply cannot benefit from the Griffin precedent.
243. 83 Yale L.J. 1553 (1974).
244. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S. Ct. 848 (1950); McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637,70 S. Ct. 851 (1950); Henderson v. United
States, 339 U.S. 816, 70 S. Ct. 843 (1950).
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This story, however, is not a story of precedent, but of raw politics.
The compatibility of the "conservative judges" explanation with this
vision of Griffin and Bray is not at all a useful explanation of the
operation of law. Rather, it says only that there is no law (in the sense
that law is distinguishable from raw politics).
Moreover, Griffin 's precedent, unlike Plessey's was never shown
to have fallen apart in operation. Unfortunately, as shown below,
Griffin is never given a chance to operate on its own terms. That is,
in some respects Griffin is never treated as precedential. Its holdings
and implications are ignored in favor of the lower court's more
general vision of the role of civil rights law. By Bray, Griffin is not
viewed as binding the Court so much as it is viewed as the repository
of general constitutional principles-to wit, the Constitution is not a
font of general tort law.245 In none of the intervening cases is
Griffin's application to new facts shown to undercut the decision's
assumptions; instead, the assumptions of Griffin are simply ignored.
Third, the Griffin/Bray paradox can be viewed as representative
of the Court's approach to precedent in civil rights and related cases.
That is, in several areas it seems that the Court has simply
disregarded the precedential background in its move to a
fundamentally different regime. These transformations, like that from
Griffin to Bray, do not require the invalidation or even the criticism
of the prior precedent. Rather, the prior precedent is generalized and
thus subverted, creating room for narrower holdings to undercut the
law in question. This move might be identified in the Supreme
Court's cases applying procedural due process to property and liberty
deprivations'" from Goldberg v. Kelly24 7 through Mathews v.
245. "We have noted the 'constitutional shoals' that confront any attempt to
derive from congressional civil rights statutes a body of general federal tort law,
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1971); a fortiori, the procedural
guarantees of the Due Process Clause cannot be the source for such law." Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1160.
246. It might also be explained in the Court's state action cases from Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836 (1948) (enforcement of private restrictive
covenants by courts constitutes state action, triggering Fourteenth Amendment
coverage) and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856
(1961) (state financed and owned parking authority is public entity subjecting its
restaurant tenant to requirements of Fourteenth Amendment), to Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S. Ct. 1965 (1972) (reducing Burton to factual
determination and refusing to extend to private club which holds liquor licence from
state), to Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 93 S. Ct. 2804 (1973) (state aid to
discriminatory private schools is illegal state action), and on to Jackson v. Metro
Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974) (Burton reduced to case where factual
nexus establishes state action, a test not met by action of heavily regulated utility
providing public services under at least de facto monopoly), Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S. Ct. 1729 (1978) (state law authorizing creditor's sale
does not take action of private entity conducting such a sale state action) and NCAA
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Eldridge248 and Paul v. Davis.249 In six short years the radical
implications of Goldberg were completely subverted. The decision
has never been overruled but is substantially compromised.
Goldberg recognized a liberty interest in social entitlements, the
deprivation of which required notice and an opportunity to be heard.
The key finding was that even temporary deprivations of welfare
payments for the poor compromised their life chances. Consequently,
Goldberg came quite close to either establishing social welfare as a
fundamental right or recognizing poverty as a suspect classification.
In any case, Goldberg represented the Court's recognition of the "new
property" as a basis of constitutional rights.25 These implications of
Goldberg were qualified soon after in Rogers v. Rush2 ' where the
Court explained that Goldberg's due process rights were rooted, not
in the Constitution but the general law-liberty and property were
subject to due process requirements because they are established in
state or other law. In Mathews, the Court then established that post-
deprivation process would satisfy procedural due process in most
instances. The Court had transformed and neutered Goldberg's
broader implications by initially narrowing the basis of the right and
then generalizing the right itself to include procedures available in
other regimes. Goldberg's death was then confirmed in Paul v.
Davis, where the court held that listing a person on a flyer containing
the names of "known shoplifters" with neither notice nor a trial did
not constitute deprivation of due process. Rather, the Court sought
to distinguish between constitutional rights and "mere torts" deciding
that the common law tort of slander did not, without more, state a
constitutional claim.
The key finding in Paul makes no sense without the prior
holdings of Rogers and Mathews. With the right rooted in state law
(the narrowing move) and the remedy disconnected from a particular
federal-law mandated response, the Court's line between
constitutional and state rights seems clear. The plaintiff's right is not
the right to be free from punishment without a trial (a right that would
v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988) (private entity made up
substantially of state actors and which compelled state actor to act is not itself a
state actor).
In this line, the broad statements of Shelley and Burton are initially reduced to
statements on the unique facts of the cases, then generalized into a rule that private
entanglement with state entities does not, normally, constitute state action. So that
by Tarkanian, the private entity's entangled action is viewed as presumptively
private.
247. 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970).
248. 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976).
249. 424 U.S. 693, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976).
250. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964).
251. 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972)
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transcend state law), but the right to be free from slanders to his
reputation (a state law right). Because the state law undoubtedly has
procedures to address deprivations of the right which it defines, it is
unnecessary to provide constitutional protection without showing
more.
What more must be shown is established by the cases which the
Paul Court struggled to distinguish. In Wisconsin v. Constantineau2
52
the Court had found that deprivation of the right to buy alcohol by
having one's name placed on a list of "known alcoholics" did violate
due process. This was a Goldberg-like holding that could be
explained by a "conservative judges" theory: by the time of Paul the
Court was uncomfortable with broad procedural due process
protections. And so it was. But the legal innovations of the
intervening years that made the distinction work were the narrowing
and generalizing moves. While it still seems strange that one can be
punished for shoplifting without a trial (Paul) but one cannot be
called an alcoholic and limited in one's right to purchase alcohol
without notice and an opportunity to be heard, the innovations of
Rogers and Mathews power the distinction. Per Rogers the right to
buy alcohol is a state granted privilege, ordinarily restricted only
according to age. Deprivation of that right is equivalent to the taking
of "old property," that established by the common law. And, while
it is not clear today what process would be due, it was clear in 1976
that post-deprivation process would not be adequate to resolve this
"old property" problem.
With the shift from Goldberg to Paul, the Court could continue
to develop the Goldberg "new property" approach to due process,
without the radical implications Goldberg suggested. In Ingraham v.
Wright253 the court could recognize a liberty interest in freedom from
paddling without disrupting state corporal punishment regimes (since
the right was based on state law) and, in any case without providing
a federal cause of action (since post deprivation process was deemed
adequate). In Vitek v. Jones25 the Court could recognize a liberty
interest in not being transferred from prison to a mental institution,
despite its earlier holding in Meacham v. Fano255 that there was no
liberty interest implicated by transfer from a medium to maximum
security prison. The determinative factor was whether there was a
residual expectation of liberty held by prisoners that was implicated
by the transfer to the mental institution. And, in Owen v. City of
252. 400 U.s. 433, 91 S. Ct. 507 (1971).
253. 430 U.S. 651, 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977).
254. 445 U.S. 480, 100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980).
255. 427 U.S. 215, 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976).
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Independence,256 the Court could require a name-clearing hearing for an
at will employee dismissed under circumstances sullying his reputation.
These changes amounted to tinkering with the basic distinction in Paul
between real constitutional rights and mere torts. Yet all were
undertaken under the umbrella of the now moribund Goldberg.
D. Anti-Formalism and the Destruction of§ 1985(3): Novotny and
Scott
"Since the plaintiffs in Griffin. . were Negro citizens of
Mississippi and charged harassment on racial grounds, the Court
expressly reserved the question whether conspiracy motivated by
invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be
actionable under § 1985(3). Since then the task of defining the
scope of the private conspiracy cause of action under § 1985(3)
has been going forward in the lower federal courts.""
If my argument in parts Ill, A & B is believed, Griffin revived a
rights warrior from the grave to which the state action requirement of
Collins v. Hardyman had banished it. An alternative approach to rights,§ 1985(3) was readied to banish from the social landscape conspiracies
depriving individuals of meaningful equality of citizenship. In a series
of decisions that prompted far too little controversy for its significant
disruption of this interesting balance, the Supreme Court transformed the
Griffin-informed statute into no more than a very limited means of
enforcing rights declared elsewhere. Having been transformed into a
mere corollary of§ 1983, this potentially magnificent defender of rights
hobbled into obscurity, defending only what in changed times were the
rare and insubstantial rights inherent in the Griffin facts.
The destruction ofthe Griffin construct proceeded in three stages. In
Novotny the Court declared the statute "remedial only." This was the
most consequential holding for future interpretations of the section. As
Professor Taunya Lovell Banks noted,
The characterization in Novotny of section 1985(3) as remedial
is without question the greatest limitation that the Court has
placed on the statute. Requiring plaintiffs to invoke some
independent right whose denial section 1985(3) is suppose [sic]
to remedy practically emasculates the provision since most
federal statutory rights have their own exclusive administrative
and judicial remedies and very few constitutional provisions
apply against private persons."'
256. 445 U.S. 662, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980).
257. Phillips v. Trello, 502 F.2d 1000, 1005 (3rd Cir. 1974) (citations omitted).
258. Taunya Lovell Banks, RethinkingNovotny In Light ofUnited Brotherhood
of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott: The Scope and Constitutionally Permissible
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Next, in Scott, the Supreme Court ruled that if the underlying rights
alleged to have been violated required state action, the § 1985(3)
plaintiff must prove state action to prevail. Scott also held that the
classes of citizens protected by the section were limited. These
determinations were merely extensions of Novotny since, by Scott, the
right of action created by the section was distinct from the 1871 act
corollary, § 1983, only in its application to the rare cases resembling
the Griffin facts. In the third stage any hope that cases resembling
Griffin's facts might state a § 1985(3) cause of action was dashed in
Bray. In Bray Justice Scalia's opinion for the court applied
Fourteenth Amendment-based specific intent requirements to the
class based animus requirement and located an independent specific
intent requirement for the underlying rights alleged violated by the
conspiracy.
Thus, by Bray the unique response to the plaintiffs' allegations in
Griffin had been jettisoned. It no longer matters that both federal and
state created laws and rights were violated by the Griffin defendants
or that the Griffin opinion spent no time discussing specific intent to
violate such rights. Nor is it any longer of consequence that the
Griffin Court did not concern itself with whether the invidious animus
of the defendants was aimed at the plaintiffs (as opposed to the
persons for whom they were mistaken), or that the defendants
assaulted both the mistaken activists and hangers on alike. If
anything survives of Griffin it seems that black citizens beaten by
white men in civil rights-era Mississippi raises a cause of action."'
The inevitable question, treated below, is how did this happen? The
answer, in short, is that the Courts have evidenced a troubling lack of
allegiance to law-the very kind of legal formalism that rights
advocates generally disdain and rights conservatives celebrate, but
which here is abandoned by both in ways that force questions which
the Supreme Court is lead to believe it must answer. This is less the
Periphery of Section 1985(3), 27 How. L. J. 1497, 1513 (1984) (citations omitted).
259. Ofcourse, such an argument for the section's appropriateness inthe context
of similarly acrimonious abortion controversies such as alleged in Bray is very
powerful. Nevertheless, it is troubling that the undeniable complexities of Griffin
are reduced to such a trite metaphors as "the '60s" or "the civil rights movement."
Indeed such an approach - however potentially useful it may have been in theory
to the Bray plaintiffs - is exposed by the Bray opinion to be a means of confining
legal doctrine to "special times" - that is to say, denying that legal doctrine was
created and characterizing the developments of the period as abandonments of the
rule of law to cope with emergencies. It is submitted that such a view of civil rights
law, however popular, is an outrage, legitimizing the terrorism and lawlessness that
necessitated lawsuits like Griffin by imbuing the racism of the period with
ostensibly reasoned defenses of the very rule of law absent throughout Jim Crow
and disregarded by overt and subtle white supremacists while casting the defenders
of law as naive firebrands responsible for their own subordination.
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story of"conservative judges" hell-bent on destroying civil rights law.
Instead it is the revealing tale of liberal judges sullying the Griffin
construct in an activist insecurity related effort to buttress the cause
of action.
1. Disarming the Warrior: Novotny and the Requirement of
Externally Defined Rights
Novotny is best known for declaring that Title VII's
administrative procedures were exclusive. 260 However, that question
arises in Novotny because the case also presented a substantial §
1985(3) issue. The presence of these two legislative regimes, one
specific and detailed with complex administrative procedures, the
other general with apparently broad scope, no doubt affected the
Supreme Court's resolution of the case. Consistent with the first
move of the activist insecurity, the court favored the narrower, more
specific cause of action, over the broader, more general cause.
However important this fact may have been and however reasonable
the Court's final resolution may, therefore, seem to the casual reader,
the Supreme Court's rulings on § 1985(3) were particularly
devastating to the Griffin construction and the future viability of §
1985(3). The root of the section's ultimate demise, planted firmly in
Novotny, is not an antagonistic judiciary. Rather, as the following
pages document, the section's demise resulted from largely
sympathetic lower court decisions that failed to embrace the
implications of Griffin in favor of more familiar but ultimately more
restrictive constitutional equal protectionjurisprudence. It is Griffin 's
reception in the lower courts, then, that is closely examined below.
a. Novotny Below: (Re)equipping the Warrior for Battle
In January of 1975 the board of directors of Great American
Federal Savings and Loan Association (GAF) voted to terminate the
employment of John R. Novotny, a fellow board member and
"undesignated" employee.26' Novotny alleged that, in the course of
his 24 odd years of employment, he had come to understand that his
fellow board members "intentionally and deliberately embarked upon
and pursued a course of conduct the effect of which was to deny
260. The district court in Novotny found that the plaintiff was not the proper
party to raise Title VII discrimination claims. See Novotny, 442 U.S. at 369 n.5, 99
S. Ct. at 2347. That court also dismissed the plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claims,
which were subsequently revived by the Third Circuit. Id. at 370 n.6, 99 S. Ct. at
2348.
261. See Novotny, 584 F.2d 1235, 1238 (1978).
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female employees equal employment opportunity. '262  Novotny
further alleged that in the summer of 1984 he "took up" the cause of
Betty Batis before the board. Batis was a female employee whom
Novotny claimed experienced sex discrimination in the company. In
response to his advocacy of Batis' cause, Novotny claimed he was
fired.263 Novotny brought actions under Title VII and § 1985(3),
alleging the board conspired to deprive him of his rights in retaliation
for "his advocacy of the cause of equal rights for women in the
corporation. 2
6
(1) The District Court
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
dismissed Novotny's suit.265 It had little difficulty with the fact that
Novotny was not a member of the class alleged to be protected,266
simultaneously extending the act to cover the invidious class of
women.261 It nevertheless found no conspiracy, citing the Seventh
Circuit's decision that there was no § 1985(3) conspiracy where the
agents of a single business entity participated in a decision to commit
a single act.268
262. 584 F.2d at 1237. The complaint, as quoted in Novotny, lists eight specific
practices alleged to limit the opportunities of women at GAF. Id. at 1237 n. 1.
263. See Novotny, 584 F.2d at 1238.
264. Novotny, 584 F.2d at 1238.
265. Novotny v. Great Ani. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 430 F. Supp. 227 (W.D.
Pa. 1977).
266. Id. at 229 ("Novotny is not barred from bringing this suit [for
discrimination against women] under § 1985(3) simply because he is a male since
he alleges suffering a sex-based discrimination.").
267. Id. at 229, citing Pendrell v. Chatham Coll., 386 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa.
1974) ("We realize that Pendrell, as a woman, was a member of the protected
class."). This issue is more contentious than the district court gave it credit for, as
would become clear in Bray, see supra text accompanying notes 209-16. The
question of what constitutes a protected class, central to the Griffin balance,
remained unaddressed in that case: "We need not decide, given the facts of this
case, whether a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than
racial bias would be actionable under the portion of § 1985(3) before us." Griffin,
403 U.S. at 103 n.9, 91 S. Ct. at 1798.
268. Id. at 229-30, citing Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir.
1972):
... [I]f the challenged conduct is essential a single act of discrimination
by a single business entity, the fact that two or more agents participated in
the decision or in the act itself will normally not constitute the conspiracy
contemplated by this statute. Cf Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82..
. In this case we believe the evidence fails to establish this element of a
§ 1985(3) action.
Dombrowski involved a corporate landowner's refusal to rent office space to an
attorney when it discovered that many of the attorney's clients were black.
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(2) The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit reversed the District Court, authorizing
Novotny's suit. Nevertheless, its more detailed and careful
examination of the issues exposed the chink in the Griffin armor that
would ultimately begin the felling of § 1985(3). Rejecting the
District Court's use of the Seventh Circuit's view on single act
corporate conspiracies,269 all that the Circuit Court needed to do to
sustain Novotny's complaint was to accept the tacit findings of the
District Court that the act constitutionally applied to women as an
invidious class and that Novotny had standing to raise a § 1985(3)
claim. The Circuit Court expressly affirmed these findings with
detailed discussion in support of its position. The Circuit Court,
however, engaged what had been an increasingly heated debate over
whether the statute had substantive meaning or was merely
"remedial. , 270
Circuit Judge Adams acknowledged that jurists and scholars had
concerned themselves with this question, designed largely as an
interpretive exercise into the meaning of "equal protection of the
laws" and "equal privileges and immunities under the laws. '271
The Novotny district court also dismissed Novotny's Title VII retaliation claim,
finding he had not taken any action before the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. Novotny, 430 F. Supp. at 230-3 1. It determined that "the intent of
the Congress was a limited one relating to enforcement of the Title and was not to
involve the courts in every board meeting that occurred across the land ....
Novotny did not in [this] sense "oppose" a practice made unlawful by Title VII."
Id. at 231. Today the mostly settled law would support his claim for retaliation in
response to his opposing an apparently illegal employment practice under Title VII.
See, e.g., Taylor v. Runyon, 175 F.3d 861 (11 th Cir. 1999). The District Court was
ultimately reversed on this question by the Court of Appeal. Novotny, 584 F.2d at
1262.
269.[D]efendants maintain that their alleged concerted action was taken in
their official capacities as officers and directors of GAF, and therefore
cannot legally be deemed a combination within the terms of § 1985(3).
This contention finds no support in the language of § 1985(3). ...
Similarly, we can discern no basis for the defendants' argument in the
legislative history of § 1985(3). Nor does defendants' suggestion have
solid roots in general tenants of conspiracy theory....
Novotny, 584 F.2d at 1257 (footnotes omitted).
270. Id. at 1246-47. "Once the existence of class-based invidious animus is
established, the boundaries of protection offered by § 1985(3) are traced by the
scope of the words, "equal protection of the laws" and "equal privileges and
immunities under the laws." Id. at 1246.
271. Id., citing Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc)
(protecting freedom of religion); Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958, 96 S. Ct. 1436 (1976) (protecting the right to vote);
Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971) (protecting free expression);
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Although Judge Adams declined to resolve the debate, his approach
to the issue had the same effect.272 He rejected any construction
similar to that in Griffin, stating that "§ 1985(3) is not to be read as
a general charter to federal courts to set codes of conduct wherever
'equality' of any class is allegedly infringed." '273 Resting this view on
the "reluctance to trigger the development of such a 'general federal
tort law,"' Adams argued that "the laws" and "under the laws" in §
1985(3) "connotes the existence of laws outside of 1985(3) which
define 'protection' and 'privileges and immunities." 74 He then gave
special weight to Senator Edmunds' statement that the rights in the
act are not created therein but that the act merely provides a remedy
for rights established elsewhere.2
75
Adams invested little in this discussion, however, since he later
found that whatever else the language means it certainly includes
deprivation of rights based on a federal statute guaranteeing equal
employment opportunity (Title VII).276 Resolution of Novotny's
Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
943, 96 S. Ct. 1683 (1976) (sex discrimination not actionable under 14th
Amendment and § 1985(3)); Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th
Cir. 1974) (free association not protected); McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light
Co., 545 F.2d 919 (1977), (en banc), (only independently illegal acts deprive of
equal protection and not reaching the scope of privileges and immunities). Also
citing Note, Private Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1721
(1977) (arguing that restriction to remedy independent illegal actions is "formalistic
and over-restrictive" but suggesting that the statute should exempt "areas of private
choice that should remain autonomous"); Note, The Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85
Harv. L. Rev. 3, 99-101 (areas covered by § 1985(3) are "uncertain," suggesting
limitation of protection of guarantees of Bill of Rights); Note, The Scope of Section
1985(3) Since Griffin v. Breckenridge, 45 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 239,242-251 (1976)
(arguing that § 1985(3) should be limited to providing a remedy for independent
federal rights); Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination; The
Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74
Colun. L. Rev. 449, 497-98 (1974) (suggesting statute should be read as
"remedial").
272. "While we have not occasion to undertake to review the entire debate,
certain observations frame our discussion here." Novatny, 584 at 1246-47.
273. Id. at 1247.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
This is not to say, however, that the object of the conspiracy must
necessarily be independently illegal, or that the law conferring a right must
by its own force secure it against private action. For the statute proscribes
conspiracies to deprive persons or classes of persons of legal rights
"directly or indirectly." And, as Judge Learned Hand said of another
section of the Ku Klux Klan Act securing federal privileges, "it would
emasculate the act either to deny protection against reprisal to those whom
threats did not deter, or to leave without recourse those who were later
made victims of reprisals of which they had not been warned."
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claim was thus relatively easy for Adams: "Having held that at least
some federal statutory rights can form the predicate for a suit under
§ 1985(3), we conclude that Novotny, in alleging the existence of a
conspiracy to violate the equal employment rights of... Title VII,
has adequately pleaded" a § 1985(3) case.2 7
Adams' construct appears considerably appealing on its own
merits, as well as a fair reading of Griffin, albeit quite different from
the reading offered by this author.278 Its appeal, as Adams' opinion
states, is it that it reads the language of § 1985(3) as broad in scope
while limiting it so as to not supplant state tort law. On close
inspection, however, Adams' reading is not consistent with the
construct in Griffin or the terms of the section. Adams seems to have
slighted the importance of the position of the "class-based animus"
language in Griffin and replaced it with a discussion of the meaning
of "equal protection of the laws" and "equal privileges and
immunities under the law."
The Griffin court discusses "equal protection of the laws" and
"equal privileges and immunities under the law" only at the beginning
of Part III of its opinion. There the court is concerned with whether
it should give the statute plain meaning and extend it to private
actions. In this section the court perfects a particular balance between
the private law application inherent in "conspire or go in disguise on
the highway"279 and the awkward notion of finding private actors
depriving a person of protection ofprivileges and immunities of laws,
equal or otherwise. The Griffin Court says:
This language is, of course, similar to that of § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which in terms speaks only to the
States, and judicial thinking about what can constitute an
equal protection deprivation has.., focused almost entirely
upon identifying the requisite "state action" and defining the
offending forms of state law and official conduct. A century
of Fourteenth Amendment adjudication has, in other words,
made it understandably difficult to conceive of what might
Id. at 1247-48 (citations omitted). Judge Adams was quite aware that this result
was contrary to the Fifth Circuit's approach in McLelland v. Mississippi Power &
Light, 545 F. 2d 919, 924-28 (5th Cir. 1977), discussed infra in the text
accompanying notes 304-315.
277. Id. at 1251. Adams also found the Title VII claim cognizable, rejecting the
District Court's view that the plaintiff in a retaliation case must oppose action
before the EEOC. Id. at 1222.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 218-36. See also White, supra, note
22.
279. "[S]ince the 'going in disguise' aspect must include private action, it is hard
to see how the conspiracy aspect, joined by a disjunctive, could be read to require
involvement of state officers." Griffin, 403 U.S. at 96, 91 S. Ct. at 1795.
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constitute a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws by
private persons.280
This statement of Justice Stewart's may be read to suggest only
his commitment to extending the act to private action. After all, he
says only two sentences later that "failure to mention any such [state
action] requisite can be viewed as an important indication of
congressional intent to speak . . . of all deprivations of 'equal
protection of the laws' and 'equal privileges and immunities under
the laws,' whatever their source." 28 However, the reticent nature of
this statement and the actual difficulty of conceiving of a "right"
against a private actor (especially in light of this century of
adjudication), counsels for accepting the equality view as established,
however tacitly, in this portion of the opinion. The next several
paragraphs are silent on this point, establishing only that the private
action reading is permissible, logical, and consistent with legislative
history.
By the last paragraph of part Ill, when Stewart's opinion mentions
the risk of supplanting state tort law, Stewart has already accepted the
application of the statute to private action, along with the implication
that it enforces equality. The magic paragraph, to which Judge
Adams refers, does not articulate the nature of the right protected in
Griffin, much less its internal or external origin. Rather, that
paragraph offers a judicially fashioned limitation on § 1985(3)'s
application, perhaps necessary to sustain the constitutionality of the
statute after the court determined it reached private action. 282 Adams'
opinion offers an additional means of limiting § 1985(3) when
extended to private action; it is, however, at odds with Griffin.
Whatever strength there is to Stewart's construction in Griffin, the
location of the relevant findings therein at least undercuts support for
Adams' alternative construct.
Adams' construct seems to ignore the limiting role of class-based
animus in Griffin, or at least slighted its effectiveness. Perhaps the
ease with which the Circuit Court decides women constitute a
protected class leaves it distrustful of the barrier class-based animus
provided between the § 1985(3) cause and state tort law. To
recognize women as an included invidious class (as the courts should)
the Circuit Court would have been forced to make several
280. Id. at 97, 91 S. Ct. at 1796.
281. Id. at 97, 91 S. Ct. at 1796 (quoting the statute) (emphasis in the original).
282. Justice O'Connor makes a similar point in Bray. "Griffin 's narrowing
construction [the invidiously discriminatory language] was a rational effort to honor
the language of the statute without providing a federal cause of action for 'all
tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others."' Bray, 506 U.S. at
348 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101,91 S. Ct. at 1798).
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determinations it might have been reluctant to make. First, it would
have had to determine whether the act should be limited to the
historical circumstance of 1871. If so, women might arguably still be
covered, but the statute, importantly, would have to be read as
unavailable to white men, or certain classes of white men, such as
former or present members of the Ku Klux Klan and perhaps their
families or other beneficiaries of the organization's activities. While
perhaps inconsistent with the statute, such a construct would most
certainly conflict with the "color-blind" visions of the Fourteenth
Amendment solidifying at the time Novotny was decided.
Second, if the section were read as historically particular, the
Circuit Court would have had to determine if the historical
circumstances that birthed the section still existed. Third, if not
historically particular, the Circuit Court would, presumably, have had
to suggest some basis for including women and perhaps other groups;
that is, how is the category women similar to race (or blackness) in a
way that matters for § 1985(3) jurisprudence.
Adams' opinion purports to defer to Congress on this matter,
citing Frontiero v. Richardson for the proposition that "Congress
itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently
invidious." '283 However, the opinion at least in part chooses to answer
the third question, announcing the Third Circuit's acceptance of the
principle that individuals should not be discriminated against on "the
basis of traits for which they bear no responsibility [which] makes
discrimination against individuals on the basis of immutable
characteristics repugnant to our system."' This construct, however,
does not emphasize any current or historical oppression which might
make the characteristic in question a font for the diminution of
equality. Unlike Congress' finding which can be read as a
determination of fact, the Circuit Court's own construct establishes
a category rooted deeply in a particular view of the relationship of the
government to its citizens. The "color-blind" approach that grows out
of such a view finds its strength in the proposition that the use of race,
gender or another immutable category by the government is always
invidious. The Griffin construct, rather, seems to focus on the
operation of the categories in a complex, plural society. Griffin 's
"racial, or perhaps other class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus" limitation works as a limit precisely because it focuses on
invidiousness in a society where meaning and knowledge are
contingent on latent assumptions that cannot be fully captured by
shorthand (and self-referentially socially constructed) categories such
as race or gender.
283. Novatny. 584 F.2d at 1243, quoting Fronterio v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
687, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 1770 (1973) (plurality opinion).
284. Id.
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As such, Judge Adams' identification of an invidious
characteristic cannot work to limit the application of§ 1985(3) when
applied to private parties because, to whatever degree invidious
categories constitute a functional shorthand for invidious government
action, it cannot sufficiently isolate the various motivations for private
action, much less determine when such motivation is sufficiently great
to justify the extremely intrusive inquiry into elements of conscience
that are expressed as permissible speech.285 As difficult as it may be to
determine the intent of deliberative bodies, the abstract character of
public institutions at least make such determinations commonplace and
familiar. To say a legislature enacted a racially restrictive law is simply
less troublesome than to allege that decisions of employers or
tortfeasors are "racially motivated." Consequently employment
discriminationjurisprudence and the emerging anti-hate legislation has
acknowledged (as it must) that these determinations are rough and
entail social costs which in all events are justified by the social goal
underlying those prohibitions. This surrogate construction cannot,
however, be said to constitute an adequate limitation on the scope and
reach of the § 1985(3) cause of action through invidiousness because,
quite simply the use of the categories is not always invidious.28 6 In this
context the different roles suspect categories play in equal protection
jurisprudence and employment discrimination law, as opposed to §
1985(3), is extremely consequential and lost upon Judge Adams.
Using Judge Adams' construct, all injuries committed by
conspiracy against someone with an immutable characteristic (perhaps
by someone with another) would be actionable. Thus it is not
surprising that the Circuit Court lacked confidence in the limiting effect
of the invidious class-based requirement since Judge Adams' approach
to identifying a cause of action has deprived the class-based animus
requirement's most crucial component, "invidiousness," of all meaning
in favor of its incidental surrogate, "class basis."
285. This is the dilemma confronted by anti-hate legislation.
286. Suspect categories fail as shorthand for invidiousness on two grounds.
First, it is difficult to discern impermissible private motivation. This, again, is the
dilemma of anti-hate legislation and such legislation aimed at incursions on free
expression and conscience. The second ground must not be lost, however. If the
category is to be a limiting device, it must refer to a category of actions that is to be
prohibited and distinguish that category from permissible action. It does neither in
Adams' use of it since all complaints against members of different categories could
presumably access the section's cause of action. Moreover, unlike employment
discrimination law's disparate impact cause of action, no argument is offered that
perfidy, sandbagging, or an impossibility of determining the effects of actions
would impair or prevent the fulfillment of the section's purposes, and thus justify
the very rough shorthand. As such, any goal that might be attributed to § 1985(3)
is lost and the section subsumed into § 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence.
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By the time the Supreme Court accepted Novotny for review, the
Third Circuit had already quietly distorted the balance of Griffin.
Depriving its primary limiting component of effect, perhaps out of the
benevolent motivation of ensuring that women could use the section,
the Circuit Court was forced to craft another limiting tool to keep the
section alive. Replacing the section's apparently drab armor for a
highly polished suit, the Circuit was to find the new facade protected
not at all. The Circuit's shiny new construct weighed down the
statute, leaving it to fight itself. In one swift blow the Supreme Court
then crippled the warrior, clothing it in yet another new and more
burdensome outfit and invoking the section's own devices to its
detriment.
b. Breaking the Law at the Supreme Court
The Third Circuit's struggle to determine whether § 1985(3) was
"substantive" or "remedial" might have led some to believe the
Supreme Court would find it a difficult issue, particularly given the
Circuit opinion's conflict with the unanimous Griffin decision.
However, the Court rejected Novotny's § 1985(3) claim with
deceptive ease. In his opinion for the court, Justice Stewart spent no
time on the remedial/substantive question. Without support or
apparent acknowledgment that the issue was even substantial, Stewart
flatly stated "Section 1985(3) provides no substantive rights itself; it
merely provides a remedy for violations of the rights it designates.""'
As such the only question for the Court was whether Title VII
could be the underlying right violated by the conspirators. Citing the
complex administrative procedures required in Title VII suits, the
court saw the question as "whether the rights created by Title VII may
be asserted within the remedial framework of § 1985(3)."2'8 Since
the case "does not involve two 'independent' rights, '289 "a
complainant could avoid most if not all of these detailed and specific
provisions of the law.' '290 Novotny must lose under this construction
because application of § 1985(3) to these facts would thwart
Congress' complex scheme.
But this approach, too, is deceptively simple. Only if the section
creates no rights does the question of Title VII's use as an underlying
source of rights arise. The alternative approach of Griffin requires a
focus on the effect of the deprivation on the equal protection and
equal enjoyment of privileges and immunities of laws. In its most
287. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372, 99 S. Ct. 2345, 2349 (1979).
288. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 377, 99 S. Ct. at 2351.
289. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 372, 99 S. Ct. at 2352.
290. Id. at 375-76,99 S. Ct. at 2350-51.
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broad construction equal protection and equal privileges and
immunities of laws means merely substantial equality of
citizenship.29" ' The Novotny Court takes a different approach.
Treating § 1985(3) as it had § 1983, it makes the ad hoc recognition
of rights the only apparent limitation preventing § 1985(3) from
standing as a font of tort law.
Because the crucial issue in § 1985(3) cases becomes the
recognition of rights in the Court's Novotny opinion, Justices Powell
and Stevens, each concurring, find it necessary to fashion some
additional limiting mechanism to "afford ... guidance to courts in
the federal system. 2 92 Justice Stevens' approach is illuminating.
Recognizing the shared origin of §§ 1983 and 1985(3) in the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, he repeats the Court's conclusion that § 1985(3)
does not create any substantive rights. However, his opinion
recognizes that the peculiar nature of the language of § 1985(3) might
not be consistent with this construct, taking the time to explain the
meaning of "equal protection of the laws" and "equal privileges and
immunities under the law."
Since § 1983 refers to "rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution of the United States" it might be argued that §
1985(3), without any reference to the Constitution, prohibited
conspiracies to deprive an individual of any rights including, as in
Novotny, Title VII.293 Stevens rejects this argument, positing the
more limiting construction that, the differing language
notwithstanding, § 1983 provides remedies for deprivations under
color of state law limited to constitutional violations 94 and § 1985(3)
291. Conceding, as the dissenters in Novotny seem to do, that § 1985(3) requires
the violation of rights found elsewhere, the role of such violations in the Griffin
scheme is that of evidence that the conspiracy was substantial enough to deprive the
person of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities.
"The majority opinion does not reach the issue whether § 1985(3)
encompasses federal statutory rights other than those proceeding in
'fundamental' fashion from the Constitution itself... I think it clear
that § 1985(3) encompasses all rights guaranteed in federal statutes as
well as rights guaranteed directly by the Constitution."
Id. at 388-89 n.5, 99 S. Ct. at 2357 (White, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 379, 99 S. Ct. at 2352 (Powell, J., concurring).
293. The Third Circuit raised, but did not embrace this point:
It could be argued that because the phrases track the 14th Amendment's
guarantees, the construction of the 14th Amendment's language should
govern the guarantees of § 1985(3). Such a conclusion may be
unwarranted. First, . . . the privileges and immunity's clause... is
broader [in § 1985(3)].
Novotny, 584 F.2d at 1246 n.47 (citations omitted).
294. He anticipates the debate in Maine v. Thibabout over the meaning of "and
laws," added to § 1983 during the 1874 revision of the statute. Novotny, 442 U.S.
at 382 n.3, 99 S. Ct. at 2354 (Stevens, J., concurring). Stevens takes no position on
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provided a remedy for some violations committed by private actors.295
Powell, perhaps more clearly, creates a similar construct. The
underlying rights of which conspiracy to violate could support a §
1985(3) action ought be limited to "fundamental rights derived from
the Constitution," 96 he posits. Powell's construct improves on
Stevens' in that it offers a clear limit on which rights might be
asserted. Both opinions, however, reveal the consequences of the
"remedial statute" designation the Court attaches to § 1985(3). The
Novotny decision, thus, gives rise to Carpenters v. Scott, which
further attempts to outline the limits of those rights.
"The pervasive and essential flaw in the majority's approach.. .
as the dissenters note, is its "characterization of [§ 1985(3)] as solely
[a] 'remedial' provision. 297 Even accepting that § 1985(3) requires
rights violations elsewhere, Justice White appropriately points out that
it is not those violations that create the cause of action. "Because §
1985(3) provides a remedy for any person injured as a result of
deprivation of a substantive federal right, it must be seen as itself
creating rights in persons other than those to whom the underlying
federal rights extends." '298 Rights violations are thus the proof of the
significance of the injury claimed by the plaintiff. The majority
opinion slights this because it both undervalues the limiting function
of the "invidious class-based" requirement, as did the Third Circuit,
and thus concerned about supplanting state tort law, it ignores the
statute's application to non-beneficiaries of federal rights who have
been injured by a conspiracy-as Justice White argues.299
Justice White proceeds from a view of invidiousness consistent
with Griffin 's use of the requirement as a limitation on the broad
scope of the act. He notes, "It is clear that sex discrimination may be
sufficiently invidious to come within the prohibition of § 1985(3).""0
This inquiry is itself sufficient to limit the reach of the act.
On the substantive issue, background rights, even if limited to
federal rights, constitute proof of the kind of violation § 1985(3) is
meant to reach, not the violation itself. On initial blush, this might
that issue in his concurrence, but implies in his discussion that the revision had
limited effect on the meaning of§ 1983. Id. at 382-385, 99 S. Ct. at 2353-55. (§
1983 authorizes a remedy for state action depriving an individual of his
constitutional rights.).
295. "Some privileges and immunities of citizenship, such as the right to engage
in interstate travel and the right to be free of the badges of slavery, are protected by
the Constitution against interference by private action ... ." Id. at 383, 99 S. Ct. at
2354, citing Griffin, 403 U.S 88, 91 S. Ct. 1790.
296. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 379, 99 S. Ct. at 2352 (Powell, J., concurring).
297. Id. at 388, 99 S. Ct. at 2357.
298. Id. at 390, 99 S. Ct. at 2358.
299. Id. at 390, 99 S. Ct. at 2358.
300. Id. at 389 n.6., 99 S. Ct. at 2357.
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appear to widen the reach of the statute but in fact it also limits its
scope.3"' "Because such private conspiratorial action, the paradigm of
which was the activity of the Ku Klux Klan, constituted a serious threat
to civil rights and civil order, it was deemed necessary to 'giv[e] a civil
action to anybody who shall be injured by [such] conspiracy."'302 As
Senator Edmonds remarked in 1871, "The . .. section ... only
provides for the punishment of conspiracy. It does not provide for the
punishment of any act done in pursuance of the conspiracy ... ,303
In the aftermath of Novotny, the Griffin approach was already
substantially perverted. Most importantly, the changes in § 1985(3)
were not perceived as involving a difficult issue or even to effect
Griffin. As a result, Novotny creates a problem of determining what
rights apply, a problem of secondary importance, at best, in the Griffin
construct. That new problem would be decided in a few short years in
Carpenters. Transformed from a brazen enforcer of equality to a clone
of its cousin statute (§ 1983), our warrior, still burdened by the baggage
of its invidiousness requirement and no more liberated by its power
over private actors, limped along. Now relevant in only a narrow set
of cases, Scott presents an opportunity for the statute's splendor to be
reestablished; but it is also threatened with exile in obscurity.
2. Demoting the Warrior: Scott and the Delineation of
Actionable Rights
The significant departure of Griffin from more traditional
approaches to rights vindication (such as the approach in § 1983
litigation), has proven problematic in operation because it has been
widely misunderstood. Both the Third Circuit's and Supreme Court's
Novotny opinions pervert the Griffin balance. Neither, however, is a
self-conscious reconsideration of Griffin. Novotny is a watershed, in
any case, because it worked additional transformations on attempts to
understand Griffin. The new questions inspired byNovotny's treatment
of Griffin are resolved in Scott but only after further lower court
struggles with Griffin 's implications.
301. Even in Hardyman the Court acknowledged that the requirement that
conspiracies under § 1985(3) be consummated "for the purpose of depriving any
person or class of persons equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the law" itself "defines overt acts necessary to consummate the
conspiracy." Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 659, 71 S. Ct. 937, 941 (1951). This
language has a limiting effect, although Griffin achieved that effect in a particular
way, reversing Hardyman's requirement of state action with a specific argument
about rights.
302. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 394, 99 S. Ct. at 2360 (citations omitted), citing Cong.
Globe 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 568 (1871).
303. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 568 (1871), quoted in Novotny, 442
U.S. at 394 n.18, 99 S. Ct. at 2360 (White, J., dissenting).
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a. Prelude to Battle: McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light
Co.
Prior to Novotny the Fifth Circuit addressed an early post- Griffin
case and sought to delineate the meaning and applicability of the
Griffin decision. In McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co.,3 4
the Circuit met en banc to decide whether § 1985(3) applied to a
conspiracy to discharge a Mississippi Power & Light employee
because he filed for bankruptcy.0 5 In the material section of the
Circuit Court's opinion, the Circuit confronted the second element of
§ 1985(3).
On its face the second element ambiguously and potentially
expansively prohibits conspiracy "for the purpose of depriving ...
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or
of equal privileges and immunities under the laws."30 6 The Griffin
Court countenanced the broad application of this language only as
limited by its invidiously discriminatory animus requirement. Griffin
thus bifurcates the second element of § 1985(3), requiring (1) a
deprivation (2) on an invidiously discriminatory basis.
In apparent conformity with Griffin the Circuit noted that, while
§ 1985(3)'s broad facial sweep was a concern of the Griffin Court, the
Court "found the means to avoid a literal interpretation of the statute
by giving the second element a restricted construction .... [T]he
presence of the word 'equal' . . . allowed the Court to limit the
application of the section."3 7  The Circuit revealed a partial
understanding of and conformity with Griffin in the next subsection
of its McLellan opinion where it addressed how private individuals
deprive another person of protection of the laws. Acknowledging that
Griffin did not delineate what constituted such deprivations, the
Circuit accepted the Griffin facts as instructive, despite the "century
of Fourteenth Amendment adjudication, which has centered on state
action [and] 'made it understandably difficult to conceive of what
might constitute a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws by
private persons.'"30
The guidance the Circuit drew from Grifin on what constitutes
a deprivation is less than clear, however. While a broad view of the
304. 545 F.2d 919 (1977).
305. McLellan's complaint had been dismissed by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Mississippi but reversed by a Fifth Circuit Panel. McLellan v.
Mississippi Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 870 (5'h Cir. 1976)..
306. McLellan, 545 F.2d at 923.
307. Id. at 924.
308. Id. at 925, quoting Justice Stewart for the Court in Griffin, 403 U.S. at 97,
91 S. Ct. at 1796.
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balance struck in Griffin implies that the stopping, threatening, and
assaulting of the Griffin plaintiffs was to be taken as a whole and read
as constituting a diminution of the plaintiffs' equal citizenship, this
reading is neither clear nor necessary under a more narrow or
formalistic reading of§ 1985(3). It is such a reading the Fifth Circuit
ultimately undertakes, departing from the broad implication of this
Griffin language and ironically turning to language in US. v.
Harris,3 the case that struck down the criminal counterpart of §
1985(3), for guidance. Harris is said to stand for the proposition that
"The only way... [a] private person can deprive another of the equal
protection of the laws is by commission of some offense against the
laws which protect the rights of persons ... ,310 For the Circuit §
1985(3) must therefore require the violation of some otherwise
protected right.
This reading is perhaps reasonable on its own terms, but it distorts
the operation of illegality in the establishment of a § 1985(3)
conspiracy in Griffin. As the Fifth Circuit correctly noted, "the
Griffin Court used the passage [from Harris] to illustrate that a
deprivation of protection of the laws is not necessarily inflicted by the
state.",31' But this does not also mean that it is the violation of laws
that establishes the deprivation of "equal protection of the laws" or
"equal privileges and immunities under the laws;" rather, it only
establishes that such violations need have that effect. As Judge
Godbold noted in his McLellan dissent, the Griffin Court "did not
intimate that the defendants' interferences with these federal rights
could lead to § 1985(3) liability only because those interferences were
independently illegal., 31 1 It may, nevertheless, be conceded that the
operation of the Fifth Circuit's McLellan distinction does not work
serious detriment to § 1985(3) by limiting the actionable deprivations
309. 106 U.S. 629, 1 S. Ct. 601 (1882).
310. McLellan 545 F.2d at 925. Judge Godbold fiercely disagreed with this
characterization of the requirement of § 1985(3). Consistent with the Griffin
approach, Godbold said:
When the Supreme Court in Griffin turned to the matter of whether
the petitioners' complaint satisfied the motivation requirement of
§ 1985(3), it did not deal at all with the defendants' liability vel
non under Mississippi law.... The Court did not intimate that the
defendants' interferences with.., federal rights could lead to §
1985(3) liability only because those interferences were
independently illegal When the court referred to defendants'
alleged "detention, threats, and battery" as establishing a cause of
action, it was discussing only the third criterion of the § 1985(3)
cause of action, i.e., the necessity of an action in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
McLellan, 545 F.2d at 535 (Godbold, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
311. Id. at 925 n.21, citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 97, 91 S. Ct. at 1796.
312. McLellan, 545 F.2d at 935.
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of citizenship to those occasioned by other illegality. What is
significant, however, is that the Fifth Circuit has fashioned a
reconciliation of the private deprivation of equal protection dilemma
that operates in the more expansive set of cases where any legal right
has been deprived rather than where equality is threatened. What in
McLellan appears as a limiting move is, on closer inspection, a severe
disruption of Griffin with potentially excessive expansionary effect.
Given this slight change of focus, the Court's concern that §
1985(3) would consume state tort law, the concern that caused it to
give the statute very limited scope in Collins,3 13 and which was
expressly rejected in Griffin, is given new life, notwithstanding
Griffin's consolation that those concerns were exaggerated. 314 The
Fifth Circuit correctly recognized that Griffin's requirement of
invidiously discriminatory animus is designed to contain this broad
prohibition. However, having broadened the potential scope of §
1985(3) by focusing on the fact of deprivation, not the effect of the
deprivation on the victim's equal citizenship, the Fifth Circuit
increases the burden borne by the animus requirement. Treatment of
§ 1985(3)'s discriminatory animus requirement is the subject of the
next section; however, it is instructive to note that the Fifth Circuit
cast its analytical eye on which class the deprivation worked against:
"the purpose to deprive ... must be class based." Conceiving of the
"act" as triggered by normal illegality in extraordinary circumstances,
the Circuit recasts Griffin's limitation as class-based rather than
invidiously discriminatory; it focused on the identity of the victim
rather than the effect of the illegality on the victim. Its discussion of
class based animus thus threatens to merge the deprivation (now
violation) and invidiously discriminatory animus components of
Griffin into a single inquiry.
McLellan's allegation, which the Circuit rejects, is that
bankruptcy should be a protected class. Limiting the actionable
deprivations to deprivations of rights and finding that the plaintiffhad
no right to employment, the Circuit discusses the class requirement
313. The Collins Court noted that
[t]here is not the slightest allegation that defendants were conscious of or
trying to influence the law, or were endeavoring to obstruct or interfere
with it. The only inequality suggested is that the defendants broke up
plaintiffs' meeting and did not break up meetings of others with whose
sentiments they agreed. To be sure, this is not equal injury, but it is no
more a deprivation of "equal protection" or of "equal privileges and
immunities" than it would be for one to assault one neighbor without
assaulting them all .... Such private discrimination is not inequality
before the law unless there is some manipulation of the law or its agencies
to give sanction or sanctuary for doing so.
341 U.S. at 661, 71 S. Ct. at 942.
314. It is this view of private action that to which Griffin construct responds.
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as though it necessitated finding a "suspect group" as required in
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection "strict scrutiny" cases. As
such, the majority's treatment slights the difference between the
plaintiff's allegation of class (bankrupts) and his deprivation of rights
(illegal firing) through a focus on plaintiffs alleged identity
(bankrupt) rather than the effect of the defendant's actions on the
plaintiff.3"5 The two approaches to animus are distinct.
It is the Fifth Circuit's failure to recognize this distinction that
occasions its formulaic treatment of the deprivation portion of the
second element of the § 1985(3) claim. Like the Third Circuit's
approach to including the "class of women" in § 1985(3) in Novotny,
the Fifth Circuit references uncritically the formal neutrality of
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection cases to define a set of
protected classes. It deprives the invidiously discriminatory animus
requirement of its limiting effect and must require a more stringent
deprivation showing in order to limit the statute's reach. By limiting
the deprivation to deprivations of legally recognized rights, however,
the Circuit in fact gives the statute coverage coextensive of state
criminal and tort law. It can only limit this scope by rejecting new
suspect-classes, no matter the effects of the defendant's behavior on
the victim's enjoyment of equal protection and equal privileges and
immunities under the law.
Inherent in the Griffin balance is the notion that a person is
deprived of equal citizenship by certain actions. This first component
of the analysis perhaps requires a showing that the deprivation is
substantial. It turns, importantly on the effect on the citizen--did the
victimization make the citizen less equal. This "effects" analysis
invokes the limitation in Griffin: the effect of certain injurious acts
on certain citizens has a more dramatic effect on their citizenship than
on others. Mere torts against newly freed men occasioned by
conspiracy could have had the effect of re-enslaving them. Indeed,
this illustration shows that, while it might be reasonable to limit the
deprivation part of the second element to violations of laws, even, as
in Novotny, to violations of "rights," it is not the violation but the
deprivation, the deprivation of equal citizenship, that establishes the
second element. It is, therefore, not the intention to violate the
plaintiff's rights through animus against a class, but the effect of the
violation against members of the invidiously discriminated class that
limits and supports that deprivation under § 1983(3).
McLellan illustrates that the Griffin construct, perhaps because it
was new and unfamiliar, proved difficult to grasp. The Fifth Circuit
315. Perhaps this is because of the existence of a hard question of whether
plaintiff's rights were violated, resolved perhaps inadequately by the Circuit's
finding that independent illegality is required. See Godbold dissent, McLellan, 545
F.2d at 934-36.
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in a largely fair reading of the act's requirements struggled then failed
to maintain the balance struck in Griffin. The Circuit's efforts
produced slight modifications in that balance which reordered the
importance of Griffin's component requirements. Although Novotny
could have had little or no effect on this holding, the spirit of that
decision and the concurring Justices' anticipation of future issues
occasioned by the limitation of the act to violations of rights, was to
change the minor modifications in McLellan into significant
transformations of the Griffin doctrine, to be imported out of the Fifth
Circuit in Scott.
b. Decisive Skirmishes: Scott Below and Dombrowski Abroad
In the early morning hours of January 17, 1975, a crowd of almost
three hundred people assembled at the main access road to the
Alligator Bayou project construction site near Port Author, Texas.
Shortly after 7:00 a.m., when the employees of Cross Construction
Company, the contractor hired to erect the Alligator Bayou Pumping
Station and Gravity Drainage Structure along Taylor's Bayou, had
begun work, four pickup trucks drove onto the job site. After a brief
exchange with workers on the site, someone allegedly stepped from
one of the trucks and hit Paul Scott, a Cross employee, on the head.
The mob then entered the job site and beat Scott, Cross, and Cross'
other employees. This brief episode of violence ended several tense
weeks between the Cross Company and the local union emplo yees
upset by the Cross Company's employ of non-union workers."
When Scott and James Matthews filed suit against several named
defendants, the local Construction Trades Council, and twenty-five
local unions, the Griffin construct was presented with its most
formidable challenge. With the benefit of its decision in McLellan
and the Supreme Court's decision in Novotny, the Fifth Circuit sought
to determine what constituted a deprivation for § 1985(3) purposes
and in what way did the discriminatory animus requirement limit
liability in those cases.
McLellan and Novotny had already defined the parameters of the
first issue; a deprivation must consist of a violation of some
independently identified right. But as Justices Powell and Stevens
observed in Novotny, there remained the question whether just any
right could give rise to a violation. The Scott plaintiffs alleged the
deprivation of an underlying right to First Amendment guaranteed
fi6edoms. The District Court agreed,31 7 and a panel of the Fifth
316. See Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979, 982-84 (5th Cir. 1982).
317. 461 F. Supp. 224 (D.C. Tex. 1978).
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Circuit affirmed with respect to three of the eleven defendants.318 The
Fifth Circuit heard the case en banc to determine, inter alia, whether
a First Amendment violation could support a cause of action for a
private conspiracy under § 1985(3). The Fifth Circuit began its
discussion of whether a First Amendment right could properly give
rise to a § 1985(3) deprivation by considering the Seventh Circuit
decision in Dombrowski v. Dowling 9 which said it could not.
(1) Dombrowski
Dombrowski, a white criminal law attorney, sought to lease office
space from Author Bubloff& Co.'s manager, Dowling. Dombrowski
sued when he was denied the opportunity because a substantial
number of his clients were black and Latino. Dombrowski prevailed
on a motion for summary judgment on his § 1985(3) claim, rooted in
a deprivation of his First Amendment rights. Treating the case as
involving a classification of criminal law attorneys as undesirable, the
Seventh Circuit proceeded to reverse the District Court, holding that
the First Amendment could not support a claim of an illegal private
conspiracy.
While the treatment of Dombrowski's complaint is a bit unclear
given the summary disposition of the case by the District Court, the
Seventh Circuit is very clear on the question that matters here.
Justice Stevens, then still on the Seventh Circuit, wrote for the panel,
acknowledging the private action reach of § 1985(3) and commending
the District Judge for anticipating the Griffin decision. He refused,
however, to recognize First Amendment rights as the basis for a
deprivation in a private conspiracy on the basis of a distinction
between the "interests of the plaintiff that the statute was enacted to
protect" and the "conduct of the defendants which [the act]
proscribes., 32" Based on this distinction, he says, §§ 1983 and
1985(3) share similar requirements.
Citing Justice Brennan's concurrence in Adickes v. S. H. Kress &
Co.,32' Stevens focuses on the dual state action requirements of §
1983: the first is the express requirement in the first element of the
cause; the second "inheres in the nature of [the] plaintiff's protected
rights. 322  Since § 1983 protects only rights secured by the
Constitution through the Fourteenth Amendment, and since those
rights themselves require state action, state action is necessary both
318. 640 F.2d708 (5thCir. 1981).
319. 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972).
320. Id. at 193.
321. 398 U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct. 1598 (1970).
322. Id. at 193, 90 S. Ct. at 1621.
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to fulfill the first element of a § 1983 cause of action and to establish
the deprivation of rights which establishes the second § 1983 element.
This reasoning, extended to § 1985(3), is the strongest argument
for what the Novotny Court later takes for granted. If the focus of the
deprivation component of§ 1985(3)'s second element is on particular
rights deprived, rather than on deprivations which work inequality of
citizenship, it is only logical to require state action if the right is an
individual's against the state. However, the Dombrowski Court still
needed to explain why § 1985(3) requires deprivation of
independently identified rights in the absence of any mention of the
state (or the Constitution for that matter) in the language of§ 1985(3).
On this point, then Judge Stevens offered that "the omitted language,
however, is directed to the proscribed conduct of the defendants
rather than the nature of the plaintiffs' rights which are protected by
the statute., 323 In other words, whereas § 1983 creates a cause of
action for (1) "deprivations of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws 324 which are caused by (2)
"[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia, '325 § 1985(3) creates a cause for deprivations, which
might include constitutional deprivations, committed by conspiracies
of private persons. By omitting reference to the state in the "equal
protection of the laws" and "equal privileges and immunities under
the laws" Congress, according to Stevens, only allowed for the
possibility of private conspiracies. In his view, Congress did not
establish an independent right, which is violated by private actors, nor
remove state action from those rights violations inherently made by
the state only.
Judge Stevens errs, however. It is that part of § 19853) that
prohibits the conspiracy that anticipates private conspiracies 2 -- "If
323. Id.
324. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
325. Id.
326.
... § 1985 (3) operates to provide a separate remedy when the manner of
denial is especially invidious and threatening. The Reconstruction
Congress that enacted § 1985 (3) believed that an especial danger was
posed by persons acting with invidious animus and acting in concert-
thereby compounding their power and resources-to deny federal rights.
Because such private conspiratorial action, the paradigm of which was the
activity of the Ku Klux Klan, constituted a serious threat to civil rights and
civil order, it was deemed necessary to "[give] a civil action to anybody
who shall be injured by [such] conspiracy." Thus, though it may be that
those who conspire with invidious motivation to violate § 703 (a) may in
many cases also be reached under Title VII itself, there is no basis for
inferring a silent repeal of the legislative judgment that the distinct nature
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two or more persons conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on
the premises of another"32 -and is comparable to the "under color of
state law" element of § 1983. It is this language that Justice Stewart
quotes in Griffin when he says the statute should be given a sweep as
broad as its language, and it is this language to which Stewart refers
in the first paragraphs of Griffin's Part III where he dismisses a state
action requirement.
The omission of any reference to the Constitution in § 1985(3) in
fact undercuts Judge Stevens' argument. Not only does the language
of the act embrace wholly private conspiracies but it does not limit
the deprivation to that of any particular law. Judge Stevens, like the
jurists in Novotny and McLellan, breaks significantly with Griffin
when he focuses on deprivations of laws and rights rather than
deprivations of equality. Having decided some other right must be
identified, Judge Stevens has wiped away most differences between
the deprivation required in §§ 1983 and 1985(3). He says "With
respect to plaintiff s protected interests, the language of §§ 1983 and
1985(3) . . . differs, but the coverage of the two provisions is
probably coextensive.""32
That § 1985(3) completely lacks the state action requirement of
the first element of a § 1983 action and conceives of the deprivation
differently, is completely ignored. The Dombrowski court soothes
this rough cut with the salve of a required constitutional authority.
That is, it turns to the Griffin Court's broad discussion of
constitutional bases for enforcing § 1985(3) against private parties to
suggest that the act only protects against constitutional violations.
Griffin's Part V is turned into Griffin, Part I. The Griffin Court's
focus on equality is replaced with a focus on Constitutional rights.
Section 1985(3) becomes § 1983.
In Scott the Fifth Circuit rejects Dombrowski 's reading of Griffin.
(2) Scott
In Scott the Fifth Circuit discusses § 1985(3) in a framework of
presumptions about Griffin that forces any decision to follow or reject
Dombrowski. This construction also ultimately seals the fate of §
1985(3); the Supreme Court's resolution of the Scott/Dombrowski
conflict severely circumscribes the section's application. At stake in
of the deprivation to which § 1985 (3) is directed warrants separate and
more complete relief, and, accordingly, the Court has an obligation to
honor the terms of that statute.
Novotny, 442 U.S. at 394-95,99 S. Ct. at 2360-61(White, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
327. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 96, 99 S. Ct. at 1795.
328. Dombrowski, 459 F.2d at 194-95.
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Scott is more than whether victims of union violence can employ the
statute, but whether the statute will have any future force. The casual
and uncontroverted presumptions of the Fifth Circuit obscure these
stakes as well as the subsequent devastating effect of the Supreme
Court's later decision.
The Fifth Circuit began its discussion of§ 1985(3) with the casual
statement, buried in the middle of an unwieldy descriptive paragraph,
that Griffin held damages available for "wholly private infringements
of constitutionally protected rights."329 With this statement and its
unassuming reference to constitutional rights, Scott assumes the Fifth
Circuit's own holding in McLellan as well as the spirit of the
Supreme Court's decision inNovotny. This presumption, that the act
addresses only constitutional rights, leaves contested only the pre-
Griffin, Dombrowski discussion of whether the act reaches private
conspiracies under the First Amendment. Moreover, it necessitates
that the Circuit revisit the limiting effect of the invidiously
discriminatory animus requirement. Because it adopts, as did the
Third Circuit in Novotny and the Seventh Circuit in Dombrowski, a
reading of invidiously discriminatory animus that merely duplicates
the suspect class of Fourteenth Amendment case law, its rejection of
the Seventh Circuit's Dombrowski formulation proves internally
inconsistent. Finally, the presumption that § 1985(3) reaches only
constitutional rights demands an argument for the constitutional
power of Congress to prohibit such private deprivations, in effect
creating an "incorporation" doctrine for the acts of private parties.
(2a) Constitutionally Protected Rights
The Fifth Circuit offers no authority for its suggestion that §
1985(3) protects only deprivations of constitutionally protected rights.
It cites Grifin but does not quote or explain any portion of that opinion
supporting that proposition. In fact, it ends its introductory paragraph
with the acknowledgment that the plaintiffs in Griffin alleged
"violations of the laws of the United States and of Mississippi .... 330
It is perhaps to be presumed that the deprivation of constitutionally
protected rights is the same as the deprivation of "equal protection of
the laws" and "equal privileges and immunities under the law."
Nevertheless, since the plaintiffs alleged deprivation of equal
protection of the laws through a violation of First Amendment rights,
it is the consequence of this designation that is important here. The
problem, stated simply, is that this approach transforms all the
elements of the § 1985(3) violation, meticulously listed by the Circuit
329. Scott, 680 F.2d 987, citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 97, 99 S. Ct. at 1796.
330. Scott, 680 F.2d 987.
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in Scott, into little more than the elements of the underlying
constitutional violation.
By approaching the question as one of deprivation of equal
protection of the laws through the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution, it becomes the constitutional deprivation that matters.
This construct transforms § 1985(3) into one that punishes
constitutional deprivations, instead of an act which punishes
conspiracies-the first element listed.33 1 If the focus is on the
constitutional deprivation, the act merges into § 1983 and it becomes
difficult to understand the purpose of the conspiracy requirement
altogether.332
The third and fourth elements, moreover, appear to merge into the
otherwise independent elements of the constitutional violation. It is
difficult to perceive how there could be a conspiracy to in fact deprive
a person of a constitutional right where the act in furtherance is
anything but an element of the constitutional right and where the
injury is not (a) the injury presumed by the constitutional deprivation
and (b) the injury of being "deprived of having and exercising any
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States." Section 1985(3),
perhaps, is to be understood as operating independently only with
regard to attempts, failed violations of constitutional rights. But
surely the Reconstruction Congress could have written an attempts
statute; indeed, the Griffin Court could have called it so.
Nowhere is the consequence of the "constitutional violation"
treatment of the section more significant than in the Circuit's
discussion of the third element-that element which raises the
question, what constitutes a private deprivation of equal protection?
The presumption that constitutional rights are the basis for a
deprivation under the third element revisits and recasts the dilemma,
presumably answered in Griffin. Instead of revisiting whether private
persons may deprive another of equal protection of laws, the Circuit
grants that Griffin involved certain peculiar rights that could be
deprived by private persons. The First Amendment is different: it can
331. Id.
332. It is, in this light, rather bizarre that the Circuit lists its own additional
element ---"that the conspirators' conduct must be unlawful independent of the
section 1985(3) violation"-developed in McLellan, 545 F.2d 919. Surely a
constitutional violation is a violation of a law; although, the Circuit perhaps meant
to suggest that the act will be available only if there were an implied right of action
available for the right in question. This "slip" on the Fifth Circuit's part likely
belies a changing view of the act. In McLellan the Circuit might still have begun
from the presumption that § 1985(3) prohibits deprivations of equality for which the
requirement that such deprivations be effected through the violation of some law.
By Scott the Circuit's casual incorporation of the "constitutional violation"
language clearly indicates that the effect of Novotny was to change the thinking of
courts about the central bases of the statute.
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be violated only by the state according to its own terms. This is an
especially difficult question because First Amendment rights are
generally litigated against state actors through the Fourteenth
Amendment, which also expressly requires state action.
The conceptual difficulties with this construction are legion, but
two are especially instructive. First, in line with the assumption that §
1985(3) protects only deprivations of otherwise identified
constitutional rights, it requires that the person be able to "claim the
rights." This necessitates the labyrinth, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, to reach the First Amendment. At each stage is a
presumption of state action upon which the whole jurisprudence is
built. Because the majority of the Fifth Circuit believed that the
plaintiffs in Scott did state a cause of action, they correctly point out
that the Griffin court rejected this view, quoting Griffin:
A century ofFourteenth Amendment adjudication has... made
it understandably difficult to conceive of what might constitute
a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws by private
persons. Yet there is nothing inherent in the phrase that
requires the action working the deprivation to come from the
State.333
The Fifth Circuit accordingly finds Dombrowski inconsistent with the
spirit of Griffin, rejecting the contrary implication of Novotny.33 This
finding is, as such, but ajudgment of the Circuit, admittedly perhaps at
odds with the requirements of Novotny's location of rights outside the
act.
The second difficulty with this construct follows from the
determination that only independent rights might produce a
deprivation. It assumes that constitutional protections can be deprived
only when there is a cause of action. That is to say, the principles of the
First Amendment are read as having been meaning only when they
operate against the state. Such is, no doubt, the implication of the
Novotny holding. If a deprivation is located only in the deprivation of
legally protected rights located outside § 1985(3), it is that initial
constitutional deprivation, committed through conspiracy, that gives
rise to recovery under the section.
333. Griffin 403 U.S. at 97, 99 S. Ct. at 1796, as quoted in Scott, 680 F.2d at
989 (ellipsis in original).
334. We are not unmindful of the Supreme Court's statement in
Novotny, that section 1985(3) 'provides no substantive rights
itself; it merely provides a remedy for violation of the rights
it designates'.... However, so long as Griffin remains viable,
we are bound by its determination that section 1985(3)
reaches all deprivations of equal protection, whatever their
source.
Scott, 680 F.2d at 990 (citation omitted).
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As constituted, adjudication under § 1983 has evidenced the
expansion of actionable rights. It seems to immediately implicate the
often cited flood of litigation in federal courts and the supplantation
of state tort law. Adoption of the § 1983 approach here means that §
1985(3) is merely duplicative of § 1983 but without the state action
limitation. Dombrowski revives the "second" state action
requirement of § 1983 in order to resolve this new found dilemma
under § 1985(3). By refusing to follow Dombrowski the Fifth Circuit
had failed to balance federal and state interests in the deprivation
section of the third element. It became incumbent on the Circuit
Court to then give greater weight to the invidiously discriminatory
animus limitation. Unfortunately, its treatment of invidiously
discriminatory animus proved unsuccessful at limiting this new
construct. Its treatment of both issues, like the approaches of the
Dombrowski and Novotny Courts, proved a significant departure from
Griffin, necessitating a balance that could not succeed.
(2b) Invidiously Discriminatory Animus
It is revealing that the Fifth Circuit titles its sub-section on
invidiously discriminatory animus "Discriminatory, Class-based
Animus." As such, the Circuit equates discrimination and class-based
animus, completely disregarding any reference to invidiousness.
Indeed, the Circuit's treatment of the question presumes
invidiousness is inherent in class-based decisions, at least those class-
based decisions of a quality the court was willing to recognize. Like
the Third Circuit in Novotny, class-based animus is, for the Fifth
Circuit, the use of immutable categories such as those recognized in
Fourteenth Amendment suspect class inquiry.
The Circuit also recognizes another basis for establishing a §
1985(3) class. The Scott decision quotes from the Fifth Circuit's
earlier en banc holding in Kimble v. D. J. McKuffy, Inc. 335 to relate its
view that the "class-based distinctions required to support an action
under the equalprotection clause" are not the only basis for § 1985(3)
discrimination."' Section 1985(3) "was certainly intended to cover
conspiracies against Republicans .... What Griffin stands for, and
what we now hold, is that Section 1985 was intended to encompass
only those conspiracies motivated by animus against the kinds of
classes Congress was trying to protect when it enacted the Ku Klux
Klan Act."-3" The Circuit then anticipates something more than the
narrow Fourteenth Amendment based classes, but the effect of
335. 648 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.1981), en banc.
336. Id. at 347 n.9.
337. Id.
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embracing this new historical class is much the same as the Third
Circuit's more limited reference to immutable characteristics alone.
By defining classes as such and limiting § 1985(3) to conspiracies
based on those classes, the circuit presumes it has shown
invidiousness but fails to provide any limitation on the operation of
the act envisioned by Griffin. Though it might have argued that class-
based decisions of some kind more often than not constitute invidious
deprivations, including perhaps a corollary determination regarding
the social situatedness of the person suffering the deprivation, the
Circuit Court's construct merely rewards those who can assert that the
deprivation is related to a broad-based invidious category such a race
or gender. Because such deprivations lack any connection to the
Constitution, a social contract, or any theory of governmental
legitimacy, recovery for private acts under such a theory becomes
indistinguishable from a general tort law. The Circuit's addition of
historical categories like Republican to the list from which cognizable
claims can be stated operates similarly; it merely adds other groups
to the statute's coverage, without regard for the effects of the
challenged conspiracies on the person or the category with which they
are associated. Indeed the Circuit's construct seems to confirm the
fears of those who would see civil rights law as a collection of special
preferences for special people: if a person does not belong to a
historically or contemporarily disadvantaged group, only a conspiracy
to deprive a person of certain constitutional rights might suffice to
state a civil claim under the section-but then the section is
indistinguishable from § 1983. Having presumed, as the Fifth Circuit
does, that the act is triggered whenever a constitutional right is
violated and that no state action is required in such a constitutional
violation, the statute seems to demand a more restrictive reading of
animus. Instead the Circuit slights invidiousness to allow class
animus to be shown in a mechanical, and therefore often less
restrictive manner.338
So far is the Circuit Court away from the balance of Griffin, its
decision is confused, and internally inconsistent. As such, its
338. In dissent Judge Rubin, who created the Civil Rights Legislation class the
author now teaches at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center correctly argues that the
majority slights the animus requirement. He goes too far, however, requiring the
plaintiff to show the defendant intended to prevent the operation of the laws. This
reversion to Collins aside, his animus argument overlooks the various ways equality
may be deprived by ascribing too inflexible an animus requirement to the Griffin
opinion. Griffin focused on the limiting effect of discriminatory animus, not the
relation of that animus to laws. Indeed, Griffin rejects the implication in Collins
that a private deprivation of "equal protection under the laws and equal privileges
and immunities under the laws." Judge Rubin, like the majority, was perhaps
misled by the mistakes of Novotny.
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position is vulnerable on several points. However, the most urgent
criticism, given its construct, is the constitutional authority for a
court to allow a cause of action for private violations of
constitutional rights that heretofore required state action.
(3) The Constitutionality of Scott
The discomforting implication of the Fifth Circuit's
presumption that violation of constitutional rights formed the only
basis for a deprivation under § 1985(3) is nowhere more evident
than in the court's apparent need to discuss the constitutional power
of Congress to enact § 1985(3) as it interprets it in Scott. Like the
Dombrowski court, the Fifth Circuit transforms Part V of the Griffin
opinion into an extension of that opinion's Part III. It notes that
"Griffin emphasized that it was unnecessary to test the
constitutionality of section 1985(3) in all conceivable applications
in order to sustain its facial constitutionality.- 3 9 Nor is § 1985(3)
unconstitutional "merely because it reaches wholly private
conspiracies. 340 However, the court's assumption that the statute
protects primarily against deprivations of constitutional rights
leaves it to read Griffin as finding a deprivation in the violation of
the right to interstate travel and the Thirteenth Amendment. It is
these rights that are said to be inherent in the Griffin finding of a
deprivation and which support the constitutionality of Congress'
power to enact § 1985(3) as applied.34'
Since the Fifth Circuit in Scott found the section violated,
through the private conspiracy's violation of a constitutional
provision, the First Amendment, it needed to confront the difficult
task of locating constitutional authority for prohibiting private
violations of rights normally thought to be violated by acts of the
state. Its Scott opinion seeks to locate such authority in Griffin 's
Part V; however, it misapprehends Part V of Griffin. That part
explained the various bases for constitutional authority to enact §
1985(3) itself; not the authority to protect underlying rights
independently. Indeed, there is no cause of action for violation of
the Thirteenth Amendment, as such; nor is there any cause of action
implied or express for the violation of the right to interstate travel.
For sure, there is nothing in Griffin that suggests that § 1985(3) was
such a statute creating such causes of action and, if it did, that
construction would not support the reading that requires
deprivations to be based on independent rights violations.
339. Scott, 680 F.2d at 996.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 997.
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What Part V does do is outline the broad remedial powers of
Congress under the Constitution to prohibit conspiracies, particularly
those that disrupt the relationship between a citizen and her state.
The various allegations of illegal activity in Griffin evidenced that the
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, such as the beating, had the
effect of reducing the value of the plaintiffs' rights as equal citizens.
Once this construct has been abandoned, the transformation of Part
V into a specific authorization section is understandable. It remains,
nevertheless, internally inconsistent with the Circuit's view of §
1985(3) as analogous to § 1983. It is the existence then of the
constitutional discussion that causes the most concern, for such a
discussion is wholly unnecessary under Griffin and virtually
impossible to make under the Novotny construct guiding the Circuit
in Scott.
By the time the Supreme Court was presented Scott for review,
nearly all the important questions have been framed by the significant
leap of the Novotny Court. The rather narrow question presented in
Scott, whether there ought be a state action requirement for
constitutional violations is unremarkable, but for the irony of
reweaving that requirement into a statute whose language is wholly
inconsistent therewith.342 The Fifth Circuit's opinion, birthed in
undeniable good intentions, ultimately sentences the statute to its
final demise.
CONCLUSION
On the surface, the move from Grffin to Bray seems to be a
manifestation of the ascendence of conservative justices. Even
considering the damage wrought by the Novotny and Scott decisions
to the Griffin conception of rights under § 1985(3), one remains
tempted to embrace the conservative justices' view, only moving the
advent of conservative retrenchment to the Burger rather than
Rehnquist eras. Closer inspection, however, shows that Griffin was
debased by sheepish and fearful efforts of more liberal minded judges
seeking to apply the statute in support of civil rights plaintiffs. The
activist insecurity prompted a narrowing of the statute and then its
generalization into a purely remedial corollary to constitutional
litigation under § 1983. Ultimately, it was this, as much as the
conservative trend in the courts that explained the statute's demise.
The conservative trend in the courts is quite real and has led to the
derogation of civil rights law. However, the activist insecurity is both
an independent explanation for the fate of civil rights law and a key
explanation of how the law changed in a way which facilitated the
342. I mean here the "going in disguise" language.
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conservative transformation. Indeed, the activist insecurity explains
why it has generally been unnecessary for conservative judges to
overrule civil rights law even while gutting it.

